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AN ENQUIRY INTO THE APPLICATION OF EU ANTI-DUMPING LAW 
WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO PAKISTAN 
Muhammad Bilal 
ABSTRACT 
Dumping is to unfairly sell goods at a lower price (at foreign market) as compared 
to their normal value at domestic market of the manufacturing country, thus 
causing material injury to the local industry of the importing country. Other 
researchers have explored the global (WTO Agreement) and the European 
Union’s (EU) Anti-Dumping law mostly with a commercial perspective. At 
doctoral level EU-China, EU-Japan and EU-Korea trade relations with reference 
to the application of protective measures have been studied. This dissertation is, 
however, the very first aimed to examine the application of EU Anti-Dumping 
law relating to Pakistan. This is a complete health check of EU-Pakistan trade 
relations with reference to the application of Anti-dumping duties on Pakistan.  
This study is a combination of doctrinal research and empirical research, whereby 
it critically evaluates the Commission’s investigation and the judgements of the 
EU Courts related to Pakistan and thus establish their consistency or 
inconsistency; it also studies the voting patterns within the Council and the impact 
of AD duties on Pakistani imports. It is a qualitative exploratory study based upon 
an inductive approach.  
Contradictions are found in the calculations of normal value and export price, 
constructed normal value, the comparison of normal value and export price, the 
calculation of dumping margin, and the calculation of injury. Suggestions are 
made as to the extent to which Unions’ anti-dumping rules need to be reviewed to 
moderate their tilt that unequivocally favours Union manufacturers. Moreover, 
this dissertation identifies many provisions of the basic regulation, which being 
too vague offers multiple interpretations, which are thus recommended to be 
amended.  
iv 
  
In the empirical part of this research the voting style of EU member states for or 
against the adoption of AD measures against Pakistan has been studied. 
Thereafter, the content analysis of stated reasons for specific voting styles reveals 
that the member states vote on the basis of the findings and conclusions of 
investigation as done by the Commission, thus trade partner loyalty is not the 
reason for their voting. Furthermore, application of the ADDs is found to be 
reason of import decline from Pakistan to the EU. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
PART I: INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS 
1.1 RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
Dumping is to export products into the market of another state at a lower price 
than their normal value (NV) in the exporting country. Sometimes such export 
price (EP) is even equal to or lower than the cost of manufacture of the product, 
and the budget of making reported by the relevant company through investigation 
is usually found to be erroneous.1 It is an unfair practice, as it causes damage to 
the home industry of the importer country. Therefore, in order to address this 
problem, almost all countries have now adopted Anti-Dumping laws to safeguard 
their local industry. However Finger opine that anti-dumping (AD) as practiced 
today is a combination of power politics, bad economics and shameful public 
administration.2  
Through last two decades the EU has imposed many AD duties on Pakistan 
through Council Regulation (EC) 384/96 and Council Regulation (EC) 
12225/2009. Commonly, cotton type bed linen, unbleached cotton fabric and 
polyethylene terephthalate had been the subject matter of these duties. A wide gap 
in research is intended to be filled because research about consistent and/or 
inconsistent procedures of the EU Commission through application of its AD 
duties is drastically needed as, it has not investigated before.  
                                                            
1 Ralf Boscheck, ‘The Governance of Global Market Relations: The Case of Substituting Antitrust 
for Anti-dumping’ (2001) 24(1) World Competition 41 
2 Michael Finger, ‘Reform’ in Michael Finger (ed), Anti-dumping- How it Works and Who Gets 
Hurt (Michigan University Press 1993) 57 
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Therefore, this study will originally contribute to the existing knowledge by 
analysing the actions and procedures of EU Commission, Council and judicature 
within the light of recurrent applicable AD law; and is attempting to identify the 
grey areas (provisions offering multiple interpretations) in the EU’s AD law 
which led to the controversial conclusions drawn by the EU institutions with 
specific reference to Pakistan. Subsequently, it is also significant to explore 
whether application of these AD duties on Pakistan affect the scale of imports 
from Pakistan. 
The in-depth examination of EU’s application of AD law related to Pakistan helps 
to understand certain application and interpretation issues associated with the 
EU’s basic AD regulation e.g. in Gul Ahmed v Council3, the EU Court of Justice 
and the General Court interpreted Article 3(7) of the basic regulation. Similarly, 
inconsistent calculations of the Dumping margin and Normal value as done by the 
Commission and the Council through multiple AD investigations related to 
Pakistan also signify the need explore and identify the problems. 
However, in order to explore the consistency of EU institutions, it is necessary to 
understand the historical development of global and EU AD framework. It is also 
required to understand the functioning and structural framework of the EU 
institutions. It is precisely described as follows. 
1.2 AIM AND OBJECTIVES OF THIS STUDY 
This dissertation aims to study the implementation and interpretation of EU AD 
laws by EU institutions including, the EU Court of Justice. How do EU 
institutions interpret same question of law falling under similar circumstances but 
in different cases? In this regard, in-depth analysis of all AD duties imposed on 
Pakistan through at least the last 20 years is carried out. And the 
interpretation/decision of investigative and judicial bodies is checked against 
corresponding cases and pertinent legislation. 
                                                            
3 Case C-638/11, Council of the European Union v Gul Ahmed Textiles Ltd [2013] OJ C 65; Case 
T-199/04, Gul Ahmed textiles Ltd v Council of the European Union [2011] ECR II-00321 
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Calculation of dumping margin, construction of normal value, fair comparison, 
adjustments to normal value or export price, other known factors and causal link 
are the most debateable topics of AD laws. Therefore, this dissertation aims to 
ascertain whether the EU Commission’s calculations regarding normal value etc. 
find their basis from relevant law and other judicial precedents or not. Moreover, 
this research is targeting the discretionary aspects of the AD laws, and will entail 
whether such discretionary interpretations tend to prejudice either of the parties to 
the litigation. In order to achieve this goal the AD duties imposed on Pakistani 
products including, cotton-type bed linen, polyethylene terephthalate, ethanol and 
staple fibre fabrics are analysed. 
Additionally, through deep analysis of Gul Ahmed case law, the multi-
dimensional interpretation of other known factors in Article 3(7) of Council 
Regulation 1225/2009 made by the General Court and the EU Court of Justice is 
aimed to be investigated within the context of scope of Article 3(7). Through such 
examination of legal debate involved in the said case, this study aims to conclude 
whether legislative amendments could be considered within the ambit of other 
known factors thus, if their non-attribution analysis is necessary or not? Similarly, 
the findings of this case are aimed to corroborate with the WTO panel report on 
the same subject matter of causal link analysis. 
Furthermore, the researcher intends to study the scope and reasons for the 
application of investigation of dumping against Pakistan’s bed linen. It will be 
suggested that zeroing practice does not have any basis in the WTO Agreement 
1995, and it is an unfair practice which may significantly prejudice fair trade. 
Through the analysis of advantages and disadvantages of zeroing practice the 
logic/ or otherwise of its basis shall be explored. This research aims to draw 
conclusions and make recommendations with regard to the future of this practice.  
This study inclines to find the basis for particular voting patterns of EU member 
states through imposition of different definitive AD duties on Pakistan. In this 
regard the data provided by the Council of the European Union is analysed, to 
figure out countries which have been mostly on Pakistan’s side and against it. 
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Later, EU member states are individually contacted to know the reasons for their 
specific voting patterns. Through the analysis of their replies it is aimed to 
conclude that either it was trade partner loyalty which instigated the member 
states to vote in favour of Pakistan or they voted purely on legal and technical 
grounds.  
Similarly, it is aimed to unearth whether different interest groups within the EU 
can influence the whole course of an investigation, and whether big countries 
usually succeed against the will of comparatively small countries. In the same 
way it will establish whether strong association and unity among different 
stakeholders helps them to get their interests secured. This dissertation has also 
supplementary objective: to find out if AD laws are really being used against 
unfair trade instead of fair and competitive trade.  
The dissertation also studies the scope and practical application of the Community 
interest clause, and tries to establish that sometimes the imposition of AD duty on 
foreign exports is not in the favour of the EU nationals, as they lose the 
opportunity to have access to cheap foreign exports. Although the Community 
interest clause entails analysis of interest of the whole Union, including all stake 
holders, as a matter of fact it is the public whose interest is least secured, as it 
does not have very strong associations like Union manufacturers. 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. How consistently do the EU institutions including the Commission and the 
EU Court of Justice interpret and implement AD law with reference to 
Pakistan? 
2. What were the voting patterns of the EU member states in the EU Council 
for imposition of duties on Pakistan and what were the reasons for those 
particular voting patterns? 
3. How does the imposition of AD duty affect the level of imports from 
Pakistan to EU? 
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1.4    RATIONALE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
Due to the existence of a gap in the available literature, a complete health check of 
EU-Pakistan trade relations in respect of the application of safeguard measures 
was drastically needed. An extensive research was needed examining the 
calculations of dumping margin and normal value etc. (as done by the 
Commission) through all investigations conducted by it related to Pakistan. It was 
also necessary to analyse whether some ambiguous provisions of the EU AD law 
led to its inconsistent interpretations as carried out by the investigative bodies 
(Commission and the Council) and Judicature (the General Court and EU Court of 
Justice). It was also necessary to establish whether these inconsistent approaches 
adopted by the institutions tend to jeopardise the application of the EU’s AD law. 
This research evaluates the trade relationships between Pakistan and the EU, 
specifically with reference to AD duties imposed on Pakistan. It provides a big 
picture covering maximum aspects of safeguard measures imposed on Pakistan 
and their background. The most important reason and logic of this study is that it 
is innovative and the very first in its nature on the topic of the consistency of EU 
AD laws regarding Pakistan. Although there are a couple of article written on the 
same general area, a study on the doctoral level has never been done. Similarly, 
the doctoral research has been done during 1993 to 2008 on EU-China, EU-Korea 
and EU-Japan trade relationships regarding AD duties, but EU-Pakistan mutual 
relationship in this area at doctoral level will be unearthed for the very first time 
by this thesis. 
Secondly, while going through the in depth-analysis of the subject matter of this 
study, it highlights many occasions where investigating bodies, by using their 
discretionary powers, have significantly changed the course of investigation. 
However, these in-depth analyses throughout this study help to understand the 
disadvantages of the discretionary powers available to the investigative bodies.  
It offers evidences through analysis of investigations (as conducted by the 
institutions) whereby Pakistani exports were unnecessarily targeted. In the same 
way it spots many occasions where the calculations of normal value, export price 
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and dumping margin etc. were not found to be well reasoned. The Commission 
may, however, have adopted other just ways offering more reliability and 
justification to its procedures. 
As the national AD laws and EC Regulation 1225/2009, are based upon the 
international guiding Agreement (WTO Agreement 1995), therefore indirectly the 
critical evaluation of the EU’s AD regime and corresponding recommendations 
also offer proposals to revise the ambiguous provisions of the WTO Agreement 
(which is quite older). Additionally, the removal of grey areas in the applicable 
legislation and procedures of the Commission and the Council can ultimately 
bring consistency in the whole mechanism of AD; and it may significantly help to 
reduce the litigation, as in most of the litigation the question of law is about the 
point of law, which is unclear bearing multiple interpretations of the concerned 
provisions. 
Similarly, through analysis of voting patterns of EU member states, cast in the EU 
Council for imposition of various AD duties, it can help to find the countries 
which usually support the imposition of duties on Pakistan and those which 
mostly support Pakistani exports to EU. The analysis of reasons for particular 
voting patterns helps to negate the presumption that usually trade partner loyalty 
is the reason for the voting styles of the member states.   
This study, however, unveils the multiple reasons for particular voting patterns of 
member states, as Union interest, manifest error of assessment by the 
Commission, and absence of material injury are found to be the most common 
grounds. The detailed reasons and logic for the specific voting pattern of each 
member state (discussed in detail in Chapter 8) may help Pakistani authorities to 
understand the rationale of specific voting pattern against or in support of them. 
Moreover, this study explores the nature of AD duties: whether they are 
predominantly legal and technical, or just political and strategic. As the 
Commission can impose only provisional AD duties, but their transformation in-
to definitive measures is only in the hand of the Council. And the Council is 
comprised of ministers from each member state, who vote on the basis of their 
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own interest. Therefore, it does not matter whether transparent and effective 
investigation is conducted by the Commission, as the final decision will be of the 
Council, based on the majority vote. 
Furthermore, it suggests to Pakistani exporters that they should co-operate 
properly with the Commission through the investigation of dumping. As it has 
been found in the bed linen case, when Pakistani exporters provided misleading 
information regarding profit margin and cost of production, and verification visits 
could not be completed due to an anonymous threatening letter to the 
investigation team; therefore the Commission had to base its decision on the best 
available information. And it resulted in the form of higher AD duties for 
Pakistani producers. But later through the revision of measures and upon 
rendering the correct information by Pakistan exporters, the duty rates were 
reduced for them. 
1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 The research methods used for this study are a fine combination of doctrinal and 
empirical research. This study is doctrinal, as it investigates the context of laws 
and particular provision therein, and interprets the actions of investigative bodies 
according to the essence and crux of statutes. A standard issue based doctrinal 
examination has been conducted by taking following steps: assembling relevant 
facts; identifying the legal issues; analysing the issues with a view to searching for 
the law;  locating and reading background information; locating and reading the 
primary sources including legislation and case laws; synthesizing all the issues in 
context; and coming to a tentative conclusion. 
But at the same time, the study also relies on the empirical data sought from the 
EU Parliament and member states. Later, it interprets such innovative and first 
hand data to bring more originality in the work and to confirm the theoretical part 
of the study based on doctrinal research with the recurrent practical evidence from 
the ground. 
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The data related to doctrinal part of this research, specifically related to first 
research question of this thesis was originated from following significant sources: 
regulations of the Commission and the Council of the European Union; the EU 
Council’s annual reports; Council regulation (EC) 1225/2009 (the basic 
regulation)4; the WTO panel reports; judgements of the General Court and of the 
EU Court of Justice; opinions of the advocate generals; news articles; journal 
articles and books. 
For the empirical part, addressing the second research question of this thesis; the 
EU Parliament was contacted and requested to provide data regarding voting 
patterns of EU member states; as they cast votes for the transformation of 
provisional AD duties into definitive ones. The EU Parliament duly provided the 
requested data. On the basis of data collected from the EU Parliament, individual 
member states of the EU were contacted and requested to give access to the 
information regarding particular voting patterns. They were asked to provide 
information about reasons for their particular voting pattern either YES to impose 
AD on Pakistan, or NO in favour of Pakistan. Similarly, in order to answer third 
research question of this dissertation, data about magnitude of import of specific 
imports from Pakistan is collected from Eurostat website. Thus, level of imports 
with and without application of ADD on Pakistan’s exports is compared to assess 
the impact of application of ADD. 
For data analysis, different approaches have been adopted to analyse diverse 
forms of data establishing the base of the doctrinal part of this research. The 
Golden, literal and mischief rules of interpretation are applied to analyse the 
Council’s and Commission’s regulations, official reports and statutes. Where the 
meaning and text of the statute is absolutely clear, no other rule except the Literal 
Rule is applied. The Golden Rule of interpretation is applied where the text of the 
statute or regulations of the Council or Commission is found to be unclear. Where 
                                                            
4 Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against dumped 
imports by the countries which are not member of European Community [2009] OJ L 343/51: 
(Regulation 37/2014 not being relevant to any of the investigations under discussion) 
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use of the Literal Rule may cause absurdity, recourse is made to the Golden Rule. 
This rule allows the interpreters to give meaning to unclear text based upon logic 
and reason, and reference to the context of the text. 
The Mischief Rule is applied where instead of some provision, the statute and its 
language cause absurdity on a large scale. Under the Mischief Rule, the Court’s 
role is to suppress the mischief the Act is aimed at and advance the remedy. It 
allows law to change as per the changing circumstance, although, it interrupts the 
rule of separation of power. 
However, in the EU context, it is important to also consider a fourth rule of 
interpretation – that is teleological approach. Inside of this wide interpretative 
rule, the Court picks an extensive variety of sources. It extracts the aims and 
objectives of the European Community not just from those announced in the texts 
of the EC Treaty, but additionally from affirmations by member states or by 
Community institutions. Where suitable, the Court looks for solutions in the laws 
of member states. Much of the time it depends on legislative history as, for 
instance, a prior legislative proposition from the Commission of the European 
Communities (‘Commission’) including situations where that proposition has 
been rejected.5 
In analysing the judgements of the EU Courts, two important concepts from 
English law were borne in mind: obiter dicta and ratio decidendi. A judge’s 
communication of view expressed in Court or in a transcribed judgement, but not 
vital to the decision and hence not legally obligatory as a precedent, (obiter dicta) 
must be segregated from the ratio decidendi (the point in a case which determines 
the judgment” or “the principle which the case establishes”).6  
 In this thesis at many points the operative and un-operative parts of the 
judgements were segregated, and use was made of the operative one. The most 
                                                            
5 Nial Fennelly, ‘Legal Interpretation at the European Court of Justice’ (1996) 20(3) Fordham 
International Law Journal 656, 664 
6 Alfred William Brian Simpson, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case and the Doctrine of Binding 
Precedent (Oxford University Press 1960) 3; Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed, 1979) 1135  
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recurrent example is the use of quotations from many judgements of the General 
court and the EU Court of Justice dealing with calculation of dumping margin, 
NV and EP etc. where the ratio decidendi of these judgements were used to 
corroborate or contradict the findings of EU Commission through their 
investigation of alleged dumping regarding Pakistan.  
The voting patterns and rationale for such voting were analysed by employing 
qualitative content analysis. Similarly, the impact of AD duties imposed on 
Pakistan was examined by comparing the level of imports from Pakistan with and 
without the enforced protective measures. 
1.6 RESEARCH GAP IN THE EXISTING LITERATURE 
It could be said that at doctoral level some researchers explored the EU’s 
application of AD laws regarding different jurisdictions. For example, by 
illustrating the AD legislation of the US, Australia, New Zealand and Japan 
insofar as it is applicable to China, Qian conducted comparative studies to reveal 
alternative strategies in order to suggest solutions to several of the problems thus 
identified.7 Eeckhout8 analyses European AD policy towards China; Suder 
analyses and discusses the relationships between EC-Japan trade policy and the 
competitiveness of the European Consumer Electronics industry.9 Alasdair Bell 
examined the EEC’s application of Anti-dumping measures against Japan.10 
Similarly, through a comparative study of AD laws in the EU and Korea within 
the context of international law, Chun identified protectionist bias in the 
application of the EU’s safeguard measures.11 
                                                            
7 Qian Wenjie, ‘An Analysis of the Legal Problems and Issues Arising from the European Union’s 
Current Anti-Dumping Legislation with Regard to the People’s Republic of China (PhD thesis, 
University of Glasgow 2003) 
8 Piet Eeckhout, ‘European Anti-Dumping Law and China’ (1997) 1(7) EIOP  
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=302667> accessed 20 December 2015 
9 Gabriele Suder, ‘Anti-Dumping Measures and the Politics of EU-Japan Trade Relations in the 
European Consumer Electronics Sector’ (PhD thesis, University of Bath 1993) 
10 Alasdair Bell ‘Anti-dumping practice of the EEC : The Japanese dimension’ (1987) 2 Legal 
Issues of European Integration 1 
11 Cheong-Ghi Chun, ‘A Comparative study of Anti-Dumping laws in the EU and Korea in the 
Context of International Rules’ (PhD thesis, University of Hull 1996) 
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But the EU’s application of AD laws with respect to Pakistan, and the consistency 
of its procedures, still needs to be unearthed. A few research articles have been 
written in this regard, but only a few of them seem to be written within legal 
perspective.  
None of them have paid relevant attention to the analysis of the investigation 
procedures of the EU Commission. Although, previous researchers have evaluated 
whether the EU Commission’s calculations about normal value, export price and 
dumping margin were according to the relevant provisions of the law or not? But 
an analysis about EU institution’s calculations and conclusions drawn through 
ADDs imposed on Pakistan was still lacking. Therefore, the current dissertation 
will originally establish either the consistency or inconsistency of the EU 
Commission’s investigative procedures and calculations as things stand today. 
Additionally, most of the pieces of literature have been written by economists 
discussing the financial and economic aspects of AD duties through their 
quantitative studies. Therefore, the legal aspect of EU AD duties generally, and 
more specifically with respect to Pakistan, still needs to be evaluated. 
Furthermore, the AD duties imposed on Pakistan in the last two decades are not 
studied yet; this research will explore all of them including the investigation 
procedures of the Commission, and the levying or withdrawal of duties. Similarly, 
the existing literature particularly related to EU-Pakistan trade disputes, is also 
lacking in another way, as researchers have rarely examined and critically 
evaluated the judgements of the General Court and EU Court of Justice in terms 
of their interpretations of legal provisions.  
This thesis, therefore, will establish the consistencies/inconsistencies in the 
application of AD laws by the EU institutions including the EU Court of Justice. 
A separate chapter of this dissertation explores and analysis the interpretation of 
‘causal link’ and ‘other known factors’ in the light of Article 3(7) of the basic 
regulation and other case laws. The said chapter thus originally concludes that 
instead of the EU Court of Justice’s verdict, the interpretation as it is made by the 
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General Court is more logical and close to the literal meaning of Article 3(7) of 
the basic regulation. 
Another way by which this research will fill the gap in existing literature is that it 
will explore the voting patterns of the EU member states for or against the 
imposition of AD on Pakistani products. It will also analyse the same in terms of 
the Commission’s proposal for extension or termination of existing protective 
measures. Conclusively, this study is trying to identify the countries mostly voting 
in favour of or against Pakistan. In short there are many areas which still need to 
be addressed with reference to the EU’s trade policy towards Pakistan, and this 
thesis potentially aims to address all those issues which are still untouched. 
1.7 STRUCTURE OF THIS THESIS 
This thesis comprises of seven chapters. Chapter 1 is an introduction, giving the 
brief background of the study, rationale of the research and research questions. It 
explains the research methods used for this study. It also establishes the gap in the 
existing literature and justifies that, how this study will fill it. 
Chapter 2, 3 and 4 analyse and discuss the AD duties imposed on Pakistan by the 
EU through the last two decades. Chapter two examines the AD imposed on all 
other Pakistani products except the textile sector, including polyethylene 
terephthalate and ethanol, while chapters three and four discuss the AD imposed 
on Pakistan’s textile products, including cotton-type bed linen and staple fibre 
fabrics. These chapters study the procedures and course of investigation as it is 
conducted by the Commission. It identifies the possible ways which may be used 
to change the nature and outcome of the AD investigations. However, these 
chapters at the end conclude with possible recommendations to bring further 
consistency in the relevant provisions of law. 
Chapter five analyses the findings of the General Court and the EU Court of 
Justice in Gul Ahmed case. It evaluates the interpretation of Article 3(7) about 
‘other known factors’ and ‘causal link’ as it is made by both courts within the 
context of other cases falling in similar circumstances and WTO Panel reports. 
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Through identification of grey areas in the said interpretation, at the end this 
chapter concludes by giving recommendations accordingly.  
Chapter six explores the voting design of EU member states for imposition of 
definitive measures on Pakistan. Further, it critically analyses the various 
motivations for different voting patterns of the EU member states. It examines the 
edge and advantage available to those stakeholders which are united in the form 
of association, over other stakeholders which are not so united.  
The last chapter is the crux of the whole debate, as it is set out in the previous 
chapters. It concludes the whole story through analysis of all points of concerns 
raised in different chapters of the thesis. At the end it concludes with 
recommendations regarding procedures of the institutions, consistency and 
uniformity of the relevant provisions of the law. It describes the limitations of the 
study and at the end mentions the further dimensions of research in the same area. 
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PART II: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS, KEY CONCEPTS AND 
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF THE EU 
1.8 DEVELOPMENT OF THE WTO ANTI-DUMPING 
AGREEMENT 1995 
Initially these safeguard measures were being used by few industrialised countries 
including the USA, the UK, Canada and Australia, but with the passage of time 
they are now being used globally. The situation, however, gets worse, when 
different countries adopted AD laws being inconsistent with each other. In order 
to synchronize the whole AD regime, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) 1947 was launched as binding rules at international level.12 The 
signatories of this agreement were required to orchestrate their national laws in 
accordance with Article VI of the said agreement which specifically relate with 
AD matters.13  
Due to the many effectiveness and enforceability issues attached with this 
agreement, it was revised through the Kennedy Round 1963, and resultantly 
reforms in the form of extended and effective binding force of agreement were 
agreed in Geneva on 30th June 1967.14 The 1967 AD code again went through 
reforms by the Tokyo Round; consequently, a new Agreement on Implementation 
of Article VI of GATT was concluded on 30 June 1979.15 For the first time it 
provided for the segregation of injury caused by dumped imports from injury 
caused by other known factors. 
GATT 1979 was once again revised in the Uruguay Round, which concluded the 
‘Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
                                                            
12 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (10th April 1947) 
<https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/prewto_legal_e.htm> accessed 10 May 2015 
13 Edwin Vermulst, EU Anti-dumping Law and Practice (2nd edition, Sweet & Maxwell 2010) 6 
14 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(24th April 1967) TN.64/NTB/W/19 
<https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/91890175.pdf> accessed 10 June 2015 
15 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1st 
January 1980) <https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/prewto_legal_e.htm> accessed 10 
June 2015 
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and Trade 1994’ (Anti-Dumping Agreement).16 It was included in Annex IA of 
the WTO Agreement with other multilateral agreements automatically binding on 
all WTO members. It introduced the provisions regarding verification visits, use 
of best available information in case of non-cooperation and use of average export 
price. It is now also called WTO Agreement 1995, and all members of the WTO 
automatically become signatories of the Agreement; however, 27 of them are 
observers. 
 
Figure 1.1: A World Map of WTO Membership 
Source: Adapted from 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm 
   Members 
   Members, dually represented by the European Union  
   Observers 
   Non-members 
 
                                                            
16 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (“GATT 1994”) (15th April 1994) 
<https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_e.pdf> accessed 10 June 2015 
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1.9 DEVELOPMENT OF THE EU ANTI DUMPING 
FRAMEWORK 
1.9.1 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EU AND EU’S ANTI-DUMPING 
INFRASTUCTURE THROUGH TREATIES OF THE EU 
These are two core functional treaties, the Treaty on European Union (originally 
signed in Maastricht in 1992) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (originally signed in Rome in 1958 as the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community), which lay out how the EU operates, and there are a 
number of satellite treaties which are interconnected with them. The treaties 
provide for the establishment of European institutions including the European 
Parliament, the Council of Ministers, the Commission and the Court of Justice. 
They also prescribe the powers, functions, limitations and procedures of these 
institutions.17   
These treaties have been amended many times through the last 65 years, however; 
the consolidated version of the above mentioned two basic treaties is published 
every year by the EU Commission. The most recent amendment was made in 
2007 by the Lisbon Treaty which came into force in 2009.18 The treaty on the 
functioning of the European Union discusses in detail the functioning, policies 
and procedures of the EU. It is divided into seven parts; Articles 205-207 of part 5 
deal with the common commercial (trade) policy of the EU. However, part 6 deals 
with the structure and formation of the institutions of the EU in detail.19 
Similarly, Article 13 of the Treaty on the European Union provides for the 
establishment of all European institutions and Articles 21 and 22 deal with the 
external actions and foreign policy of the EU.20 
                                                            
17 Damian Chalmers, Gareth Davies and Giorgio Monti, European Union Law: Text and Materials 
(Cambridge University Press 2014) 1-46 
18 Treaty on Functioning of the European Union (Treaty of Lisbon as amended) 
19 Ibid, part 5 and 6 
20 Treaty on European Union, art 21 and 22 
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Table 1.1: Transition of European Treaties as from 1948 to Date 
Source: Developed by the author 
Signed 1951 1954 1957 1965 1975 1985 1986 1992 1997 2001 2007 
Enforced 1952 1955 1958 1967 N/A 1985 1987 1993 1999 2003 2009 
Document Paris 
Treaty 
Modified 
Brussels 
Treaty 
Rome 
Treaties 
Merger 
Treaty 
European 
Council 
Conclusion 
Schengen 
Treaty 
Single 
European 
Act 
Maastricht 
Treaty 
Amsterdam 
Treaty 
Nice 
treaty 
Lisbon 
Treaty 
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1.9.2 DEVELOPMENT OF EU’S BASIC ANTI-DUMPING 
REGULATIONS 
As far as the EU AD framework and its developments are concerned, the first EU 
AD rules were framed in 1968, when responsibility for commercial policy and 
tariffs was substantially transferred from member states to the Union.21 However, 
a new set of rules was proclaimed after the succession to Article VI of GATT AD 
code in 1979.22 And it was later amended in 1982.23 The reforms made in 1984 
significantly called for the statement of reasons for reaching a particular decision 
regarding imposition or termination of duties.24 To prevent the circumvention of 
AD duties, a controversial procedure was adopted in 1987; which entails the 
establishment of assembly plants within the Union.25  
Originally, the EU Court of Justice had jurisdiction regarding AD and anti-
subsidy proceedings26, but in 1994, these powers were transferred to the General 
court. The major changes to the WTO Agreement 1995 were reflected in in EU 
regulation (EC) 384/96.27 The rules relating to the comparison of prices and 
calculation of dumping margin were amended through Council Regulation (EC) 
                                                            
21 Regulation (EEC) 459/68 of 5 April 1968 on protection against dumping or the granting of 
bounties or subsidies by countries which are not members of the European Economic Community 
[1968] OJ L 93 
22 Council Regulation (EEC) No 3017/79 of 20 December 1979 on protection against dumping or 
granting of bounties or subsidies by the countries which are not members of the European 
Economic Community [1979] OJ L 339 
23 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1580/82 of 14 June 1982 amending regulation (EEC) No 3017/79  
on protection against dumped or subsidised imports by the countries which are not members of the 
European Economic Community [1982] OJ L 178 
24 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2176/84 of 23 July 1984 on protection against dumping or 
granting of bounties or subsidies by the countries which are not members of the European 
Economic Community [1984] OJ L 201 
25 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1761/87 of 22 June 1987 amending Regulation No (EEC) 
2176/84 on protection against dumped or subsidised imports by the countries which are not 
members of the European Economic Community [1987] OJ L 167 
26 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), art 251-286 
27 Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 of 22 December 1995 on protection against dumped or 
subsidised imports by the countries which are not members of the European Community [1996] OJ 
L56 
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2331/96.28 In 1998, changes were made to facilitate exporters from China and 
Russia.29 However, these changes were later amended in 2000 and 2002 along 
with other amendments in the basic regulation. 
 The rules regarding simple majority voting in the Council were amended in 
2004.30 With the enlargement of the EU in 2004, the application of existing rules 
was extended to the new member states. The most current form of the basic 
regulation is (EC) 1225/2009; which is more consistent and clear as compared to 
its counterparts, as, for the first time it introduced rules regarding “lesser duty 
rule” and “community interest clause”.31 
The regulation applied to dumped imports from WTO signatories and non-
signatory countries alike. Although the WTO Agreement provides that special 
regard shall be given by the advanced countries to the special circumstances of the 
developing counties, when applying ADD on imports originating from the latter 
the EU basic regulation does not provide as such. The regulation applies only to 
products including agricultural products but not to services.32 
1.10 REGULATION (EC) 1225/2009 IN A NUTSHELL: KEY 
CONCEPTS 
In order to evaluate the investigations as carried out by the Commission, it is 
necessary to understand the basic concepts of the AD law, as the whole discussion 
of core chapters of this thesis (Chapters 4,5,6 and 7) involves the debate about the 
Commission’s’ and Council’s calculations of NV, EP, dumping margin, Union 
interest etc. 
                                                            
28 Council Regulation (EC) No 2331/96 of 2 December 1996 amending Regulation No (EC) 
384/96  on protection against dumped or subsidised imports by the countries which are not 
members of the European Community [2000] OJ L  257 
29 Council Regulation (EC) No 905/98  of 27 April 1998 amending Regulation No (EC) 384/96  on 
protection against dumped or subsidised imports by the countries which are not member of 
European Community [1998] OJ L  128 
30 Council Regulation (EC) No 461/2004 of 27 April 1998 amending Regulation No (EC) 384/96 
on protection against dumped imports by the countries which are not member of European 
Community [2004] OJ L 77 
31 Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against dumped 
imports by the countries which are not member of European Community [2009] OJ L 343/51 
32 Above (n 13), 25 
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According to article 1(1) of EC Regulation 1225/2009 (hereinafter referred as 
basic regulation), a merchandise is considered to be dumped if its free circulation 
in the market of importing country causes material damage to the domestic 
market. A product is considered to be dumped if its EP is less than its NV in the 
exporting country.33 
This is the price of exported commodity actually paid by the independent 
consumer in the ordinary course of business in the exporting country. In case of 
insufficient sale of the like product or due to the compensatory arrangements 
between exporter and importer; normal value may be calculated by adding cost of 
production in country of origin; SG&A costs and adequate profit margin.34 
Export price is the price paid by retailers, importers or independent buyers when 
such -product is destined for consumption from exporting country to the Union. 
However, in order to construct a reliable export price, Article 2(9) of the basic 
regulation provides for the adjustments of duties, direct or indirect taxes sustained 
between import and resale.35 
Article 2(10) asks for a fair comparison to be drawn between NV and EP. It 
should be drawn at the same level of trade and as much as possible transactions 
made at the same time should be compared. To draw a fair comparison, wherever 
it is justified adjustment shall be made to export price or normal value. Any 
duplication with regard to rebate or discounts shall be avoided while making 
adjustments.36 
According to article 2(12) this is the difference or gap by which NV exceeds the 
EP of the exported product. An average dumping margin may be calculated if 
dumping margin varies.37 
                                                            
33 Council Regulation No (EC) 1225/2009, art 1(1) 
34 Ibid, art 2(1) 
35 Ibid, art 2(9) 
36 Van Bael and Ballis, EU Anti-Dumping and other Trade Defence Instruments (5th Edition, 
Kluwer Law International 2011) 104 
37 Council Regulation No (EC) 1225/2009, 2(12) 
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The existence of Dumping margin shall be based on comparison of the weighted 
average EP and the weighted average NV or on the basis of comparison of 
individual NV to individual EP on a transaction-to-transaction basis. 
Nevertheless, if export price differs significantly from transaction to transaction 
among different purchases or regions, then it may be compared with the average 
normal value individually.38 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Article 3(1) of the basic regulation requires establishing material injury or 
material threat of injury being caused to the Union market in order to prove 
dumping. In this regard quantum of dumped imports, their influence on the prices 
of like product in the Union and their impact on the Union market shall be 
analysed.39 
Injury caused by all other known factors shall be differentiated from the injury 
caused by the dumped imports. A causal link needs to be established between 
                                                            
38 Above (n 17) 
39 Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009, art 3(1) 
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Figure 1.2: Explaining the calculation method of dumping margin 
Source: Developed by the author 
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alleged injury and alleged dumping. A non-attribution analysis is required by 
Article 3(7) before conclusion of findings in respect of source of injury; as 
domestic industry may also deteriorate due to multiple factors; including 
reduction of demand or production of like product within Union or inflation.40 
Under Article 5(1) of the basic regulation, a written complaint may be filed by 
any natural or legal person to the Commission along with sufficient evidence 
establishing causal link among dumped imports and injury. Nevertheless, no 
inquiry will be started when Union manufacturers explicitly back up the 
complaint account below 25% of total manufacture of the product concerned 
manufactured by the Union industry.41 
Under Article 6, the Commission will investigate the elements of dumping and 
injury. Questionnaires will be sent to all interested parties and they are to reply 
within 30 days. The Commission may seek co-operation or further information 
from member states whenever it is necessary. The Commission is bound to 
conclude the investigation within 15 months from the initiation of proceedings 
under Article 6(9).42 
A provisional AD duty can be levied if initial enquiry reveals substantial injury 
and significant threat to the Union industry. Such measures can be imposed not 
before two months of initiation of proceedings or later than 8 months after 
initiation. These measures will be imposed as a matter of security which would be 
released if outcome of the provisional investigation is negative. Article 7(2) 
provides that such provisional measures should not exceed dumping margin, 
instead lesser duty rule should be applied. This measure expires after six months 
of imposition; however it may be further extended for three months.43  
The Commission possibly will admit suitable undertaking submitted by any trader 
to review its prices or to terminate exports at lower prices if, after a particular 
                                                            
40 Ibid, art 3(7) 
41 Ibid, art 5(1) 
42 Ibid, art 6(9) 
43 Above (n 17) 
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session of the Advisory Committee, it is contented that the adverse outcome of the 
dumping is thereby eradicated.44 
According to Article 9(1), proceeding may be terminated in case of withdrawal of 
complaint by the complainant. Similarly, it may be terminated after consultation 
and agreement of the Advisory Council, if, after the investigation, the 
Commission concludes that imposition of AD duty is unnecessary. Otherwise the 
Commission will submit proposal of termination in the Council and later will 
decide about it within one month.45 Additionally, Article 9(3) provides for the 
instant termination where it is well-founded that the verge of dumping is below 2 
%, quantified as a proportion of the EP. 
If the Commission’s investigation reveals that the Union market is being 
significantly damaged by dumped foreign imports, and Union interest calls for 
intervention, then the EU Council can impose definitive AD duty on the proposal 
of the Commission after consulting the Advisory Council. The proposal can only 
be approved by the Council if it is supported by simple majority vote. Such 
proposal for definitive duties should be approved at least one month before the 
expiry of provisional measures.46 
Under Article 9(6) any AD duty levied on imports from manufacturers which 
were not involved in the investigation but within the meaning of article 17 they 
have made themselves known will not surpass the weighted average margin of 
dumping calculated for the exporters in the sample. In this regard, the 
Commission shall disregard any zero and de minimis margins.47 
A definitive AD measure will terminate five years from its levying or five years 
from the date of the conclusion of the utmost current review which has covered 
both dumping and injury, except if it is concluded in a review that the termination 
would be likely to lead to a perpetuation or reappearance of dumping and injury. 
                                                            
44 Ibid, art 8(1) 
45 Ibid, art 9(1) 
46 Ibid 
47 Ibid, art 9(6); Van Bael and Ballis, EU Anti-Dumping and other Trade Defence Instruments (5th 
Edition, Kluwer Law International 2011) 135 
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The Commission may, where it thinks suitable, conduct verification visits at the 
premises of exporters, importers, agents, traders and trade associations to verify 
the accounts and information submitted by the parties regarding their cost of 
production, profit margin or normal value etc. In the absence of appropriate and 
well-timed reply, verification visits cannot be conducted.48 
Under Article 17(1) where a huge number of exporters, importers, complainants, 
types of products or different type of transaction are involved, the Commission 
may use a sampling technique, which should be statistically valid, representing 
maximum production from the country under investigation. In case of non-
cooperation by many sampled complainants or exporters, resampling can be done 
if it does not involve significant difficulty to continued investigation.49 
Article 18(1) state that in case any interested party denies access to the relevant 
information, tries to impede or interrupt the investigation process, or provides 
misleading information; the Commission may disregard such information and 
may make use of the best available information.50 
The Commission is supposed to undertake Community interest analysis before 
any final decision. In this regard the interest of all stakeholders within the Union 
including importers, manufacturers and consumers shall be analysed and every 
interested party shall be provided with an opportunity to be heard. AD duty may 
not be applied even if a product is being dumped in the Union market; if the 
Commission concludes that such imposition of AD duty is against the public 
interest at large in the Union.51  
                                                            
48 Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009, art 16(1) 
49 Ibid, art 17(1) 
50 Ibid, art 18(1) 
51 Ibid, art 21(1) 
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Figure 1.3: Explaining the Course of Investigation in Anti-dumping Cases 
Source: Adapted from <trade.ec.europa.eu> 
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1.11 ATTEMPTS TO REFORM EU’S TRADE DEFENSE INSTRUMENT 
In late 2006, European Commissioner for Trade Peter Mandelson initiated a 
process of consultation with all stakeholders with the aim of possible reforms of 
the basic regulation. The idea behind the Green Paper was that, because over the 
last ten years the European trading framework had changed (as many EU 
producers outsourced their production outside the EU), it was necessary to re-
examine how all stakeholders (exporters, importers, consumers and member 
states) viewed the current trade defence system of the EU.52  
The main issues to be discussed through these reform consultations included: 
increased transparency in the EU’s trade defence procedures; a reassessment of 
retailers’ and consumers’ interest in ADD proceedings; safeguarding the interest 
of small businesses; and re-evaluation of the criteria for launching AD 
investigations and implementing measures. The Commission sent questionnaires 
to and held detailed consultations with all stakeholders including producers, 
importers and consumers.  
However, in 2008 the reform process failed, as it was against the interest of Union 
producers. According to Bièvre, the Union producers were well-organised and 
they effectively lobbied with the influential member states to get their interest 
secured. The importers and consumers, however (being isolated), could not 
sufficiently make their case and failed in their lobbying activities in Brussels.53  
Later, in 2012, in order to modernise the EU’s trade defence instrument, the 
Commission held a public consultation which attracted more than 300 replies 
from all stakeholders. On the basis of this consultation process and suggestions 
                                                            
52 Dirk De Bièvre and Jappe Eckhardt, ‘Interest Groups and the Failure of EU Antidumping 
Reform’ (Paper for the Workshop ‘The EU in the World Economy’ Lisbon, 2009) 
https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/943248f2-963c-4eee-bc1d-6cbdc900555b.pdf accessed on 
14th July 2016 
53 Ibid 
31 
  
received, an independent study was finalised which pin-pointed the areas of 
improvement in the basic regulation.54  
These suggestions enclosed in the actual proposal included: increased 
transparency and predictability for businesses concerning the imposition of 
provisional measures (before their imposition); initiation of AD proceedings on 
the Commission’s own initiative (ex officio) without any official complaint by 
Union industry and finally that a higher level of protection would be granted in 
certain cases, and the review process would be optimised.55  
In respect of this proposal, the ordinary process of legislative amendment is 
continuing within the EU Council and the Parliament. The Parliament completed 
the first reading of the draft and voted a legislative resolution in April 2014. At 
that time, the Commission also took note of four points with the view of their 
adoption, as the legislative procedure advanced.56 
While interpreting Article 9(5) of the basic regulation the Appellate Body 
concluded that a general perception is that, the exporting producers operating in 
the non-market economies are not entitled to the individual treatment. Thus the 
onus of proof is upon the exporters to establish that they qualify for the individual 
treatment. According to the Appellate Body57, WTO agreements do not provide 
any basis for such a presumption. Thus the Panel noted that Article 9(5) do not 
corroborate with the Article 6.10 and 9.2 of the WTO Agreement. Therefore, in 
                                                            
54 COM (2013) 191 final, Modernisation of Trade Defence Instruments-Adapting Trade Defence 
Instruments to the Current Needs of the European Economy (Brussels, 10 April 2013); Panos 
Koutrakos,  Modern Studies in European Law: EU International Relations Law (2nd Edition, Hart 
publishing 2015) 377 
55 Ibid 
56 COM (2015) 385 final, 33rd Annual Report from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament on the EU's Anti-Dumping, Anti-Subsidy and Safeguard activities (Brussels 
3 August 2015) 
57 WT/DS397/AB/R, Appellate Body Report, European Communities- Definitive Anti-Dumping 
Measures on Certain Iron  or Steel Fasteners from China (Adopted on 15th July 2015) 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/397abr_e.pdf  
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order to fulfil the guiding principles of the Appellate Panel, Article 9(5) was 
amended accordingly.58 
Similarly, the amended Article 17 provides that any ADD imposed on imports 
from manufacturers which were not made part of the sample but they intended to 
co-operate being the part of sample shall not surpass the weighted average 
dumping margin calculated for exporters in the sample, regardless of the fact that 
NV for such traders is calculated in accordance of subparagraph (a) of Article 2(7) 
or Article 2(1) to (6).59 
In May 2016, the Commission took some steps to increase transparency in its 
trade defence investigations and communication with stakeholders. In the trade 
defence case on hot rolled steel and paper from China, the Commission published 
an executive summary containing additional information about the complaint. To 
improve access to information, it will now publish an executive summary of any 
request for the initiation of a review or fresh investigation. Moreover, the 
Commission will establish a new online forum improving communication among 
all stakeholders. These steps are taken in order to increase the transparency of EU 
trade defence procedures.60  
1.12 EU INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK BREAKDOWN 
1.12.1 EU COMMISSION 
This is the executive branch of the Union. It is entrusted with the duty to 
implement the Treaty and executing Council’s decisions.61 The EU Commission 
is comprised of 28 Commissioners, at least one from each member state of the 
                                                            
58 Regulation (EU) No 765/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2012 
amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 on protection against dumped imports from 
countries not members of the European Community [2012] OJ L 237/01 
59 Regulation (EU) No 1168/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 
2012 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 on protection against dumped imports 
from countries not members of the European Community [2012] OJ L 344/1 
60 European Commission Directorate-General for Trade, ‘The Commission Increases Transparency 
of its Trade Defence Procedures’ (News, 19 May 2016) 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1500> accessed 14 July 2016 
61 Article 294, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
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EU.62 Commission decisions are adopted by simple majority vote.63 It is 
comprised of 49 Directorate–General (‘DGs’) however; the Directorate-General 
of trade is responsible for implementing the common commercial policy (CCP). 
Within this Directorate-General, Directorate H is responsible for implementing 
the trade defence instrument. They are supposed to work independently and with 
integrity and their aim is to safeguard the mutual benefit of the Union as a whole. 
It does not mean that they should overlook or ignore their national interest 
altogether instead they are supposed to look at their national interest through the 
lens of Union interest. A Commissioner can be appointed for a maximum period 
of five years, and he/she can only be impeached by the EU Court of Justice on the 
grounds of misconduct.64 Post Lisbon Treaty the seats of Commissioners have 
now been divided corresponding to the population of the member countries.65 
For purpose of the common commercial policy, the Commission is in fact an 
investigative body, which starts its investigation after the initiation of a complaint. 
It undertakes the injury analysis and dumping analysis; it can also construct the 
normal value and calculate the dumping margin. It can conduct verification visits 
to verify the information submitted to it by interested parties. After conclusion of 
the proceedings it can terminate proceedings if no evidence of dumping is found; 
otherwise a provisional duty may be imposed for a maximum period of 15 
months.66 However, under the new rules concerning the mechanisms for control 
by member states, the EU Commission will also impose definitive measures 
subject to approval of the committee of the representatives of the member states 
(discussed in detail in section 1.13). 
                                                            
62 Article 245 TFEU 
63 Article 250 TFEU 
64 Article 246 TFEU 
65 Paul Craig and Grainne Burca, ‘EU Law Text Cases and Materials’ (Sixth edition, Oxford 
University Press 2015) 39 
66 Ibid, 35 
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1.12.2 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
The Council is the political forum/institution of the European Union, where every 
minister can openly protect its (their country’s) interest within the Union through 
their voting power. Therefore, here, unlike with the Commission, Union interest is 
looked at through the lens of national interest-and this is often more or less tinted. 
It sets the basic policies and paradigms of the Union’s trade with the rest of the 
world. The Council is the main legislative body and decision making authority in 
all major affairs which take decisions by unanimity, qualified or simple majority 
depending upon the nature of issue.67  
The Council’s secretariat is based in Brussels. It consists of at least one delegate 
from each member state, the identity of the delegate however, varies as the subject 
matter of decision changes. Pursuant to entry into force of Regulation (EU) 
37/2014, the role of the Council in AD matters is curtailed, as it is substituted by 
the committee of the representatives of the member states.68 However, in this 
committee too, a qualified majority vote is required to impose definitive AD 
duties, and the member states who abstain from voting will be deemed to have 
voted yes. 
1.12.3 THE COMMITTEE OF PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES 
This Committee is a subsidiary of the Council, which undertakes all the 
supplementary work for the Council of Ministers. It is comprised of permanent 
representatives appointed by each member country, and they are based in 
Brussels. The Committee of permanent representatives is divided into two groups 
COREPER I (abbreviation of French name) is comprised of deputy permanent 
representatives who give advice on technical and legal matters; while COREPER 
II consists of permanent representatives, and they assist ministers in financial, 
institutional and political matters.69  
                                                            
67 Article 16(3) TEU 
68 Above (n 13), 5 
69 Ibid, 8 
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1.12.4 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
These are public representatives directly elected by public vote. They are not 
members of national parliaments, neither they are answerable to their national 
governments. In fact they represent the common will of the people of the Union. 
A member of Parliament is elected for a period of five years. The number of seats 
is distributed among member states corresponding to their population size. Thus 
big countries get more seats as compared to the smaller ones. 
The EU Parliament can pass or reject the annual budget if it has important 
reasons. It can influence the Commission, as the appointment of Commissioners is 
subject to the approval of the EU Parliament. In most matters, while the European 
Parliament is now a co-legislator with the Council of European Union to the latter, 
in some cases, the Council is still only required to consult Parliament.70 It plays a 
larger role in negotiating trade agreements with third countries. Along with the 
Council, it is also entrusted with obligation to check if any such agreement is 
negotiated according to the internal policy of the Union.71 
1.12.5 THE EU COURT OF JUSTICE 
The Court is comprised of 28 judges one from each member state72, along with 
(originally) eight advocate generals for the assistance of the Court, since 2015, the 
number of advocate generals has been eleven. The advocates general are duty 
bound to submit their submission with complete impartiality.73 The Judges are 
appointed for a maximum six-year period by the common accord of the 
governments.74 The Judges then appoint their president for a renewable period of 
two years. The court sits in chambers, grand chambers or full chambers. In cases 
of dismissal of members of the Commission, the court meets in full chamber.75 
However, one proposal of the Lisbon Treaty was that there should be an advisory 
                                                            
70 Above (n  65) 
71 Art 207 TFEU 
72 Art 253 TFEU 
73 Art 252 TFEU 
74 Art 253 TFEU 
75 Art 251 TFEU 
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panel, which should be discussed regarding appointment of judges and advocate 
generals. Secondly, it proposes to increase the number of advocate generals. 
The court is authorised to ensure the implementation of treaties and to interpret 
them wherever they are ambiguous. Moreover, if the aggrieved parties are not 
happy with the findings of the Commission or the imposition of definitive 
measures by the administrative institutions, they can challenge their actions in the 
General Court (action for annulment), with a possible avenue of appeal to the 
Court of Justice.76 A direct action for failure to act may be brought by any 
institution, member state or individual who has been directly affected by any 
institution’s failure to act.77 The Court acts as an international court regarding 
disputes between the states or a member state and the Commission. The court can 
annul the acts of the Commission and the Council, on the grounds that they lack a 
suitable legal basis in the applicable treaty. 
1.12.6 THE GENERAL COURT 
The General Court (GC) also consists of 28 judges, one from each member state.78 
The judges appoint their president themselves for a period of six years which is 
renewable. There are no permanent advocate generals in this court, however in 
particular circumstances any judge may ask to perform the role of advocate 
general, and in that case his responsibilities will be identical to an advocate 
general of the Court of Justice.79 The method of appointment of judges is similar 
to the appointment procedure of judges of the Court of Justice.80 It sits in 
chambers of five judges or a single judge. In 75% cases it sits in chambers of 
three judges. It may also sit as a grand chamber or full court, if the complexity of 
the issue demands so.81  
                                                            
76 Art 263 TFEU 
77 Art 265 TFEU 
78 Art 19(2) TEU 
79 Paul Craig and Grainne Burca, EU Law Text Cases and Materials (Sixth edition, Oxford 
University Press 2015) 59 
80 Above (n 17) 
81 Protocol (No 3) On the Statute of Court of Justice of the European Union [2010] OJ C 83/210, 
art 50 
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The GC performs a number of different duties.  An Appeal may be filed against a 
decision of the civil tribunal in the General court. The GC can bring an action of 
annulment or action of damages if EU institutions, including Parliament and 
Council, do not perform according to the treaties. It can also take an action under 
an arbitration clause to resolve a matter between two parties.  
More importantly, any aggrieved party can challenge the imposition of 
provisional or definitive AD duties in front of the GC.82 An Appeal can be filed in 
the ECJ within two months of promulgation of a decision by the GC. The appeal 
is limited only to questions of law and it covers infringement of EU law by the 
GC, lack of competence of the GC and breach of procedure before it which 
adversely affects any interested party.83 
1.13 AMENDMENTS TO THE EU INVESTIGATIVE AUTHORITIES’ 
FUNCTIONING POST REGULATION (EU) 37/2014 
The basic regulation divided the powers between the Commission and the 
Council, whereby the Commission was responsible for imposing provisional 
measures, while definitive measures were to be approved by the Council on the 
basis of the Commission’s proposal. This approach was, however, amended by 
Omnibus I Regulation. The reforms of decision-making procedures in the CCP 
and the said regulation eliminated the Council’s role in respect of approval of 
definitive measures. However, the Commission became more powerful, as it is 
now responsible for implementing both provisional and definitive measures.84 
As the Council’s and the Advisory Council’s roles are curtailed, the member 
states acquired a more active consultation role after this amendment. In areas, 
such as, acceptance of undertaking, initiation or non-initiation of expiry reviews, 
and adoption and extension of suspended measures, the Commission must take 
                                                            
82 Art 256 TFEU 
83 Council Decision of 26 April 1999 amending Decision 88/591/ECSC, EEC, Euratom 
establishing a Court of First Instance of the European Communities to enable it to give decisions 
in cases when constituted by a single judge [1999] OJ L 114/52 
84 Regulation (EU) 37/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 January 2014 
amending certain regulations relating to the common commercial policy as regards the procedures 
for the adoption of certain measures [2014] OJ L 18/1 
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advice from the Committee of the representatives of the member states, which 
will decide by simple majority vote of its members.85 
This Committee acquired a role not only in advisory procedures but also in 
examination procedures. For adoption of definitive AD measures, termination of 
AD investigations and for the repeal or maintenance of AD measures after expiry 
review, the Commission cannot act without the advice of the Committee. In 
examination procedures, the Committee may block the Commission’s move only 
by qualified majority. Under these circumstances, the Commission can either send 
a revised proposal for adoption of certain measures, or it may approach the 
appellate committee.  
The appellate committee acting with qualified majority will try to find out the 
solution in this regard. Sometimes its members may also suggest amendments in 
the Commission’s proposal. The Commission can impose the definitive measures 
only if the appellate committee delivers a positive opinion or stays silent on the 
matter. However, if the appellate body delivers a negative outcome, no further 
action is possible in this regard.86  
For imposition of provisional AD measures, the Commission must inform the 
Committee of the representatives of the member states. However, after such 
imposition, the Commission must submit a report to the Committee. The latter can 
ask the Commission to repeal the provisional measures by qualified majority vote 
of its member states. However, in the case of a positive opinion of the Committee, 
the provisional measures will stay enforced.87 
The reformed procedure for decision-making has strengthened the role of the 
Commission in decision-making. Under the previous decision-making procedure, 
the Commission was required to consult the Advisory Council before imposition 
of provisional measures, termination of existing measures or initiation of expiry 
                                                            
85 Ibid; Panos Koutrakos,  Modern Studies in European Law: EU International Relations Law (2nd 
Edition, Hart publishing 2015) 377 
86 Above (n 84) 
87 Ibid 
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review. The role of the Advisory Council has been completely eliminated under 
the new rules. Similarly, the role of the EU Council is also eliminated, as it was 
responsible for adopting definitive measures.88 
The role of the Advisory Council and the EU Council is now more or less 
performed by the Committee of the representatives of the member states. Member 
states were already speaking through the EU Council under the previous regime, 
but under the current decision-making procedures they acquired a more active 
role. The role of the Council and Parliament is now restricted to scrutiny of the 
draft measures. The current decision-making procedures strengthened the role of 
the Commission, thus they offer more concentration of power in a single 
institution as compared to the previous decision-making policy.89 
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CHAPTER TWO: ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES IMPOSED ON 
ALL OTHER PAKISTANI IMPORTS EXCEPT TEXTILES: 
CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE EU COMMISSION’S 
INVESTIGATIONS AND THE JUDGEMENTS OF THE EU 
COURTS 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
After discussion of research methods employed for this thesis in the previous 
chapter, the current chapter intends to find the answer of the first research 
question of this study, i.e. how consistently do EU institutions interpret and 
implement anti-dumping (AD) law in relation to Pakistan? The discussion about 
this research question spreads through four chapters (Chapter 4, 5, 6 and 7). The 
current chapter, however, encloses the examination of AD duties imposed by the 
Union on all other exports except textiles. Apart from textile products, duties have 
been mainly imposed upon polyethylene terephthalate and electronic compact 
fluorescent lamps, while ethyl alcohol escaped the imposition due to the 
calculation of negative dumping margin (DM). The calculations of normal value 
(NV), export price (EP) and dumping margin as did by the commission have been 
cross-checked against the relevant provision of basic regulation and judgements of 
the EU Courts. 
2.2  PROVISIONAL MEASURES IMPOSED ON 
POLYETHYLINE TEREPHTHALATE EXPORTS 
The proceeding was originated due to a complaint lodged in April 2003 by the 
Association of Plastic Manufacturers in Europe (APME) (the complainant). It was 
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lodged on behalf of manufacturers’ representative of majority, in this case more 
than 80%, of the total Union produce of polyethylene terephthalate. Notices of 
launch of proceedings were delivered to all concerned parties.1 For the purpose of 
this inquiry, the Commission indicated that sampling would be significant enough 
to use. Nevertheless, due to the lesser than anticipated number of exporting 
manufacturers which showed their readiness to cooperate, use of sampling was 
not considered to be necessary. Questionnaires were sent to all those companies 
who made them known within a specific time, and to all the involved parties. 
Furthermore, the Commission conducted verification visits at sampled Union 
manufacturers and foreign exporters, including two Pakistani exporters.2 
2.2.1 NORMAL VALUE 
The Commission assessed the comparability of the product concerned to the 
product vended on the national market by the exporters. Then the Commission 
conducted a ‘representative sales’ test according to Article 2(2) of Council 
regulation (EC) 384/96. If sale (of an exporting producer) in the exporting country 
constitutes at least 5% of its exports to the Union, its sale was considered to be 
representative.3  
To decide whether sale of each type of polyethylene terephthalate (PET) at local 
market was being manufactured in the ordinary course of trade, the percentage of 
profitable sale (of product concerned) as compared to the overall sale at local 
market was calculated by the Commission. In circumstances where the weighted 
average price of that type of PET was equivalent to or over the expense of 
manufacture and where the trade volume of PET type, sold at a net sales value 
equivalent to or over the ascertained expense of manufacture, denoted 80% or a 
greater amount of the aggregate sales volume of that sort, NV was determined on 
                                                            
1 Commission Notice of initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of 
polyethylene terephthalate (PET) originating in Australia, the People’s Republic of China and 
Pakistan [2003] OJ C 120/04 
2 Commission Regulation (EU) No 306/2004 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports 
of polyethylene terephthalate originating in Australia, the People’s Republic of China and Pakistan 
[2004] OJ L 52/5 
3 Commission Regulation (EC) No 306/2004, Para 20 
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the genuine local cost, figured as a weighted normal of the costs of every single 
local sale of that type made amid the examination period, paying little heed to 
whether these sales were money-making or not.4  
In circumstances where the weighted average price of that type was beneath the 
expense of creation, or where the volume of profitable sales of PET sort constitute 
under 80% of the aggregate sales volume of that type (of PET), NV was depended 
on the actual local cost, calculated as a weighted average of prolific sales of that 
type of PET only, gave that these sales denoted 10% or a greater amount of the 
aggregate sales volume of that type. Also, a specific type of PET was thought to 
be sold at the local market in inadequate amounts to give a suitable premise to the 
foundation of NV, where the volume of beneficial sales of a PET account less 
than 10% of the aggregate sales volume of that type (PET).5 
Subsequently, as per Article 2(3) of the fundamental regulation, NV was 
developed by addition of the assembling expenses of the exported types, 
accustomed where important, a sensible margin of profit and a sensible amount 
for selling, general and administrative (SG&A) costs. In this regard, the 
Commission inspected if the profit gathered by each of the exporting 
manufacturers concerned on the local market and the SG&A incurred founded 
reliable data.6 
As per Article 2(1)7 of the Council regulation (EC) 384/96, for all types of PET, 
except one, exported by one of the Pakistani exporting manufacturers, the 
Commission could create NV on the basis of the prices paid through the normal 
course of trade by free consumers on the local market. However, constructed 
normal value was used, followed by Article 2(3) of the basic regulation for the 
                                                            
4 Ibid, Para 23 
5 Ibid, Para 24 
6 Ibid, Para 26 
7 Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 of 22 December 1995 on protection against dumped imports 
from countries not members of the European Community [1996]OJ L 056, art 2 (1) 
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single PET type where less than 10% of the local sales were in the ordinary course 
of trade.8 
 The second exporting producer had no domestic sales. Therefore, pursuant to 
Article 2(1), the NV was constructed based on the prices of the product concerned 
charged on the local market by the first exporting manufacturer because the sole 
two exporting producers in Pakistan were linked to each other.9 
2.2.2 EXPORT PRICE 
The export price was determined pursuant to Article 2(8), based upon the prices 
actually paid or payable because all sales of the product concerned made by the 
two related Pakistani exporting manufacturers on the Union market were made to 
unrelated consumers in the Union.10 
2.2.3 COMPARISON 
In order to draw a fair comparison among the NV and the EP due allowance was 
given in the form of adjustments where necessary as required by Article 2(10) of 
the Council regulation (EC) 384/96, In all circumstances it was established to be 
practical, precise and supported by confirmed evidence, appropriate adjustments 
were granted accordingly.11 
2.2.4 DUMPING MARGIN 
In pursuance to Article 2(11), the weighted average EP of each type (of PET) 
concerned were compared to the weighted average NV of each type of (PET) 
exported to the Union.12 
The comparison demonstrated the presence of dumping in respect of the 
coordinating trading manufacturers. The provisional DM communicated as a rate 
                                                            
8 Above (n 2) Para 43 
9 Ibid, Para 44 
10 Ibid, Para 28 
11 Ibid, Para 30 
12 Ibid, Para 31 
44 
  
of the CIF13 import price at the Union border has been computed as the weighted 
average of DM of the two cooperating producers as both producers found to be 
related with each other. And it was done in line with the Union’s policy for related 
exporting producers. This margin amounts to 14.8%, for both Novatex Ltd and 
Gatron (Industries). The residual provisional margin was established at the level 
of the cooperating trader having maximum dumping margin to guarantee the 
efficacy of measures, since the level of cooperation was high, as there were only 
two exporting manufacturers of the product concerned in Pakistan.14 
2.2.5 INJURY 
The scale of imports from the markets concerned started to penetrate the Union 
market at a substantial scale from 2002, resulting in price undercutting on the 
Community market. The Union industry lost market share and its financial 
stability was again threatened as reflected in its poor financial results.15 
Under the significance of Article three of Council regulation (EC) 384/96, it is 
however for the time being decided that the Union market has sustained material 
injury.16 The Commission considers all relevant factors to reach a conclusion in 
this regard: it includes scale of actual margin of dumping, retrieval from the 
previous dumping, investments and ability to raise capital, sales volume, return on 
investment, market share, profitability and cash flow and growth and average unit 
prices in the EC.17 
2.2.6 CAUSATION 
The Commission established that there is a causal link amongst dumped imports 
and the alleged injury caused to the EU industry. The same fact is evident from 
the increase in market share and profitability of the dumped imports which later 
caused price undercutting of the Union industry. Moreover, there is a striking 
                                                            
13 Cost, insurance and freight 
14 Above (n 2) Para 48 
15 Ibid, Para 146 
16 Council Regulation (EC) No. 384/96, art 3 
17 Above (n 2) 
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concurrence in time among the sharp rise of dumped imports and the decline of 
the monetary condition for the Union industry.18 
 The investigation has also shown that it cannot be excluded that some of the 
imports from Taiwan and the Republic of Korea also have contributed to the 
injury. However, there is no indication that the probable influence of these 
imports is so significant that it can break down the causal link between dumped 
imports from Australia, Pakistan and China, and the injury borne by the Union 
industry as a result of dumped imports. No other factors have been put forward or 
found which could have affected in a significant way the condition of the Union 
industry.19 
A provisional AD duty was thereby levied on imports of poly (ethylene 
terephthalate), classified under combined nomenclature (CN) code 3907 60 20 
and originating in Australia, China and Pakistan. The provisional duty rate was 
128 (EUR/t) for Novatex Ltd, Gatron (Industries Ltd and all other Pakistani 
companies.20 
2.2.7 ANALYSIS 
The review of the investigation revealed that the complaint was being supported 
by Community producers representing 80% of the total production of 
polyethylene terephthalate. The levels of support, however, were significantly 
high otherwise, Community producers having 25% share of the Community 
industry and Community producers representing 50% of the Community industry, 
respectively, are sufficient for the initiation and continuation of a complaint. It is, 
however, noted that reference is made only to the Community manufacturers, as 
Union manufacturers representing at least 25% of total Union production can 
initiate a complaint. It means that other stakeholders, such as importers or 
                                                            
18 Ibid, Para 177 
19 Ibid, Para 178 
20 Ibid 
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consumers, do not have any right to lodge a complaint if they are suffering from 
alleged dumped imports.21 
The EU Court of Justice established in Case C-105/9022 that it is apparent both 
from the wording and the scheme of that provision that it is the price actually paid 
in the ordinary course of trade which must, as a matter of priority, be taken into 
consideration in principle to establish the normal value. Under Article 2(3) of the 
basic regulation, that principle may be derogated only when such sales are 
insufficient or do not permit an appropriate comparison or when there are no sales 
of the like product in the ordinary course of trade. However, Vermulst argues that 
alternative ways of calculation of NV tend to create higher and non-representative 
domestic prices as compared to the actual price paid on the local market.23 
The EU Courts held in Case C-393/1324 and Case T-304/1125 that in order to 
establish whether EU market is being dumped by foreign imports, the ordinary 
course of trade is a notion which is related to the character of the sale itself and 
not the price of the product. According to Article 2(4), sale of the like product in 
the local market of the manufacturing country at prices less than unit 
manufacturing costs plus SG&A costs may be disregarded in determining normal 
value and such sale can be considered as not in accordance of ordinary course of 
trade only if it met with following three conditions: 
1. Such non-profitable sale should be made in an extended period of time 
(minimum six months and maximum one year); 
2. It should be in substantial quantities; 
3. It should be sold at prices which could not repay the production cost of 
product concerned within an adequate time (prices above the weighted 
average production costs during investigation period but which are below 
                                                            
21 Johannes Beseler and Neville Williams, Anti-dumping and Anti-subsidy Law: The European 
Communities (Sweet & Maxwell 1986) 177 
22 Case C-105/90, Goldstar Co. Ltd v Council of the European Communities v Council of the 
European Union [1992] ECR I-0067, Para 31 
23 Edwin Vermulst, The WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement (Oxford University Press 2005) 35-37 
24 Case C 393/13 Council of the European Union v Alumina d.o.o. [2014] OJ C 274, Para 25-32 
25 Case T 304/11 Alumina d.o.o. v Council of the European Union  [2013] OJ C 226, Para 27-30 
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cost at the time of sale shall be considered as price providing for recovery 
of production cost within reasonable time). 
It is not clear, under which circumstances the investigative bodies can depart from 
the one-year rule. However, in all circumstances, the minimum time in which sale 
below cost cannot be regarded as being made outside the ordinary course of 
business is six months.26 
Sales below unit cost will only be considered substantial if it constitutes at least 
20% of total sales volume of the product concerned in local market or third 
country’s market and when it is established that the weighted average selling price 
is lower than the weighted average production cost. Van Bael and Bellis are critics 
of this methodology, and they argue that this 20% may tend to inflate the 
character of artificial dumping.27 
It was also held in Case C‑76/0028, Case C-105/9029 and Case T-34/9830that 
derogation from actual price paid by consumers on the domestic market is 
possible in two cases, Firstly, if there are compensatory arrangements between 
exporter and importer which make normal value unreliable. In the second place, 
under Article 2(4) of the basic regulation states that while determining the NV, the 
price of the product paid in third independent country or the NV paid by the 
independent consumers in the local market of the manufacturing country can be 
disregarded; only if, such normal value is lesser than its average manufacturing 
costs. To establish the sales below production cost, it must also be established 
that, such sales do not provide for recovery of production expenses within a 
reasonable time; such sale is made in substantial quantity and it has been made in 
an extended time period. 
                                                            
26 Wenxi Li, ‘Antidumping Law of the WTO/GATT and the EC. Gradual Evolution of 
Antidumping Law in Global Economic Integration’ (2001) Juristförlaget i Lund 71 
27 Van Bael and Ballis, EU Anti-Dumping and other Trade Defence Instruments (5th Edition, 
Kluwer Law International 2011) 57 
28 Case C-76/00 P: Petrotub SA and Republica SA v Council of the European Union [2003] ECR I-
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However, it is noted that, while establishing that profitable sale representing less 
than 80% of the total domestic sale of the product concerned cannot be considered 
as sale made in the ordinary course of trade, the Commission has not explicitly 
explained in the recitals of the Regulation whether all three above mentioned 
conditions as provided by Article 2(4) to establish the ordinary course of business 
were met? Therefore, it could be established that the EU Commission in its 
regulation 306/2004 could only establish that the non-profit able sale was in 
substantial quantity exceeding more than 20% of the total sale.  
However, the Commission has failed to explain whether such non-profitable sale 
was continued for a substantial period (at least six months). Similarly, the EU 
Commission also failed to explain whether; such non-profitable sale provides for 
the recovery of cost of production within a reasonable time, as price below cost at 
the time of sale but above the average cost of production provides for recovery of 
cost within a reasonable time. Didier argues that the onus of proof should lie on 
the investigating bodies to prove that all above-mentioned three conditions are 
met, to establish that the sale is made outside the ordinary course of trade. 
Consequently, many times the investigative bodies put that burden of proof on the 
producers.31 
The Commission may have taken all three tests to establish the ordinary course of 
trade, but if it has done so, it should be explained to the parties by its Regulation 
(EC) 306/2004, as the investigative bodies are expected to provide a full and 
adequate statement of reason for their calculations and decisions as established by 
EU Courts in Case T-558/1232 Case T-310/1233 and Case T-401/0634. As it will 
help the interested parties to understand the reasons of the measures thus they will 
be in appropriate position to contest and defend their rights. Although, the 
                                                            
31 Pierre Didier, ‘The WTO Anti-Dumping Code and the EC Practice- Issues for Review in Trade 
Negotiations’ (2001) 35 (1) Journal of World Trade 35, 41 
32 Joined Cases T- 558/12 and T- 559/12, Changshu City Standard Parts Factory, v Council of the 
European Union  [2015] OJ C 46, Para 121 
33 Case T 310/12, Yuanping Changyuan Chemicals Co. Ltd,  v Council of the European Union 
[2015] OJ C 273, Para 195 
34 Case T-401/06, Brosmann Footwear (HK) Ltd and Others v Council of the European Union 
[2010] ECR II-00671, Para 180 
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institutions are not expected to release all relevant facts and points of law but the 
adequacy of statement of reasons will be assessed as per the specific 
circumstances of each case.    
Furthermore, if the Commission had not established the fulfilment of all three 
conditions, then it is a manifest error of assessment on the part of the 
Commission, as under the meaning of Article 2(4) all three conditions must be 
met in order to establish the ordinary course of trade.  However, the conclusion 
that sale is not made in the ordinary course of business cannot be drawn if any one 
of the conditions could not be met. Apart from that it could be concluded that rest 
of the calculation of the EU Commission regarding export price, dumping margin, 
comparison, causation and calculation of injury are significantly explained and 
reasoned by the Commission. 
Moreover, this dissertation objects to the criteria of establishment of ‘substantial 
amount of sale below cost’ as provided by Article 2(4) of the basic regulation. It 
suggests that sales underneath unit cost should be thought to be made in 
significant amounts when it is established that the weighted average selling price 
is beneath the weighted normal unit price, or that the volume of sales beneath unit 
cost is above 20% of sales being utilised to establish normal value. The 
researcher, however, objects to the discretionary power given to the Commission 
to make use of either of the two mentioned criteria (which are exclusively 
different) to establish the sale below cost in substantial quantity at the domestic 
market. 
It means that if sale below cost represents less than 20% of the total sale, then the 
Commission, having recourse to the alternative option, can establish so by 
concluding that the average sale price is below the average cost of production, or 
vice versa. However, the author recommends that either there should be only one 
criterion to adjudge the substantial quantity of sale below the cost of production, 
or that the Commission should apply both thresholds simultaneously; failing any 
of them should lead to a negative result regarding ‘substantial quantity’ check. 
This will bring consistency and conformity in the Commission’s findings about 
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sale in the ordinary course of business; otherwise the choice of method available 
to the Commission may tend to manoeuvre the outcome of the investigation. 
The analysis of current and other investigations discussed in Chapters Two to Five 
reveal that the basic regulation has purposely left many substantial issues be 
decided by the Commission. The use of these discretionary powers has been pin-
pointed and examined within their context as they come across in this thesis. The 
frequent use of these discretionary powers by the Commission tends to lead to 
inconsistency and lack of transparency in the EU’s AD proceedings.  
Vermulst noted two major problems associated with lack of transparency. Firstly, 
it grants excessive discretionary powers to the EU Commission, which being an 
administrative body is the only institution having access to the factual context of 
cases. Secondly, it enables leaks and abuse. For example, information about the 
complaint is often leaked even before initiation of proceedings. He has observed 
some important instances of lack of transparency of EU procedures, which 
include: complaints are treated as confidential until initiation; only interested 
parties can have access to questionnaires; there is no public access to non-
confidential files; non-confidential questionnaire responses are often vague and 
meaningless; verification reports are not provided to interested parties; hearings 
are ex parte.35 
Similarly, when disclosure is provided, calculation methods of dumping margin 
etc. are removed, and the Commission’s guidelines about the application of ADD 
are internal, and thus considered confidential. Vermulst’s analysis makes clear 
some of the major transparency issues relating to the basic regulation. But as it is 
established by other researchers, including Van Bael and Bellis, transparency and 
consistency in the EU’s anti-dumping framework or any other national AD 
framework can only be ensured by tightening some of the vague provisions 
                                                            
35 Edwin Vermulst, ‘The 10 Major Problems with the Anti-Dumping Instrument in the European 
Community’ (2005) 39(1) Journal of World Trade 105, 106; Andre Sapir, ‘Some Ideas for 
Reforming the Community Anti-Dumping Instrument’ (2006) 
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(specifically related to calculation of NV, DM and like product) of the WTO 
Agreement. 
The lack of transparency in the EU’s AD procedures is also felt by some 
individuals within EU institutions, and they have called for reforms in basic 
regulation. For example, in 2006, European Commissioner for Trade Peter 
Mandelson’s attempt failed due to lack of support from Union industry and some 
member states.36 Similarly, in 2013 the Commission proposed to modernise the 
EU’s trade defence instrument,37 which is still going through ordinary legislative 
procedure, as in April 2014 the EU Parliament voted a legislative resolution and 
thus closed its first reading.38 However, in May 2016 the Commission pledged to 
increase transparency as far as it extends to publication of executive summaries of 
information about complaints.39    
However, Wenig advocates the transparency of the EU’s anti-dumping 
instrument, as he claims that despite the fact that the EU is the largest trading 
entity in the world, its anti-dumping-related investigations have rarely been 
challenged in the WTO. He claims that the majority of researchers criticising the 
EU’s trade defence framework only evaluate it from an exporter’s perspective. 
However, the Union institutions are under obligation to confirm balance of 
interest while using the trade defence instruments.40  
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39 (4) Journal of World Trade 787, 788 
52 
  
Another significant factor which makes the EU’s AD system consistent and 
transparent is the scrutiny of proposed measures through three-layer control: 
Internal Commission control (by 28 member states) in Brussels, European Courts 
in Luxembourg and WTO Panels in Geneva. However, analysis of the 
investigations relating to Pakistan, as discussed in this thesis, reveals that 
sometimes the EU institutions concluded diverging outcomes. 
2.3  IMPOSITION OF DEFINITIVE DUTY BY THE COUNCIL 
REGULATION (EC) NO 1467/2004 
The two associated exporting manufacturers made entries taking after the levying 
of provisional AD measures, in which they asserted that they ought not to have 
been viewed as two separate but related companies, but instead in perspective of 
their relationship as an extraordinary trading manufacturer, and that subsequently 
only one dumping margin ought to be calculated. This solicitation was deeply 
analysed on the premise of the contentions created by these exporting 
manufacturers ensuing to the provisional measures.41 
It was found that the specific attributes of the relationship between the companies 
concerned and the nearby interlinks in their operation was such as to differentiate 
their position from the normal circumstance of two related companies. 
Specifically, record was taken of the extremely critical money related and 
different connections between the two trading makers, the fact that they sell the 
concerned product under the same brand name, the way that they have the same 
regulatory premises and association and a marketing division.42  
In addition, they share generally the same staff individuals and directors, and have 
common manufacturing arrangement. The combination of every one of these 
                                                            
41 Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/2004 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting 
definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of polyethylene terephthalate originating in 
Australia, the People’s Republic of China and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding 
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42 Ibid,  Para 24 
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components is esteemed adequate to consider that under these specific 
circumstances the circumstance of the two exporting manufacturers’ warrants that 
they regarded as a one trading company in the Pakistani PET business, as opposed 
to as two separate organizations. In this way, in perspective of every one of these 
components, it was viewed as that the claim ought to be acknowledged.43 
The Council, however, confirmed the calculations as done by the EU Commission 
about export price and determination of injury, as none of the Pakistani exporters 
challenged this calculation. However, the Council reviewed and accordingly 
amended the Commission’s calculations about normal value and dumping 
margin.44  
2.3.1 NORMAL VALUE 
Within the meaning of Article 2(2), the Commission first determined, for the 
unique exporting manufacturer, if its entire local sales of the concerned product 
were representative. In accordance with the said Article, local sales were 
measured representative, where the entire national sales size of each exporting 
manufacturer was found to be at minimum 5% of its entire export sales volume to 
the Union. The Commission later figured out those types of PET; sold 
domestically by the unique exporting producer that were openly analogous to the 
types (of PET) vended for export to the Union, and had overall representative 
domestic sales. An examination was moreover made to develop whether the 
national sales of each kind of PET could be seen as having been made in the 
customary course of business.45 
For the three PET sorts whose local sales were observed to be not representative, 
constructed normal value (NV) was utilized, according to Article 2(3) of the 
Council regulation (EC) 384/96. For two sorts of PET traded by the 
manufacturing exporter, the Commission could calculate NV taking into account 
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the prices paid or payable in normal circumstances by independent consumers on 
the local market as provided by Article 2(1).46  
2.3.2 ANALYSIS 
It is found that the Commission incorrectly considered a single company as a 
separate albeit related company, despite the fact that they share the same 
marketing division as well as an administrative premises and organisation. Such 
manifest error of assessments is apparently improbable, especially where the 
exporters are fully cooperating and information submitted by them could be 
verified by verification visit. However, following the complaint by the exporter, it 
was validly rectified by the Council accordingly.  
The judgements of Case-76/9847 suggest that the opening words of Article 2(3) 
(b) of the regulation state that for the purpose of calculation of normal value, the 
Community institutions are required to have recourse to the latter two methods 
(construction of NV) in case the domestic sale of the product concerned in the 
market of the exporting country could not meet with the ordinary course of trade 
criteria. Stewart contends that the purpose of construction of NV should be to 
assess the actual domestic price of a product which has been assessed under 
normal market conditions, or if the transaction was ordinary.48   
This dissertation finds that the method of calculation of normal value as applied 
by the Commission in its provisional regulation was inconsistent with the method 
applied by the Council in its definitive regulation. As five different types of PET 
were involved in the investigation, the Commission however calculated normal 
value of two types of PET on the basis of actual price paid at the domestic market, 
as according to the conclusion drawn by the Commission, the sale of these three 
types of PET was not found to be representative of its export. However, the sale 
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of two types of PET was found to be in the ordinary course of trade; therefore 
their NV was calculated based upon the actual price paid by the consumers in the 
domestic market. Vermulst argues that the ordinary course of trade test should be 
carried out on the product as a whole; it should not be divided into different types 
to carry out the ordinary course of trade test upon them individually.49 
On India’s appeal against the practice of ‘zeroing’ (in the bed-linen case), the 
Appellate Body upheld the findings of the Panel by ruling that the Commission’s 
practice of categorising the bed-linen products under investigation into subgroups 
of models or types was impermissible under Article 2.4.2 of the Agreement.50 
However, it was established by the General Court in Case T-385/1151 that the EU 
institutes acquired extensive choice in the determination of what may be regarded 
as a slightly modified like product, and review by the EU Judicature is confined to 
ascertaining whether the procedural directions have been obeyed. In the context of 
an AD investigation, where the product concerned contains a wide range of goods 
which have considerable differences with regard to their characteristics and prices, 
it may prove necessary to group them under categories which are more or less 
homogeneous. The purpose of that grouping is to allow for a fair comparison 
between comparable products, and thereby to avoid an incorrect calculation of the 
dumping and injury margins owing to unsuitable comparisons.52 
The Commission, however, omitted to pin point the names of three types of PET 
whose sale was not found to be in ordinary course of business. For the clarity of 
all stakeholders, including the importers, exporters and local manufacturers, the 
Commission’s statement in this regard should have been clearer. 
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The EU Courts established in Case T-192/0853 Case T-401/0654  that under 
Article 253 EC the statement of reasons must show unmistakably and clearly the 
thinking of the EU authority which approved the challenged measure, to 
illuminate the concerned parties of the legitimisation for the measure embraced, 
and in this way to empower them to defend their rights, and the Courts of the 
European Union to exercise their powers of review. Obligation to state reasons is 
a procedural requirement which should be distinguished from the question that if 
they are correct and adequate.55  
Moreover, the representative sale of some types of PET out of all four was not 
found to be in the ordinary course of trade, as allegedly their profitable sale was 
found to be less than 80% of total sale hence, their NV was based on average of 
all profitable transactions only while ignoring the non-profitable sale. It may be 
contended that for clarity of investigation the EU Commission should clearly state 
the number of types of PET whose sale was found to be in the ordinary course of 
trade and vice versa.  
Moreover, the Commission calculated normal value of four types of PET on the 
basis of actual price paid on the domestic market, while normal value of one type 
of PET was constructed (by adding SG&A costs, production cost and reasonable 
profit) in accordance with Article 2(3) due to its insufficient domestic sale. 
On the other hand, in regulation imposing definitive dumping duty, the Council 
calculated normal value of only two types of PET on the basis of actual price paid 
by consumers in the domestic market. The normal value of the remaining three 
types of PET was calculated in accordance with Article 2(3) by adding average 
SG&A costs, production cost and a reasonable amount of profit margin, as their 
sale was found to be insufficient, constituting less than 10% of exports of the 
same product to the Union. Therefore, the calculations of both institutions 
                                                            
53 Case T-192/08, Transnational Company ‘Kazchrome’ AO and ENRC Marketing AG v Council 
of the European Union [2011] ECR II-07449, Para 256 
54 Case T-401/06 Brosmann Footwear (HK) Ltd and Others v Council of the European Union 
[2010] ECR II-00671, Para 197 
55 Case C‑66/02,  Italy v Commission of the European Union [2005] ECR I-10901, Para 26 
57 
  
regarding number of PET having insufficient sale at the domestic market were 
found to be inconsistent with each other. 
Vermulst found that, for ‘like product’ assessments, the Commission divides the 
product concerned into specific product control numbers (PCNs). It then 
calculates individual injury margin and dumping margin for each PCN. There is 
nothing wrong with this methodology as far as it goes to bring more accuracy in 
calculations. The commission tries to compare identical models instead of using 
similar models along with necessary adjustments, and it applies 5 % and 20 % 
below cost rule to each PCN. Furthermore, it rarely makes use of NV paid in 
another identical third country. Thus, NV is constructed for each PCN 
separately.56  
These calculations of constructed normal value involve a variety of discretionary 
elements and choices. Additionally, calculation of reasonable profit margin is 
complicated, and highly vulnerable to arbitrary decision. Consequently, CNV 
sometimes prove to be artificial and non-representative of the actual price paid by 
customers in a national market.57  
However, the Commission’s discretionary powers are not unlimited instead they 
are subject to certain legal rules, in this case the basic regulation. The more 
detailed and comprehensive are the legal provisions of the basic regulation more 
confined are the Commission’s discretionary powers. Thus, detailed rules related 
to the construction of normal value will curtail their arbitrary use.58 
Moreover, according to the WTO agreement, where average SG&A costs of other 
producers would be used, it includes their SG&A costs both in profitable and 
unprofitable transactions, falling outside the ambit of ordinary course of trade. 
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Therefore, use of only profitable transactions for this purpose would be against 
the law.59    
The author however concludes that it is the application of different methodologies 
to calculate normal value applied by the Commission and the Council that leads to 
the calculation of highly varying dumping margin (14.8% of the export price 
calculated by the Commission, 1.6% i.e. below the de minimis as calculated by the 
Council) by both institutions for the same trader. One possible reason for this 
variation may be the calculation (by the Commission) of normal value for some 
types of PET based on an average only of profitable transactions, while 
completely ignoring the non-profitable ones. However, the positive aspect of this 
investigation is that the error of calculation regarding normal value was later 
rectified by the Council, and the duties paid by Pakistani traders in terms of 
provisional measures released.  
2.4  IMPOSITION OF PROVISIONAL AD DUTY ON 
PAKISTANI POLYETHYLENE TEREPHTHALATE 
2.4.1 INITIATION 
The investigation was started following a complaint was lodged by the 
Polyethylene Terephthalate Committee of Plastics Europe (the complainant). The 
complaint was made on behalf of manufacturers in lieu of a majority of Union 
industry, in this investigation above than 50%, of the total Union, making certain 
polyethylene terephthalate. The complaint enclosed significant proof of dumping 
of the product concerned importing from Iran, United Arab Emirates and 
Pakistan.60 
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In pursuance to Article 17 of the primary regulation, and in view of the apparent 
large number of Union manufacturers and importers, sampling was proposed in 
the notice of initiation of investigation issued to the concerned parties. Based on 
the information obtained from the co-operating Union producers, the Commission 
selected a sample of five Union producers constituting 65% of the sales by all 
cooperating Union producers.61 
2.4.2 PRODUCT CONCERNED AND LIKE PRODUCT 
The product concerned is polyethylene terephthalate being imported from Iran, 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the UAE currently falling within CN code 3907 
60 20. Since this grade of PET is a homogeneous product, it was not further 
subdivided into different product types.62 
The investigation showed that the PET manufactured and sold in the EU by the 
Union industry, and the PET manufactured and vended on the local markets of  
the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan and Iran and exported to the Union have 
essentially matching basic chemical and physical features, and similar basic 
usages. According to Article 1(4)63 of the regulation, they are hence provisionally 
considered to be similar.64 
2.4.3 NORMAL VALUE 
The domestic sales of the sole Pakistani producer were considered sufficiently 
representative during the investigation period, as the whole volume of such sales 
constituted no less than 5% of its aggregate volume of export sales of the 
concerned product to the EU. Since the profitable sales constituted above 20% of 
the total domestic sale of the concerned product in the manufacturing country’s 
market; therefore, within the meaning of Article 2(4) local sale was considered to 
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be in accordance with ordinary course of trade. Hence, NV was computed on the 
premise of average of all local sale prices of the like item in domestic market.65 
2.4.4 COMPARISON 
The sole exporting manufacturer in Pakistan exported the product concerned 
specifically to free consumers in the Union. As per Article 2(8) of the primary 
regulation, EP was thus determined on the premise of the costs factually paid by 
these non-related clients for the product subject to investigation. The NV and the 
EP of the sole exporting manufacturer were compared. Due stipend by mean of 
adjustments was made to accommodate variations influencing costs and price 
comparability with the end goal of guaranteeing a reasonable comparison between 
the EP and the NV.66 
2.4.5 NEGATIVE DUMPING MARGIN AND TERMINATION OF 
INQUIRY 
Pursuant to Article 2(11) and (12) of the Council regulation (EC) 384/96, for the 
purpose of calculation of dumping margin for sole Pakistan exporter involved, 
weighted average export price was compared with the weighted average normal 
value. Adequate adjustments were granted where different factors were affecting 
the price comparability. The provisional dumping margin for the sole Pakistani 
exporting manufacturer, Novatex Limited, was calculated at the rate of 1.5 % of 
the export price, i.e. below de minimis in the sense of Article 9(3) of the primary 
regulation. Later it was further reduced to 0.6% of the export price.67Therefore the 
investigation was terminated, and the amounts held by way of the provisional AD 
duty levied were released.  
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2.4.6 ANALYSIS 
The EU Courts in Case T-423/0968 Case T-299/0569 established that in a review of 
an AD measure, the investigative institutions are supposed to use the same 
method, including the method related to the comparison of EP and NV under 
Article 2(10) as that used in the original investigation; although, institutions can 
have recourse to different methodologies for the calculation of NV and EP if 
circumstances of the case have been significantly changed. However, derogation 
from general principle and recourse to exception should be interpreted strictly and 
the institutions must show that a significant shift has been occurred in the 
circumstances of the case which led to the application of different methodology in 
review investigation.70 However, the application of the same or different 
methodologies for calculations of normal value in two different (but having 
identical circumstances) original investigations has not been discussed in the EU 
courts, or may be this issue is not raised in the courts. 
It could be concluded, that comparatively, it was more transparent and consistent 
investigation as done by the EU Commission. This investigation is significantly 
varied from investigation conducted through Commission Regulation (EC) 
306/04. In both investigations (the one conducted in 2004 and latest conducted in 
2009) the same product originating from the same exporter (Novatex) was 
involved, however the outcomes of both were completely different (as in the 
previous investigation dumping margin 14.8% of the export price was calculated, 
however in the latest investigation its rate was 0.6% di minimis of export price).  
The author believes that it is due to the different methodologies applied by the 
Commission to calculate normal value. Another important difference is that 
although the product concerned involved was the same in both inquiries, in the 
previous investigation the Commission divided the product concerned into five 
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different types, thus calculating their normal value by applying different 
methodologies, as sale of some types was not found in the ordinary course of 
trade. But in the later inquiry held in 2009, unlike the previous investigation, the 
product concerned was not classified into different types, instead it was placed in 
the same homogeneous group, and thus only one methodology was used to 
calculate normal value.  
However, it is noted that after termination of proceedings in 2009 due to the 
calculation of negative dumping margin in respect of a sole Pakistani exporter, an 
anti-subsidy proceeding was initiated against the same exporter alleging 
subsidised imports of the same product (polyethylene terephthalate), which 
resulted in the imposition of anti-subsidy duty through Commission Regulation 
(EU) 473/10.  
2.5  INITIATION AND WITHDRAWAL OF COMPLAINT FOR 
IMPOSITION OF AD DUTY ON ETHYL ALCOHOL BEING 
EXPORTED FROM PAKISTAN 
2.5.1 INITIATION 
On 26 May 2005, the Commission reported (by a notification distributed in the OJ 
of the EU) the start of an AD investigation  concerning imports into the Union of 
ethyl liquor originating in Guatemala and Pakistan, normally declared under CN 
codes 2207 10 00 and ex 2207 20 00.71 
The AD inquiry was opened following a complaint was filed on 11 April 2005 by 
the Committee of Industrial Ethanol Producers of the European Union. The 
complaint was filed on behalf of manufacturers constituting a main part, in current 
investigation above 30%, of the Union manufacture of ethyl alcohol. The 
complaint enclosed sufficient proof of material injury and the existence of 
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dumping of the said product. It was considered enough to validate the initiation of 
investigation.72 
2.5.2 TERMINATION OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Commission served notice to all concerned parties about the initiation of 
proceedings; however, later the complaint was withdrawn by the applicant. The 
applicant asserted that complaint was withdrawn due to the late critical 
amendment in the GSP73 status on ethyl liquor being imported from Pakistan. By 
complainant, however this has not completely disposed of practice of dumping; it 
has helped significantly to control the huge volume of dumped imports originating 
from Pakistan. The applicant stated that the withdrawal of the complaint 
concerning both nations is an adequate course of action at the present time, as the 
injury information in the complaint depended on the joined impact of imports 
from Pakistan and Guatemala,.74 
The Commission considered that the present proceeding should be terminated as 
the investigation had not come across any concern presenting that such 
termination would not be in the Community interest.75The Commission therefore 
concludes that the AD proceeding relating to imports into the Union of ethyl 
alcohol being imported from Pakistan and Guatemala should be dismissed without 
the levying of ADD. 
2.5.3 ANALYSIS 
It is concluded that, apparently, grant of generalised system of preference cannot 
be a reason for reduction of dumped imports of ethyl alcohol from Pakistan. 
Conversely, Generalised System of Preference (GSP+) status (a promise from the 
EU to liberalise trade from Pakistan and free trade access to EU markets through 
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grant of generalised preferential tariff arrangements) may have helped to increase 
the flow of imports from Pakistan. 
The same issue was raised in bed linen Case T-199/04 and Case C-638/11 where, 
due to the sanction of GSP status to Pakistan by the EU, the level of imports of 
bed linen from Pakistan to EU significantly increased which later resulted in the 
form of initiation of investigation and imposition of AD duty on alleged dumped 
imports from Pakistan. In this case, responding to the argument of Gul Ahmed (a 
manufacturer of bed linen based in Pakistan) argument, the Union’s industry has 
not suffered due to dumped imports from Pakistan; instead it is allegedly injured 
due to the increased flow of trade bearing grant of GSP status to Pakistan, the 
Council argued that the impact of GSP status is no dumped imports themselves as 
legislative amendment of or grant of GSP status cannot be considered an ‘other 
known factor’ directly affecting the Union’s industry. 
Therefore, considering the arguments of the Council in Case T-199/0476, and the 
decision of the WTO Panel in report WT/DS405/R77, it could be established that 
grant of GSP status and removal of quantitative quota, instead of reducing the 
volume of dumped imports, help to increase the flow of trade. Secondly, 
legislative amendment and grant of GSP status could not have any bearing upon 
the conduct of the Union industry instead their impact will be considered on the 
dumped imports itself thus, it cannot be considered as ‘other known factor’ within 
the significance of Article 3(7). 
Vermulst noted that Union industry have withdrawn their complaints during the 
investigation process when they are informed that the Commission is about to 
terminate the proceedings on account of negative injury margin or Community 
                                                            
76 Council’s Arguments in Case T-199/04, Gul Ahmed textiles Ltd v Council of the European 
Union [2011] ECR II-00321, Para 47 
77 WT/DS405/R, ‘WTO Panel Report, European Union anti-dumping measures on certain 
footwear from China (adopted on 28th October 2011) 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/405r_e.pdf   
65 
  
interest requirement. Complaints can also be withdrawn where Union industry 
stopped production of ‘product concerned’.78 
The Commission’s argument was that, as combined data of alleged dumping was 
used to establish injury to the Union’s market, therefore investigation should be 
terminated in respect of Guatemala as well. In order to protect the Union industry 
from dumped imports originating from Guatemala, however, a fresh investigation 
might have been conducted exclusively based upon data of injury caused to the 
EU due to alleged dumped imports originating from Guatemala. In other words, 
EU manufacturers and institutions knowing that their market is being injured due 
to dumped imports from Guatemala just decided to withdraw the complaint and 
terminate the investigation, though Community interest did not call for 
termination of the investigation, as apparently this test was not even conducted . 
One of the potential reasons for withdrawal of a complaint can be fear on the part 
of Union industry that negative injury margin calculation in this investigation may 
set a precedent for other similar investigations already on-going.79   
2.6  EXTENSION OF AD DUTY ON ELECTRONIC COMPACT 
FLUORESCENT LAMPS ASSEMBLED IN AND/OR 
ORIGINATING FROM PAKISTAN  
2.6.1 INITIATION OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Council levied definitive AD measures going from 0% to 66.1% on imports 
of integrated electronic compact fluorescent lights (CFL-i) (by regulation (EC) No 
1470/2001) exporting from China (the original investigation). On 16 August 2004, 
as per Article 13(3), the Commission received an application to inquire the 
assumed circumvention of the protective measures levied on CFL-i China (PRC). 
The application was put together by the Lighting Industry and Trade in Europe 
(‘LITE’) in the interest of manufacturers and merchants of CFL-i in the Union. 
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All stakeholders from Pakistan were given opportunity to make them known, and 
the questionnaires were sent to them.80  
However, only one Pakistani exporter (Ecopak Lightening Karachi) replied. A 
verification visit was conducted on its premises. The investigation period enclosed 
the period from 1 July 2003 to 30 June 2004. It was established that the data 
provided by the Pakistani collaborating trader was untrustworthy. Given the 
above, the Commission partially relied upon the facts available, and import data 
available at Eurostat was also used.81 
2.6.2 CHANGE IN THE TRADE PATTERN 
Imports from Pakistan, the Philippines and Vietnam, nearly non-existent before 
2001, enlarged meaningfully following the levying of duty. On the other hand 
imports from PRC almost halved following the levying of duty in 2001, i.e. it 
reduced from 85 million units in 2000 to 37 million units in 2002. The 
Commission, however, determined that after imposition of AD duty on China the 
Chinese exports to EU clearly reduced, but imports from Pakistan started in 2001 
and enlarged during the investigation period (IP) from 0.2 million units in 2001 to 
0.9 million units during the investigation period, i.e. 490%.82 
2.6.3 NATURE OF THE CIRCUMVENTION PRACTICE 
After the levying of temporary measures by the first inquiry about China, Ecopak 
Lighting was enrolled toward the start of 2001 (amid the first investigation) and 
began actual business in May 2001. Apparatus and machinery were bought from a 
trader situated the China.  
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It ought to be noticed that during the verification visit it was observed that no staff 
were available, no stocks existed and no movement (neither manufacture nor 
assembling) was occurring at the premises of the trader. The manufacturer 
clarified that they had halted the operations immediately before the start of the 
current examination, and had not yet chosen if they would resume the operation, 
in spite of the fact that they had assembling procedures during the investigation 
period, as appeared specifically by the machinery. The Commission established 
that on this premise, the presence of a manufacturing capability could not be 
perceived.83 
The accounting records, comprising the reports of the auditors, were found to be 
untrustworthy, as they were not in accordance with global bookkeeping 
principles; as result the value added to the parts or exact estimation of the foreign- 
made parts could not be ascertained. It was reasoned that the operations occurring 
in Pakistan amid the examination period ought to be considered as assembly 
operations, dodging the definitive dumping measures in force. The Commission 
based its conclusion on available facts and evidence. It includes the information 
submitted by the exporter and the fact that all kits and part were being imported 
from same company based in China which was already subject to EU’s AD 
measures.84 
The Commission claimed that the examination revealed further facts which 
established that except for the imposition of AD duty, assembly operations in 
Pakistan had no other due reason or financial reason. The establishment of 
assembly operations of CFL-i in Pakistan coincided with the change depicted 
above in the design of trade. The exporter asserted that the purpose behind 
beginning the operation in Pakistan was specifically enhanced infrastructure, low 
work costs in Pakistan and the empowering environment for foreign investment.  
On the other hand, the Commission established that the trader could not 
demonstrate that these components were thought about seriously when the 
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decision to begin the operation in Pakistan, and none of these arguments could be 
maintained by adequate evidence; rather the results of the on-the-spot verification 
intensely challenged the trader’s claim. Thus, it was established that other than the 
levying of the AD measures, there was inadequate due premise and no monetary 
explanation for the modification in the design of trade.85 
In this way, an examination of the weighted average of export prices amid this 
current investigation’s IP and the weighted average NV as calculated in the 
original inquiry, indicated dumping for the imports of CFL-i originating from 
Pakistan.86 Consequently, the definitive AD duty with the rate of 66.1% of export 
price was extended to electronic compact fluorescent discharge lamps dispatched 
from Pakistan, the Philippines and Vietnam. After the expiry review of the 
existing measures, it was further extended for a period of five years through 
Council Regulation (EC) 1205/2007, as the previous measures completed their 
five years’ tenure in 2007.87 
2.6.4 ANALYSIS 
Article 13 only requires evidence of dumping, it does not require calculation of a 
separate dumping margin; instead the dumping margin calculated in the original 
investigation will retrospectively apply on circumvented imports. A 
circumvention investigation is different from an ordinary AD investigation, e.g. 
no formal complaint supported by a majority of Union industry is required. 
Similarly, the AD investigation should be concluded within nine months as 
opposed to 15 months in a normal AD investigation.88 
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It is established that the original investigation was defective, as, according to 
Article 5(4) of the basic regulation, the majority of Union producers threshold 
(representing minimum 50% of total manufacture of product concerned in Union) 
threshold was not met; thus Union producers representing 48% of the total 
production of the Union were supporting the initiation of investigation.  
In this case, Philips (Pvt) Ltd. opposed the initiation of complaint; however the 
Commission excluded it from the definition of Community industry on the ground 
that it was the largest importer of dumped Chinese imports. In Electrolytic 
Aluminium Capacitors Originating in Japan, the main complainants and importer 
were sister companies. Therefore the Commission considered that import 
legitimate on the ground that these imported parts were being used to manufacture 
the principal product.89 In order to assess the possible inclusion or exclusion of a 
particular company within the ambit of Community industry, its balance of 
imports and manufacture should be assessed.90 
Further, it is determined that the EU Commission has not precisely stated the 
representative threshold of Union producers supporting the extension of measures; 
it however only states that the majority of Union producers were supporting the 
complaint. However, within the meaning of judgements in Case T-310/1291 and 
Case T-192/0892, the institutions are under obligation to reveal their findings 
completely and give appropriate statement of reasons for their actions, so that the 
interested parties can make use of these statements to challenge the institution’s 
findings in the EU Courts. In cases T-195/9593 and T-19/0194, it was concluded 
that the certainty and sound administration of justice demands that if the statement 
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of reasons are brief, it must be coherent and comprehensible with the relevant 
facts of the case and applicable law relied upon. 
Van Bael and Bellis did not find any definition of circumvention in the basic 
regulation; however decision in this regard is left on the wide discretion of the 
Commission. Normally, change of pattern means significant increase of imports 
from a third country not subject to anti-dumping duty.95 
As under Article 13(2) of the Council regulation (EC) 384/96, an assembly 
process in a third state may be measured as circumvention if it meets with the 
following three conditions: 
(a) the operation started or considerably enlarged just preceding the start of 
the AD inquiry and the parts concerned are from the republic subject to 
duty;  
(b) in no case should circumvention be thought to be occurring where the 
value added to the parts got, amid the assembling process, is above 25% of the 
manufacturing cost, and the parts must constitute 60 % or a greater amount of 
the collective estimation of the parts of the assembled item; 
(c) there is proof of dumping in connection to the NV already settled for the 
like or comparable products and the remedial impacts of the measures are 
being undermined as far as the costs and/or quantities of the assembled like 
product.  
Therefore, it could be established that the first and last condition as specified by 
Article 13(2) of the basic regulation were accurately met. The Commission’s 
claim that Ecopak registered and started business just before the imposition of AD 
duty on PRC is evident from the import data (of product concerned) exported 
from Pakistan as described below in figure 4.3. It is evident that Ecopak had no 
export of CFL to the EU before 2001. Similarly, it is also apparent that the 
remedial effect of duty imposed on PRC was undermined, as exports from 
                                                            
95 Above (n 88), 633 
71 
  
Pakistan in terms of quantity significantly increased after the imposition of duty 
on China.  
However, as far as the second condition as provided by Article 13(2) is 
concerned, it could be asked that on what basis (information or data) the 
Commission concluded that the value of assembled parts in Pakistan represents 
more than 60% of the overall value of the product concerned, or that the value 
added to the parts brought in represented less than 25% of the production cost. 
However, as adjudicated by the EU Courts in cases referred above, there is a lack 
of statement of reasons (by the Commission) about the nature and authenticity of 
data used to establish the second prerequisite of Article 13(4). 
It was established in Case T-633/1196 and Case T-192/0897 that, Article 18(1) of 
the basic regulation allows the institutions to use the facts available where an 
interested party has impeded the verification visit, refuses to provide relevant 
information or otherwise does not provide necessary information within 
prescribed time limit or provided misleading information. However, facts 
available should not necessarily be used if, information provided by the trader is 
not misleading but it is not ideal in all respects.  
It is also apparent from the judgement in Transnational Company ‘Kazchrome’ 
and ENRC Marketing v Council98, that if any of the above mentioned four 
conditions is met, Commission can use facts available for the purpose of its 
investigation. However, in this case although, non-availability of accurate 
accounts (in accordance with international standards) is a logical reason for the 
Commission to have recourse to the facts available; yet the general court in case 
T-633/11 did not consider it an ideal and preferable method. Recourse to facts 
available is authorised where no other way left to collect required information.  
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2.7 CASE ANALYSIS OF CASE T-469/07 
2.7.1 BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE 
On 16 July 2001, the Council through its Regulation (EC) No 1470/200199 levied 
a definitive ADD on imports of CFL imported from China. On 6 June 2005, the 
Council adopted Regulation (EC) No 866/2005100 extending the definitive AD 
duty on imports of same product from Pakistan, Vietnam and the Philippines 
(discussed above in detail).  
On 14 October the definitive duty expired, as it completed its five-year-term, and 
an expiry review was launched by the Commission on the request of the 
Community federation of lighting industry. In response to the questionnaires sent 
by the EU Commission to establish the Community industry threshold of 50% 
supporting the initiation of review, GE Hungary and Osram stated that they were 
in favour of such a procedure being initiated Sylvania did not reply to the 
questionnaire, while Philips opposed the initiation of expiry review.101 
The 25% threshold was achieved as two big local manufacturers supported the 
initiation; therefore, the EU Commission initiated the investigation and sent 
questionnaires to all concerned parties. By letter of 26 November 2006, GE 
Hungary informed the Commission that it was no longer in favour of AD 
measures being continued. It is to be noted that now Osram was the only 
Community producer of CFL‑i supporting continuation of the anti‑dumping 
measures at issue, as subsequently Sylvania also informed the Commission that it 
was not in favour on the initiation of expiry review. Hence, the collective output 
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of CFL‑i of Philips Poland and GE Hungary accounted for over 50% of the total 
Union production of CFL‑i.102 
However, the Commission stated that in this case, at the time when the review 
was opened, the request was supported by a majority of the union manufacture, 
but that the position had altered during the inquiry. It noted that the collective 
output of the producers opposing the request now represented slightly above than 
50% of the total Community manufacture, and it concluded that the anti‑dumping 
measures at issue ought to be repealed and the review procedure terminated.103 
On 31 August 2007, the Commission issued a general disclosure document, in 
which it stated that the period of application of the AD measures at issue should 
be extended by one year. It is stated in particular that by analogy to Art. 9(1) of 
the basic regulation104 if the Community interest test demands so, the EU 
institutions can continue the investigation regardless of the withdrawal of the 
complaint by the interested parties. However, in this case the Community 
institutions consider that it is not necessary to take a decision regarding Articles 
4(1)105 and 5(4) of the basic regulation, since it is in the Union interest to prolong 
measures for a period of one year. On 15 October 2007, the Council implemented 
Regulation 1205/2007106 levying AD duties on imports of [CFL‑i] originating 
from China, Pakistan and Vietnam. Therefore, the applicants pleaded to annul the 
Council Regulation, while, the Council of the EU and the Commission pleaded to 
dismiss the action.107 
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2.7.2 JUDGEMENT 
The General court held that Article 5(4) of the basic AD regulation No 384/96 
does not place any obligation on the Commission to terminate an AD 
investigation where the degree of support from the Union industry drops below a 
minimum requirement of 25% of Community production supporting the 
complaint. That article concerns only the level of support of the Union industry 
necessary for the Commission to be able to initiate a proceeding. Under Article 
9(1) of the said regulation, the Commission is not under an obligation to terminate 
a procedure when a complaint is withdrawn. That must apply a fortiori when the 
degree of support for a complaint merely falls.108  
Since Articles 5(4) and 9(1) of the basic regulation are applicable to review 
procedures, pursuant to Article 11(5) of that regulation, the above principles also 
apply where the level of support for the request for a review falls below the 
threshold of 50% of the Union production in the course of the review 
investigation. The institutions are thus perfectly entitled to continue the review 
procedure, notwithstanding the fact that it was possible that the 50% threshold 
referred to in Article 5(4) of the basic regulation was no longer met.109 
Furthermore, Article 9(1) of the basic regulation expressly obliges the institutions 
to take account of Community interest only if they envisage terminating the 
procedure further to the withdrawal of the complaint. Article 4(1)110 of the basic 
AD Regulation defines the term ‘Community industry’ as either manufacturers 
whose combined production of the products accounts a major share or the Union 
producers as a whole of the like products. It being understood that in both cases, 
producers coming within the situations provided for in Article 4(1) (a) may be 
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excepted from the Union production. The institutions have a broad discretion 
when choosing between the two options.111 
Furthermore, the Union industry used for the purpose of calculation of injury does 
not necessarily have to comprise the same Community producers as those making 
up the Community industry taken into account in order to ascertain whether the 
original complaint or the request for a review enjoyed sufficient support as 
provided by Article 5(4)112. Firstly, in the latter case, the Community industry 
may, in light of the wording of Article 5(4), comprise only the Union 
manufacturers backing the complaint or request for a review, whereas, in the 
former case, the definition may include all Community producers, regardless of 
whether they have expressed such support.113 
2.7.3 COMMENT 
It could be argued that the Council committed a manifest error of assessment by 
concluding that the majority of the Community industry supported the initiation 
expiry review, however factually only a single company, Orsam representing 48% 
of the EU’s CFL production supported such initiation, while the remaining three 
companies representing 52% of the EU’s industry, opposed the action. Therefore, 
it is established that the Commission and the Council infringed Article 5(4)114 of 
the basic regulation, as it states that a complaint should be considered made by the 
union industry if it is supported by manufacturers collectively producing at least 
50% of the like product in the Union.115 
It is noted that when producers are related to the importers or exporters, or they 
are importers themselves, they will not wish to support the complaint. In this case, 
the right (of other manufacturers) to file a complaint cannot be abrogated. Thus a 
complaint can be initiated by them if, after the exclusion of the related importer, 
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they fulfil the required representative threshold.116 The text of Article 4(1) (a) is 
not clear, but it seems that the 25% and 50% threshold for initiation and 
continuance of complaint will still be required.117 However, the link between 
these two thresholds is ambiguous, and it should be made more clear and 
transparent by amending article 4(1). 
The 25% threshold is too low, as it encourages non-competitive producers to join 
forces to file a complaint, instead of modernising their production plants etc.118 
Union industry means total Union industry or a majority of it; however a majority 
of Union industry cannot be represented by manufacturers accounting for 25% of 
total Union production. 
Secondly, it could be concluded that the Council has wrongly used Article 9(1) of 
the basic regulation as analogue applicable provision in the current case. Article 
9(1) of the basic regulation grants authority to the Commission that if community 
interest requires, so it may not terminate the investigation, regardless of the fact 
that the complaint is withdrawn by the complainants. Firstly, Article 9(1) relates 
with the withdrawal of fresh complaint instead of the withdrawal of request for 
expiry review. The basic regulation however lacks provision dealing with the 
withdrawal of complaint in the expiry review. Secondly, in this case the plea for 
review is not completely withdrawn however; Article 9(1) deals with the situation 
where complaint is completely withdrawn.  
If the Council’s interpretation of Article 9(1) of the basic regulation to be 
accepted, a new and potentially far-reaching power would be conferred upon it. In 
addition, this would completely emasculate the requirement set out in 
Articles 3(1), 9(4) and 11(2)119 of the basic regulation that injury to the 
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‘Community industry’ as defined in Article 4(1) of that regulation must be proven 
in order to impose AD duties. 
The Council contends that if a provision allows the institutions to continue a 
procedure where the complaint is withdrawn in its entirety, it necessarily allows 
them to do so where only part of the support is withdrawn. The Council’s 
argument is strong and logical, but as a matter of fact the Council does not have 
jurisdiction to interpret the law and apply it by analogue. Instead, the institutions 
should base their findings on straightforward and directly related provisions.  
This thesis also objects to Article 9(1) of the basic regulation because of the 
inconsistency of Article 9(1) and Article 5(4)120 with each other. The former 
requires representation of at least of 50% of the Community industry to continue 
the investigation; however, the latter provides that if the representative threshold 
of 50% is not met, the Commission can continue the investigation on its own, 
bearing the Community interest involved. But the question may arise that where 
local manufacturers, exporters, importers or consumers do not have any concern 
or complain, there is no point to continue the proceedings on its own by the 
institution. 
In Case T-249/06121 it was established that Article 5(4) of the basic regulation 
does not place any obligation on the institutions to terminate the investigation if it 
lose the prescribed threshold of support of 25% from the Community industry, 
instead it is only related to the initiation of the investigation. The Court further 
referred to Article 9(1) of the basic regulation, where in case of withdrawal of the 
complaint by the complainants, the Commission is under no obligation to 
terminate the proceedings, if the Community interest demands so. But it should be 
noted that the same Article requires local manufacturers representing 50% of the 
overall production in the Community of the concerned product, in order to 
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consider that the particular investigation is carried out on behalf of the Union 
industry.  
While defining the notion of Union industry, Article 4(1)122 of the basic regulation 
provides that either it could be the whole industry of the Union or it may be the 
major proportion of the industry representing at least 50% of them. Therefore, 
according to the Court, institutions enjoy wide discretion to exclude particular 
local manufacturers from the ambit of the Community industry, based on 
particular grounds. It is to be noted that in the original investigation, while 
defining the Community industry, the Commission included the whole local 
industry for the purpose of determination of injury.  
However, in the current investigation of review, the Commission opted to stick to 
the second option, i.e. local industry representing 50% of total produce of the 
product concerned. Therefore, in their current definition of the Community 
industry, they opted to confine it to two manufacturers namely Osram and GE 
Hungary, while excluding Philips and Sylvania from its definition of the 
Community industry. It is noted that the Commission has wide discretion in terms 
of defining Union industry, and in many cases it is unclear why it has included 
one manufacturer and excluded another. The EU Court of Justice has reaffirmed 
the Commission’s discretion in this regard. However, the Commission’s definition 
of Union industry varies from case to case.123 
It is further argued that the Commission must define the Community industry in 
the same way both in the original investigation and in the review procedure, as, it 
will bring more consistency and efficacy to the procedures. Otherwise, a flexible 
manoeuvring of procedures by the Commission may tend to unduly prejudice 
either of the parties. The Commission has profoundly excluded those Community 
producers which were against the initiation of expiry review, and it does not seem 
to be just.  
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Mickus argues that the basic regulations do not provide any criteria about 
minimum added value that can form the basis for a decision whether or not a 
related producer should be included within the definition of Union industry. 
However, the Commission has adopted certain arbitrary criteria in this regard. The 
institutions consider them within the ambit of Union industry, if they act to a large 
extent as an autonomous economic entity.124 
Secondly, if the institution’s and court’s verdict is accepted that the inclusion of 
the said Community manufacturers was inappropriate, considering the fact that 
they were overwhelmingly involved in imports from China, then also they must 
not be part of the original investigation, although it is not an consistent ground to 
exclude a local manufacturer from the ambit of Community industry. Within the 
meaning of judgements in Case T-423/09125 and Case T-299/05126, institutions 
can only use a different methodology in review and in the original investigation if 
circumstances in both cases have significantly changed. However in the current 
case neither change of circumstances occurred and nor did the Council and 
Commission use it as ground of their decision.  
It is ruled in Cases T-558/12127 and T-310/12128 that statement of reasons must be 
detailed and clear and unambiguous providing an opportunity to all interested 
parties to understand the rationale of the adopted measures by the authorities and 
thus to facilitate them to defend their rights, and the Courts of the European Union 
to exercise their powers of review. The question whether statement of reasons 
provided by the Commission meet the requirements of Article 296 TFEU must be 
assed not only within the light of wording but also the meaning and context of the 
said Article. The circumstances of each case and the legal rules governing the 
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issue should also be considered.129 However, the General court held in cases T-
387/94 and T-164/94 that it is not necessary for institutions to state the reason for 
every factual and legal consideration involved.  
However, it is also found that the Council has failed to state adequate reasons for 
its conclusion under Article 296 TFEU. The Council and Commission could not 
reasonably establish whether Community industry representing 48% production of 
the Community could be considered as major industry of the Community. The 
institutions also could not logically establish the proper reasons for the 
elimination of Philips and Sylvania from the ambit of the Union industry. 
Similarly, the institutions’ reasoning regarding application of different 
methodology in the original and review investigation is weak.   
In Case T-385/11130 and Case T-35/01131 the General Court held that EU 
Commission have wide discretionary powers due to the complex economic factors 
involved, therefore judicial review is restricted to observing whether procedures 
have been followed properly, if the fact relied upon by the investigative bodies 
have been accurately stated or whether there is any manifest error of assessment 
or misuse of powers. It is however contended that although Article 4(1) of the 
basic regulation renders discretion to the Commission to define the Union 
industry itself, either in the form of the whole industry or a major portion of the 
Community industry, the Commission must use its discretion diligently, based on 
strong grounds. 
Fritzsche defined discretion as the power of decision-makers to decide on the 
application of the relevant law to a particular set of facts or situation. The 
discretionary powers are invoked when statutory laws do not provide express 
guidance for a specific situation. The judicial review is, however, the revision of 
the administrative actions of decision--makers (in this case the Commission and 
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the Council), to assess whether relevant bodies have acted upon the express and 
implied will of the applicable law.132 
According to Galligan, two variables are essential for the central sense of 
discretion: the opportunity for calculation and judgement available to the 
decision-makers; and the surrounding approach of the officials to how the issue 
should be resolved.133 However, it is argued that there is no standard regarding the 
clarity of statutory provisions, as the express provisions may also offer multiple 
interpretations. 
According to Advocate General Lèger, technical discretion is granted to the 
administrative bodies, and it is justified by the complexity of economic 
calculations.134 Further, he noted that, in the case of technical discretion, EU 
courts exercised judicial review very strictly. However, in the presence of 
consensus of the legal literature about the politicised use of AD measures 
worldwide, it is suggested that courts should actively review the exercise of 
discretionary powers by investigative authorities. Koutrakos noted that where the 
EU Courts have refrained to review the substantive issues in AD proceedings, 
they have however adopted a more liberal approach in procedural issues involved 
in AD investigations.135  
Vermulst established that the EU Courts (the General Court and ECJ) used to take 
almost five years to review the findings of the administrative bodies. The judicial 
review process is, however, quite slow although it should be a ‘prompt review’ 
according to Article 13 ADA. The EU courts have been found to be reluctant to 
review the substantive issues (as opposed to the procedural issues). Mostly, their 
decisions about limited judicial review or comprehensive judicial review were 
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based on their usual practice instead of law. He opined that this problem can be 
solved only by the amendment of ADA, providing for the constitution of 
specialised courts.136 The issue of discretion and its judicial review has been 
further explored in sections 3.5.3, 4.5.4 and 5.6. 
2.8  CONCLUSION  
The current chapter has attempted to answer the first research question of this 
study. It has examined the provisional and definitive ADDs respectively, imposed 
by the Commission and the Council, on imports of PET, originating from 
Pakistan. The complaint for imposition of ADD on ethyl alcohol, originating from 
Pakistan; and later withdrawal of that complaint, has also been discussed in detail. 
Similarly, the application of ADD on imports of CFL, originating from China, and 
its extension to import of CFL, assembled in Pakistan; due to alleged 
circumvention of AD measures has been investigated.  
However, in the last section, the judgment of the General Court is analysed 
pertaining to the requirement that, Union industry having at least 50% share in the 
Union production must support the imposition of ADD on foreign exports. 
Through, such examination, this chapter pin-point the occasions, where the 
institutions deviated from the express provisions of the basic regulation, and 
recommended some changes to the broad provisions of the basic regulation, which 
tend to offer multiple interpretation. The next chapter is examining the 
consistency of EU institutions in their application of ADD on cotton-type bed 
linen originating from Pakistan. 
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Table 2.1: Anti-dumping duties imposed on all other Pakistani exports except textile products 
Source: Developed by researcher 
Product Internal 
Case 
Number 
Country Status Norm
al 
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y 
Original Investigation Measures in force Interim & Sunset Review Corrigen
da, Other 
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Initiation 
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es 
Def. 
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Terminatio
n 
Type of 
Measures 
Level 
(Min-
Max) 
Initiation Outco
me 
OJ 
Referenc
e 
Bicycles R608 Pakistan Investigation 
continues 
 L 265, 
03.09.2014, 
p. 5 
          
Ethyl Alcohol AD 492 Pakistan Terminated  C129, 
26.05.2005,
p. 22 
  L112, 
26.04.2006, 
p. 13 
       
Lamps 
(integrated 
electronic 
compact 
fluorescent) 
 Pakistan Expired  L289, 
10.9.2004, 
p. 54 
 L145, 
09.06.20
05, p. 1 
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valorem 
66.10
% 
C167, 
19.07.20
06, p. 13 
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of 
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es 
L272, 
17.10.20
07, p. 1 
Expiry 
C258, 
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2008 p.8 
Extension of 
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to Vietnam, 
Pakistan, 
Philippines 
Polyethylene 
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(PET) 
AD 545 Pakistan Terminated  C208, 
03.09.2009, 
p. 12 
  L254, 29-
09-10, p.40 
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in SL by 
L281, 27-
10-10 
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Polyethylene 
terephthalate 
(PET) 
AS546, 
AS 
546a 
Pakistan Definitive 30-09-
2015 
C208, 
03.09.2009, 
p. 7 
L134, 
01.06.2
010, p. 
25 
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 Specific 44,02 
EUR/to
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   C 138, 
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13, p. 32 
L253, 25-
09-2 
Reopening 
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judgement  (T-
556/12) leading to 
amendment of 
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NiE C10, 15-1-13 
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CHAPTER THREE: IMPOSITION OF ANTI-DUMPING 
DUTIES ON BED LINEN ORIGINATING FROM PAKISTAN: 
ANALYSIS OF EU COMMISSION’S INVESTIGATIONS AND 
THE JUDGEMENTS OF THE EU COURTS 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
Continuing the discussion (as done in the previous chapter) about the  of EU 
institutions in their application of EU anti-dumping (AD) law relating to Pakistan 
(the first research question), this chapter attempts to examine the Commission’s 
investigations which led to the application of provisional or definitive AD duty on 
bed linen originating from Pakistan. The consistency and/or inconsistency of the 
EU is established on the basis of dissimilar or similar calculations drawn by the 
Commission (about comparison, normal value and dumping margin etc.) in two 
different cases but having similar circumstances. Similarly, the interpretation of 
provisions of basic regulation as drawn by the Commission and EU Courts are 
cross-checked against each other, thus their corroboration or contradiction is 
figured out. 
3.2  PROVISIONAL ANTI-DUMPING DUTY IMPOSED ON 
COTTON-TYPE BED LINEN THROUGH REGULATION 
(EC) NO 1069/97 
On behalf of Union manufacturers constituting a significant extent of Union 
generation of cotton-type bed linen, on 30 July 1996 an application was filed by 
the Committee of the Cotton and Allied Textile Industries of the European 
Communities (Eurocoton). The application contained proof of material injury and 
dumping of the said item traded from Pakistan, India and Egypt. The proof was 
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viewed as adequate to legitimise the start of an inquiry.1 Notices were issued to all 
the concerned parties to give an opportunity of hearing before the Commission 
and to make known themselves.2 
According to the majority of Union manufacturers clearly supporting the 
complaint, the importers and the foreign exporters from India, Pakistan and Egypt, 
the Commission decided to make use of sampling techniques, and sent 
questionnaires to and received detailed information from a representative sample 
of Community producers, exporters and importers.3 
The Commission conducted verification visits at the sites of sampled Union 
manufacturers, importers and foreign exporters. In terms of Pakistan they 
conducted verification visits at the premises of the following Pakistani exporter:- 
Al-Abid Silk Mills Ltd, Karachi; Al-Abid Export (Pvt) Ltd, Karachi;  Fateh 
Textile Mills, Hyderabad; Gul Ahmed Textiles Mills Ltd, Karachi; Excel Textile 
Mills Ltd, Karachi; and Mohammad Farooq Textile Mills Ltd, Karachi. These 
traders constituted approximately 77% of the entire exports into the Union from 
Pakistan.4 
3.2.1 PRODUCT CONCERNED AND LIKE PRODUCT 
The procedure includes bed linen of cotton-type fibres, bleached, coloured or 
printed, unadulterated or blended with man-made fibres or flax. Bed linen 
incorporates bed sheets, pillow cases and duvet spreads, bundled available to be 
purchased either in sets or independently. The Commission inspected whether the 
cotton-type bed cloth created in Egypt, India and Pakistan and sold on the Union 
business sector and on their local markets is similar to cotton-type bed linen 
manufactured by Union producers and sold on the Union market.5 
                                                            
1Commission Regulation (EC) No 1069/97 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports 
of cotton-type bed linen originating in Egypt, India and Pakistan [1997] OJ L 156/11 
2 Commission Notice of initiation of anti-dumping proceedings concerning imports of cotton-type 
bed linen originating in Egypt, India and Pakistan [11996] C 266/02 
3 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1069/97, Para 15-18 
4 Ibid, Para 8 
5 Ibid, Para 10-12 
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The Commission concluded that although, there were differences in making and 
bled of the cotton-type bed linen manufactured in Pakistan and the bed linen 
manufactured in the Union market but they share common usage and common 
basic characteristics. Therefore, within the ambit of Article 1(4) cotton-type bed 
linen sold in the Union market and the bed linen manufactured in Pakistan were 
considered like products.6 
3.2.2 NORMAL VALUE 
It was found that only one trader in the sample was having representative trades of 
product concerned on the local market throughout the investigation period (IP). 
Based on the comparability criteria, the Commission found that domestic and 
export types of the company with representative domestic sales did not permit a 
proper comparison. Therefore, according to Article 2 (3) of the basic regulation, 
for all types sold for export to the Union by all Pakistani traders in the sample, the 
normal value has to be computed based on the constructed price for the products 
exported to the Union.7 
For the company with representative local sales it was found that less than 80% 
but more than 10% of the locally sold types were profitable (i.e. sold at prices 
above cost of manufacture plus selling, general and administrative (SG&A). Thus, 
such trades were considered as made in the ordinary course of trade. 
Consequently, the SG&A incurred and the profit margin earned in these profitable 
sales was used in constructing normal value for all Pakistani companies in the 
sample.8 
On this basis, the Commission determined the constructed value by accumulating 
to the budget of manufacture of the exported types of all exporters the expanse of 
SG&A and profit acquired individually by the exporter with representative 
profitable national sales. Two companies claimed that costs corresponding to idle 
capacity should not be taken into account in calculating constructed normal value 
                                                            
6 Ibid, Para 12-14 
7 Ibid, Para 35 
8 Ibid, Para 35 
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(NV) bearing the exceptional circumstances resulting from civil disorder on a 
major scale in Karachi during the investigation period. Given that these 
companies did not submit sufficient accounting evidence from their records which 
would justify a deviation from the cost allocations historically utilised, the 
Commission provisionally did not accept these claims when calculating dumping 
margins.9 
3.2.3 EXPORT PRICE 
For the most part, sales of bed linen made by the manufacturers on the Union 
were made to autonomous consumers. Hence according to the Article 2 (8) of the 
basic regulation, the export price was established by reference to the costs really 
paid. One Pakistani trader nonetheless, sold some portion of its exports to a 
related importer situated in the Union. For the transactions made through the 
related importer, the export prices were adjusted pursuant to Article 2 (9) of 
Council regulation (EC) 384/96. In this regard, account was made of profits 
normally accruing and all charges, including taxes and duties, sustained during 
resale and importation, so that a reliable export price could be established.10 
3.2.4 COMPARISON 
With the end goal of guaranteeing a reasonable comparison between export price 
and NV, and to review the differences influencing price comparability, due 
remittances as adjustments were made where material and applicable. An 
adjustment to normal value was claimed by all Pakistani exporters/producers in 
respect of import charges by the materials physically incorporated in the like 
product, while envisioned for consumption in Pakistan and reimbursed on export 
of the product concerned in accordance with relevant Pakistani legislation. 
However, the investigation revealed that the amounts of import charges and duties 
refunded exceeded the verifiable amounts actually included in the cost of the raw 
                                                            
9 Ibid, Para 36 
10 Ibid, Para 37-38 
89 
  
materials utilised. Therefore, as per Article 2 (10) (b),11 the adjustment was 
restricted to the amounts actually included in the cost of the raw materials.12 
3.2.5 DUMPING MARGIN 
In general, weighted average export price and weighted average constructed NV 
was compared by type-to-type. However, with regard to five Pakistani traders, 
every export transaction referred to a different product type. A comparison of 
individual NV, as determined for these companies with individual EP to the 
Union on a transaction by transaction basis, was therefore made in respect of these 
Pakistani exporters/producers.13 
The comparison presented the presence of dumping in relation to all exporters 
which completely participated in the inquiry. The provisional dumping margins 
presented as a proportion of export price at Union market was calculated at the 
following rate: Al-Abid Silk Mills Ltd, 8.2%, A1 Abid Export (Pvt) Ltd, 8.2%, 
Al-Karam Textile Mills (Pvt) Ltd, 2.6%, Fateh Textile Mills Ltd, 7.9%, Gul 
Ahmed Textile Mills Ltd, 0.2% (de minimis), Excel Textile Mills Ltd, 0.2% (de 
minimis), Mohammed Farooq Textile Mills Ltd, 6.6%.14 
The average dumping margin of the manufacturers in the sample, weighted on the 
premise of their export turnover to the Union, was ascribed to the collaborating 
traders not chosen in the sample. While figuring the average dumping margin de 
minimis dumping margins were neglected as per Article 9 (6) of the regulation. 
The average provisional dumping margin for Pakistan was computed at the rate of 
6.5% of export price.15 
For non-collaborating manufacturers (as per Article 18 of the regulation), 
dumping margin was resolved on the premise of the available facts. The 
                                                            
11 Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 of 22 December 1995 on protection against dumped or 
subsidised imports by the countries which are not member of European Community, OJ L56, 
1996, 1, art 2(8) 
12 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1069/97, Para 39-45 
13 Ibid, Para 46 
14 Ibid, Para 49 
15 Ibid, Para 50 
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Commission affirmed that it will cast a benefit for the non-co-operating traders for 
their non-co-operation if, as compare to the highest dumping margin calculated 
for the co-operated trader, a lower dumping margin is calculated for non-co-
operatives Along these lines, it was viewed as suitable to set the DM for non-
coordinating traders in every concerned market at the level of the most elevated 
DM set up for a trader in each sample. Thus, the dumping margin for non-
cooperating companies from Pakistan was set at 8.2% of export price.16 
3.2.6 ALLEGATION OF INJURY 
In figuring out whether or not the Union business was enduring material injury, 
the Commission considered all the monetary pointers, including volume and share 
of dumped imports in the Union’s market, costs of the imports concerned, 
circumstances of the Union business, and combined evaluation of the impacts of 
dumped imports.17 
The Commission noted the decline in market share of Union producers and the 
total production of the EU. It also authenticated the tough circumstances in which 
the enduring Union industry was working. The point that these remaining local 
manufacturers remained capable of sustaining market share and production must 
not undermine the calculation of overall condition. Thus, the Commission came to 
the perspective that the Union business had endured material damage.18 
3.2.7 ANALYSIS 
It is noted that there is no specific provision in the WTO Agreement or the basic 
regulation addressing the assessment criteria of ‘product concerned’. The WTO 
law and practice has also promulgated that the definition and assessment criteria 
of ‘like product’ cannot be transposed to the assessment of ‘product concerned’.19 
However, the EU Commission’s practice reveals that it determines ‘product 
                                                            
16 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1069/97, Para 51 
17 Ibid 
18 Ibid 
19 WT/DS337/R, WTO Panel Report, European Communities-Anti-Dumping Measures on Farmed 
Salmon from Norway, (adopted on 16 November 2007) 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/337r_e.pdf  
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concerned’ on these grounds: (a) physical, technical and chemical characteristics; 
(b) main use; (c) degree of interchange ability; (d) consumer perception; (e) 
manufacturing process and cost of production. However, the Commission is rarely 
found to consider (for assessment of product concerned and like product) factors 
other than physical, technical and chemical characteristics, and end users.20 
In the current investigation also, the Commission established the comparability of 
product concerned (being manufactured in the Union) and like product (being sold 
on the Pakistani market). Although unbleached bed linen and printed bed linen 
went through different processing procedures and have differences in terms of 
yarn count, the Commission considered them as like products, as they share same 
technical characteristics. Thus, the Commission relied upon similar technical and 
physical characteristics, and ignored the differences in terms of production 
process etc. The Union institutions do not pay much attention to the difference of 
production process unless such difference affects the basic physical and technical 
characteristics of ‘like product’. 
However, Van Bael and Bellis noted some instances where products having 
similar physical and technical characteristics were considered as distinguished on 
the basis of their end use. In other cases, the institutions have considered product 
concerned and like product as identical although they had different end uses. In 
the current investigation, exporters claimed that unbleached bed linen and printed 
bed linen have different end uses as, unlike the latter, the former is used in hotels 
and hospitals only. But the Commission did not find a difference in their end 
uses.21  
                                                            
20 Van Bael and Ballis, EU Anti-Dumping and other Trade Defence Instruments (5th Edition, 
Kluwer Law International 2011) 211, Marco Broncken and Natalie McNelis, ‘Rethinking the 
“Like Product” Definition in WTO Antidumping Law’ (1999) 33 (3) Journal of World Trade 73-
91 
21 Ibid, 214; Nicholas Khan, Wolfgang Müller and Hans-Adolf Neumann, EC Anti-Dumping Law- 
A Commentary on Regulation 384/96 (Chichester John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 1998) 
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It was established by the EU Courts in Case T-274/0222 and Case C-351/0423 that 
Article 2(11) of the basic regulation provides for a symmetrical method and an 
asymmetrical method for the computation of DM. The investigative body could 
not, however, use both of them at the same time. They also ruled that the practice 
zeroing of does not find any basis from Article 2(11) of the basic regulation. 
The review of the investigation establishes that the EU Commission unduly had 
recourse to zeroing. Article 2(11) of the basic regulation demands to compare 
average constructed NV with the average export price. Conversely, the EU 
Commission, while calculating average dumping margin, ignored the transactions 
where normal value was found to be higher than the export price. 
Zeroing may be practiced in various ways through the calculation of dumping 
margin in the investigation procedure. As Merit Janow and Robert Staiger have 
established, it is difficult to figure out the economic merits of zeroing because it is 
unclear why dumping should be condemned in the first place.24 However, the 
author noted that neither Article 2 of the basic regulation nor the judgements of 
the EU Courts acknowledge the practice of zeroing. It follows that the Union 
institutions performed in contradiction to Article 2(11) of the basic regulation by 
applying, in the estimation of the dumping margin for the item under scrutiny, the 
act of ‘Zeroing’ to negative dumping margin for each of the concerned product 
type. 
However, Van Bael and Bellis argue that the basic regulation does not necessitate 
the institutions to state reasons when weighted-average to a single transaction 
based methodology is used, although this is a requirement under the WTO 
Agreement. The question is whether the institutions state reasons when they use 
                                                            
22 Case T-274/02, Ritek Corp. and Prodisc Technology Inc. v Council of the European Union  
[2006] ECR II-04305, paras 54-58 
23 Case C-351/04, Ikea Wholesale Ltd v Commissioners of Custom and Excise [2007] ECR I-
07723, Para 5 
24 Merit Janow and Robert Staiger, ‘EC – Bed Linen: European Communities – Anti-Dumping 
Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India’ in Henrik Horn and Petros Mavroidis 
(eds), The WTO Case Law of 2001: The American Law Institute Reporters’ Studies (Cambridge 
University Press, 2003) 115; Jonathan Branton, ‘The E.C. washes its dirty bed linen - is the saga 
over yet?’ (2002) 8 (2) International Trade Law and Regulation 64, 66 
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weighted- average to a transaction based method. In the current investigation, 
however, they do not sufficiently state the reasons in this regard.25 
Moreover, it was established by the EU Court in Case T-249/0626, Case T-
444/1127 and Case C-200/0928 that the party who is claiming adjustments under 
Article 2(10) of Regulation No 384/96 in order to make the NV and the export 
price comparable for the purpose of determining the dumping margin must prove 
that his claim is justified and based on some significant evidence.  
However, in this investigation it is not clear how the EU Commission established 
that the claimed amount of indirect taxes was exceeding the verifiable amounts 
actually borne in the cost of raw material. It is not known how the EU 
Commission verified the so-called verifiable indirect taxes. The investigating 
institutions are supposed to base their finding on some strong direct or 
circumstantial evidence. This regulation, however, lacks adequate reasons for 
assessment or ground to reject the claimed adjustment by Pakistani traders. 
Following, the General Court held in Case T-407/0629 that the basic regulation did 
not give the right to calculate individual dumping margin to the exporters who 
were not included in the sample. The researcher argues that although sometimes, 
due to the majority of exporters involved, it is difficult for the institutions to 
calculate individual dumping margin for all, however, it does not mean that while 
calculating average dumping margin for them, the institutions should ignore the 
de minimis dumping margin. 
                                                            
25 Above (n 20), 124 
26 Case T-249/06, Interpipe Nikopolsky Seamless Tubes Plant Niko Tube ZAT (Interpipe Niko Tube 
ZAT) and Interpipe Nizhnedneprovsky Tube Rolling Plant VAT (Interpipe NTRP VAT) v Council of 
the European Union [2009] ECR I-01335, Para 180 
27 Case T- 444/11, Gold East Paper (Jiangsu) Co. Ltd and Gold Huasheng Paper (Suzhou 
Industrial Park) Co. Ltd v Council of the European Union  [2014] OJ C 298, Para 62-63 
28 Joined Cases C- 191/09 and Case C- 200/09, Council of the European Union and Commission of 
the European Communities v Interpipe Nikopolsky Seamless Tubes Plant Niko Tube ZAT 
(Interpipe Niko Tube ZAT) and Interpipe Nizhnedneprovsky Tube Rolling Plant VAT (Interpipe 
NTRP VAT)  [2012] OJ C 193, Para 58 
29 Joined Cases T-407/06 and Case T-408/06,  Zhejiang Aokang Shoes Co., Ltd and Wenzhou 
Taima Shoes Co., Ltd v Council of the European Union  [2010] ECR II-00747, Para 85-91 
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This thesis objects to Article 9(6)30 of the basic regulation, as it seems to be un-
justified to ignore de minimis dumping margin through calculation of average 
dumping margin for co-operating exporters not part of the sample. The sample of 
seven manufacturers/exporters represents the whole cotton-type bed linen industry 
of Pakistan, therefore as the EU Commission calculated individual dumping 
margin for all seven exporters ranging from 8.2% to 0.2%, in the same way 
individual dumping margin should also be calculated for the cooperating 
companies that were not part of the sample.31  
There may be many companies like Excel Textile Mills Ltd or Gul Ahmed 
Textiles Ltd having de minimis dumping margin. Therefore, by excluding the de 
minimis dumping margin while calculating average dumping margin for co-
operating exporters not part of the sample, the EU Commission may have 
prejudiced other companies having dumping margins less than 6.5%, or which are 
not dumping on the EU market at all. Apparently there is no logical reason for 
neglecting the de minimis dumping margin.32 
Moreover, it also invalidates the sample created by the EU Commission for the 
purpose of the investigation. This sample of seven companies represented more 
than 35% of Pakistan’s bed linen export industry. But as for the purpose of 
calculation of average dumping margin for companies outside the sample, EU 
Commission has ignored the de minimis dumping margin of two companies out of 
seven in the sample. Now the question may arise, what was the representative 
value of the rest of the sample comprising five companies after striking out two 
companies from the original sample?  
There may be multiple possibilities in this regard, supposedly one of them may be 
that the export magnitude of the companies having de minimis dumping margin 
were representing only 3% of the Pakistani export to the EU market. In this case 
the remaining sample of five companies may still be considered reliable, as they 
still represent 32% of Pakistani bed linen export to the EU. But in another 
                                                            
30 Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96, art 9(6) 
31 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1069/97 
32 Ibid 
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proposition if these two exporters having de minimis dumping margin constitute 
15% of the Pakistani export to EU, then it means that the EU Commission is 
calculating the average dumping margin for the rest of 65% of traders (supposing 
all of them were cooperating) on the basis of sampled exporters representing only 
20% of Pakistani export. 
The researcher, however, contends that the latter situation may raise serious 
questions of fairness and consistency of proceedings, especially for those 65% 
cooperating exporters not part of the sample. Therefore, this thesis strongly 
disagrees with the content of Article 9(6) of the basic regulation, and recommends 
the inclusion of de minimis dumping margin while calculating average dumping 
margin for cooperating traders. And cooperating traders should not be prejudiced 
for their cooperation. 
In Cases T-633/11,33 T-462/0434 and Case T-413/03,35 the General Court notes 
that regard for the rights ensured by the EU legal framework is considerably 
significant, especially where the EU administrative institutions have wide 
arbitrary powers. Those guarantees include, in particular, the privilege of the 
individual concerned to make his perspectives known, the obligation of the 
competent authority to look deliberately and un-biasedly at all the important parts 
of the individual case and to have an adequately reasoned decision. 
Within the meaning of the above-mentioned cases it is found that the EU 
Commission misinterpreted Article 2(6) (a) of the basic regulation, whereby it 
used the reported SG&A costs of a single trader to calculate the normal value of 
other traders, as their domestic sale was not found to be in ordinary course of 
business. However, Article 2(6) (a) only authorises to use average SG&A cost 
reported by other exporters and traders. Thus it could not base upon the SG&A 
cost as reported by the single exporter, because instead of singular, plural term is 
                                                            
33  Case T- 633/11, Guangdong Kito Ceramics Co. Ltd v Council of the European Union  [2014] 
OJ C 32, Para 43 
34 Case T-462/04, HEG Ltd and Graphite India Ltd v Council of the European Union [2008] ECR 
II-03685, Para 68 
35 Case T-413/03 Shandong Reipu Biochemicals Co. Ltd v Council of the European Union [2006] 
ECR II-02243, Para 63 
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used in the said Article. And where the meaning and text of the legislation is 
clear, recourse should not be made to its reasoning. 
According to Van Bael and Bellis, the average SG&A costs should be constructed 
on the basis of all transactions of the exporting industry regardless of whether 
they are profitable or non-profitable. They noted that the basic regulation leaves 
space for the EU Commission and the Council to leave out sales not made in the 
ordinary course of trade.36   
3.3  IMPOSITION OF DEFINITIVE AD DUTY ON PAKISTANI 
COTTON-TYPE BED LINEN THROUGH (EC) 2398/97 
Following the imposition of provisional AD duty, it was transformed in to 
definitive measures through Council Regulation (EC) 2398/97.  
3.3.1 NORMAL VALUE 
A Pakistani exporter claimed that the costs of one of material incorporated in the 
product concerned includes its own SG&A costs thus, for the purpose of 
construction of normal value, the SG&A costs of the material incorporated 
reported by the exporter should be deducted from the SG&A cost of the product 
concerned as a whole. Otherwise, double counting of SG&A costs will tend to 
calculate higher normal value.37 
3.3.2 COMPARISON 
The adjustments made by the Commission for all import charges and duties born 
by the product concerned or materials physically incorporated in the product 
concerned were challenged by all Pakistani traders, when product concerned was 
expected to be used in Pakistan and reimbursed on export of the product under 
investigation in accordance with the Pakistani legislation. They argued that the 
                                                            
36 Above (n 20), 74 
37Council Regulation (EC) No 2398/97 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of 
cotton-type bed linen originating in Egypt, India and Pakistan [1997] OJ L 332/1, Para 14-17 
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rate of adjustment should be expressed in the form of percentage of the production 
charges and then it should be deducted from the constructed normal value.38  
The Commission denied the plea stating that the calculation of adjustment rate on 
the basis of production charges of the product concerned could only be applied on 
the appropriate grounds; as normal value is the domestic price of the product 
concerned therefore, the argument could not be accepted.39 
3.3.3 DUMPING MARGIN 
As per the provisional regulation, and after review, the NV was compared with 
the EP, the comparison conducted showed the existence of dumping margin 
regarding all transactions subject to investigation. The Commission calculated the 
dumping margin as percentage of import price of the product concerned born by 
the Union importers on the Union borders which is described as follows: 
Al-Abid Silk Mills Ltd 6.7%, A1 Abid Export (Pvt) Ltd 6.7%, Al-Karam Textile 
Mills Ltd 1.3% (de minimis), Fateh Textile Mills Ltd 6.3%,  Gul Ahmed Textile 
Mills 0.1% (de minimis) Ltd, Excel Textile Mills Ltd 0.1% (de minimis), 
Mohammad Farooq Textile Mills Ltd 1.8% (de minimis) .40 
For those Pakistani traders and exporters who were co-operating but could not 
made part of sample, an average dumping margin was calculated for them based 
upon overall average of individual dumping margin of sampled traders. For the 
purpose of calculation of average dumping margin, the de minimis dumping 
margins calculated for certain sampled exporters were ignored. The Commission 
claimed that it did so within the meaning of Article 9(6) of the basic regulation. 
The definitive dumping margin for Pakistan was calculated at the rate 6.4% of 
export price.41 
                                                            
38 Ibid, Para 25-26 
39 Ibid, Para 27 
40 Ibid, Para 29 
41 Ibid, Para 30 
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3.3.4 ANALYSIS 
However, it is a customary practice of the EU institutions that if there is any 
compensatory arrangement among exporter and importer regarding the export 
price, then EU institutions calculate the export price by themselves as they 
calculate the normal value. There was evidence about such compensatory 
arrangements between Pakistani exporter and European importer. Therefore, the 
EU institution was rightly obliged by the basic regulation to consider such export 
price as unreliable. 
The objective of the adjustments to normal value is to ensure fair comparison 
between NV and EP at the same level of trade by adjusting the factors which 
affect price comparability. The burden of proof lies on the party, which claims for 
upward or downward adjustment. The same was established in Cases T-88/98 and 
C-191/09,42 that where a producer claims that an adjustment of the normal value, 
in principle downward, or an adjustment of the export price, logically upward, 
applies, it is for that operator to indicate and to establish that the conditions for 
granting such an adjustment are satisfied.43 
This objection was raised by all Pakistani exporters during the course of 
provisional measures. But the EU Commission adjusted normal value (as far as it 
considered it justified) for indirect taxes borne by physical raw material 
incorporated in the product concerned, regardless of the evidence produced by 
Pakistani exporters in the form of refund receipts of import duties borne by the 
product concerned issued by the Government of Pakistan.  
It is a settled rule established by the case laws that if investigative bodies reject 
any adjustment to normal value requested by concerned parties, they should have 
diligent reasons behind that. Czako et al. argue that although the basic regulation 
provides for adjustments to the NM and EP in order to ensure fair comparison 
                                                            
42 Joined Cases C-191/09 and Case C-200/09, Council of the European Union and Commission of 
the European Communities v Interpipe Nikopolsky Seamless Tubes Plant Niko Tube ZAT 
(Interpipe Niko Tube ZAT) and Interpipe Nizhnedneprovsky Tube Rolling Plant VAT (Interpipe 
NTRP VAT)  [2012] OJ C 193, Para 58 
43 Case T-88/98, Kundan Industries Ltd and Tata International Ltd v Council of the European 
Union [2002] ECR II-04897, Para 96 
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among them, it does not provide any guideline regarding how these adjustments 
should be made. This means that investigative authorities have wide discretion to 
decide about it.44 
However, the Commission’s statement during the course of provisional measures 
that the reimbursement of indirect taxes by the government of Pakistan to 
Pakistani exporters seems to be higher than actual indirect taxes paid by Pakistani 
exporters, seems to be too vague, as the EU Commission does not refer to the 
reasons of such belief in the presence of refund receipts issued by government of 
Pakistan.  
The researcher suggests the amendment of Article 9(6) of the basic regulation and 
the relevant provision from the WTO Agreement, as it prejudices the exporters 
and strongly favours the country imposing duties. As in this case, out of a sample 
of seven exporters from Pakistan, four exporters have de minimis dumping 
margin, while only three (or in another way only two exporters, as Al Abid Silk 
and Al Albid Export are the same group of companies) have significant dumping 
margin. Therefore, it seems unjustified to calculate average dumping margin 
while ignoring de minimis dumping margin regardless of the possibility that the 
companies having de minimis dumping margin may have representative export 
from Pakistan probably constituting more than 50% of export from Pakistan. 
In this case, for example, three exporters whose dumping margin is used to 
calculate the average dumping margin collectively represent only 15% of 
Pakistani exports to the EU. And the remaining four exporters out of the sample 
having de minimis dumping margin represent more than 35% of Pakistani bed 
linen exports to the EU. Then it means that the Commission calculated average 
dumping margin for the rest of the cooperating exporters representing about 50% 
of export, from Pakistan on the basis of three exporters having around 15% of 
export while ignoring those having 35% export.  
                                                            
44 Judith Czako, Johan Human and Jorge Miranda, A Handbook on Anti-dumping Investigation 
(Cambridge University Press 2003) 119 
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3.4  TERMINATION OF PROCEEDINGS WITH REGARD TO 
IMPORTS OF BED LINEN FROM PAKISTAN 
After the imposition of definitive AD measures, India challenged the EU 
Commission’s calculation of average dumping margin and normal value. It 
alleged that the EU Commission has applied ‘Zeroing’ while calculating average 
dumping margin. The WTO Appellate Panel took action in this case of India 
against the EU, and declared it against the principles of free and fair trade, which 
was basically the objective behind the enforcement of AD laws.45 Following the 
verdict of the WTO Appellate Panel in this case, the Council, by Regulation (EC) 
No 1644/2001, considered it appropriate to amend and suspend the definitive AD 
duty on bed linen importing from India.46  
The Council also decided to reconsider the calculation of dumping margin in the 
light of the EU panel report and to determine whether, in the absence of the 
application of zeroing, there was any dumping at all. All other calculation 
methods used are those applied in the original inquiry. Pursuant to the first 
sentence of Article 2(6), (SG&A) costs and profits were used to construct normal 
value, since merely one out of the five manufacturers in the main sample for 
Pakistan had representative global local sales, and the profitable domestic types 
constituted less than 80% but more than 10% of entire local sales.47 
For the other four exporters, the amount for SG&A and profits applied to create 
normal value were the weighted average of the actual amount earned by the 
exporter with representative global local sales mentioned above and a company in 
the reserve sample which had also representative global domestic sales. It ought to 
be noticed that while assessing the reasonable profit margin for other four 
                                                            
45 WT/DS141/AB/R, European Communities-Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type 
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exporters involved, those sales which were not made in accordance of ordinary 
course of trade were not eliminated.48 
No changes have been necessary as far as the original findings regarding the 
export price and adjustments are concerned. The export price by type was 
compared with constructed normal value by type. Taking account of the legal 
interpretations made in the reports, no ‘Zeroing’ was applied in the revised 
computation of the overall dumping margin for each sampled company.49 
The reviewed calculation illustrates that no dumping exists for exports of the 
goods concerned exported by any sampled exporters in Pakistan during the 
inquiry period. Resultantly, the proceeding should be dismissed for imports of the 
concerned product manufactured in Pakistan. It ought to be noted that there would 
also be no dumping if sales not made in the ordinary course of trade had been 
excluded in the determination of constructed NV based upon the method set out in 
Article 2(6) (a) of the basic regulation.50 Thus, the AD investigation about bed- 
linen being imported from Pakistan was ended. 
3.4.1 ANALYSIS 
The gradual decrease of the dumping margin through provisional measures to the 
definitive measures, and then ultimate termination of proceedings due to the non-
existence of the alleged dumping, is clear evidence that Commission’s 
calculations of normal value and dumping margin were weak and unreliable. 
Kaldes has explained the implications of the EU’s action to challenge the US’s 11 
different investigations where zeroing practice was used in order to establish 
alleged dumped imports originating from the EU. He has noted the fall of 
dumping margin in most cases, when DM was calculated without having recourse 
to zeroing.51 Some of the examples quoted by him are as follows: 
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(i) Corus Staal CV’s (exporter’s) dumping margin decreased from 2.59% 
to zero, in the case of alleged dumped imports of Certain Hot-rolled 
Carbon Steel from the Netherlands. Similarly 
(ii) UGITECH SA’s dumping margin decreased from 3.9% to zero in the 
case of alleged dumped imports of Stainless Steel Bar from France.52 
However, the outcome of the current investigation, along with the evidence and 
examples presented by Kaldes, established that the practice of zeroing tends to 
calculate inflated and artificial dumping margins for foreign exporters. 
Herrmann argued that, in the past, the WTO Panels considered a legitimate 
method of calculating dumping margin. However, the current case (Bed Linen) is 
the very first of its kind where the appellate body reversed the jurisprudence of the 
Panel. He further argued that although the AB has clearly stopped the practice of 
‘zeroing’ in cases where weighted average, EP-weighted average NV 
methodology is used, it does not address the application of zeroing in 
asymmetrical methods of calculation of dumping margin. However, it is noted 
that, in other later cases, through repeated reverse of the Panel’s findings, the AB 
declared the practice illegal in other cases as well.53 
European court of justice has put an end on the use of ‘zeroing’ by the European 
investigative authorities. Hermann did not find any circumstances where this 
practice could be considered as fair at least within the meaning of the basic 
regulation as it stands.54 
It could be established that the export of cotton-type bed linen was not dumped 
instead the EU Commission is found to use AD measures against competitive 
trade from Pakistan, although AD laws are expected to be used against unfair 
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trade. Within the meaning of judgements of EU Courts in Case T-107/0855 and 
Case T-192/08,56 the EU institutions are required to act diligently by providing 
adequate reasons for their assessment. It could be argued that the EU’s basic AD 
regulation does not authorise to practice zeroing; however it has been used 
frequently in the USA. 
Furthermore, it could be stated that undue loss has been caused to Pakistan’s 
textile industry through Council regulation (EC) 1069/97, as for a prolonged 
period of time firms had to pay an unnecessary AD duty at the rate of 6.5%, 
although there were no dumped imports at all. It is also noted that, the provisional 
AD duty imposed in 1997 later terminated in March 2002; therefore, the EU 
institutions took almost five years to rectify the erroneous calculation of dumping 
margin done by the EU Commission. However, the appropriate action of 
termination of proceedings is taken while the imposed duty was almost due to 
expire bearing the completion of five years’ term.  
This analysis corroborates the finding of Jonathan Branton, who established that 
the WTO’s inconsistent investigations have been enforced for many years. Thus it 
has been unduly restricting foreign exporters’ right of access to EU markets, 
causing them material monetary loss.57 It is also important to note that it is the 
initiative of EU Courts which helped; otherwise the measures might not have been 
terminated by the Commission itself. 
He also observed that the EU institutions adopted a discriminatory approach 
towards Pakistan and India, while reviewing regulation (EC) 1069/97, in the light 
of the WTO Panel. As the said regulation was challenged by India in the WTO, 
therefore it repealed the existing measures in respect of India, from the very date 
when they were adopted, i.e. 1997. However, in the case of Pakistani exporters, 
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they were only abrogated after review of existing measures, having effect from the 
date of conclusion of the review, i.e. 2002.58 
3.5   CASE ANALYSIS OF CASE C-351/04 
3.5.1 BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE 
The Regulation challenged in court is (EC) No 2398/9759, which imposed 
definitive ADD on imports of bed linen from Pakistan, India and Egypt (discussed 
above in detail) In this case Ikea Wholesale Ltd. challenged decision of the 
commissioners of Customs and Excise where they refused to refund the duties 
paid by Ikea on imports of bed linen from Pakistan and India. The appellants 
argued that the Council Regulation (EC) 2398/97 should be declared void, as the 
Commission has used zeroing practice to calculate a dumping margin which is 
erroneous. They also argued that the EU Commission made a manifest error of 
calculation by calculating average dumping margin on the basis of data provided 
by a single exporter.60  
However, they requested to the EU Court of Justice to revoke the said regulation, 
as it is inconsistent with the WTO Agreement61 and the Council’s basic regulation 
(EC) 384/96.62 
3.5.2 JUDGEMENT 
The Court established that, Article 2(6) (a) do not bar investigative authorities to 
use the SG&A costs and profit margin reported by a single exporter to calculate 
the profit margin and the SG&A costs of the other exporters whose reported profit 
margin or SG&A costs are not found to be reliable thus could not be verified 
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within due time. Consequently, in order to construct the NV for other traders, the 
Council has not made any manifest error of assessment while relying on data 
related to the SG&A costs and profit margin reported by the single exporter. The 
sale which is not made in the ordinary course of trade can be discredited 
according to Article 1(1) and 2(1) of the basic regulation.63 
The Court further ruled that for the purpose of calculation of DM, the 
investigative institutions are duty bound to compare the NV and EP fairly and 
transparently adjusting them where there comparability is affected. The 
investigative bodies have committed manifest error of assessment when it had 
recourse to zeroing for the calculation of DM. When this method is used during 
the comparison of weighted average EP and weighted average NV, it results in 
calculation of artificial and higher dumping margin for the traders involved, as 
zeroing is meant to avoid those transactions where normal value is equal or higher 
than the export price. Thus it does not mirror the actual magnitude of the dumping 
and injury caused to the local industry.  
Resultantly, the court adjudicated that Article 1 of the Council Regulation 
2398/97 levying definitive ADD on bed-linen being imported from India, Pakistan 
and Egypt is null and void being against the letter and spirit of the basic 
regulation.64 
3.5.3 COMMENT 
Within the meaning of Article 2(1), the EU Commission may disregard the sale 
not made in the ordinary course of business, and it was also established in the 
judgement of Case T-304/1165 and Case C-393/1366 that where the reported 
normal value or profit margin by the exporter is even less than the cost of 
production, the Commission may disregard such data for the purpose of its 
calculation of normal value. 
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Durling and Nicely contend that, while assessing the normality of exporting 
countries’ domestic market conditions and local price, the investigating bodies 
must pay attention to the differences between calculated normal value paid in the 
ordinary course of business, and the sales prices between the producer and 
consumers. There may be many reasons for these differences in price. They 
further argue that a simple comparison between actual price paid and calculated 
price in ordinary course of business may not properly explain the actual situation 
at ground level.67   
It is to be noted that in Article 2(6) of the basic regulation the plural term ‘other 
exporters or manufacturers’ instead of singular term ‘other exporter or 
manufacturer’ is used. It clearly shows that the legislators of the basic regulation 
intended or meant to use data regarding SG&A and profit margin originating from 
multiple exporters. Therefore, it is the legal rule of interpretation that where the 
text and meaning of the provision is clear and understandable instead of being 
vague and ambiguous, recourse should not be made to the mischief rule of the 
interpretation.  
But on the other hand if we only strictly stick to the meaning of Article 2(6),68 the 
question may arise, what is the solution if only one exporter’s domestic sales fall 
within the prescribed threshold, and thus only a single exporter’s data regarding 
SG&A cost and profit margin is usable?. Definitely there is no other alternative 
available instead of using the available data from a single entity. It was 
established in Case T 633/1169 that if limited information is available, or 
concerned exporters provide insufficient information, the Commission may have 
recourse to the facts available.  
Therefore, it could be suggested that Article 2(6) of the basic regulation should be 
amended accordingly, and the plural expression should be changed with the single 
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expression to allow the investigative bodies to use acceptable and reliable data 
available from single exporters. Although, the data related to profit margin and 
SG&A originating from more than one exporter provides an opportunity to cross-
check it against each other and thus ensure its reliability, however, if NV is 
constructed based upon the data of a single entity it should be verified through 
other workable alternative ways, such as verification visits etc., before its use for 
calculation of average SG&A costs for other exporters, as it is going to be used on 
a large scale not only for the calculation of NV but also for the calculation of 
dumping margin for other manufacturers, and thus if it is not verified properly, it 
may seriously lead to the calculation of erroneous dumping margin for a large 
number of exporters.  
Wenxi is very critical about using other manufacturers’ data about SG&A cost 
and profit margin. He believes that it will tend to calculate artificial and higher 
dumping margin, as the investigative institutions will disregard the data leading to 
negative or lower dumping margin.70 
It is to be noted that the practice of zeroing does not find any basis from the basic 
regulation, instead Article 2(11)71 of the regulation demands from the institution 
to make a fair comparison between NV and EP. Conversely, in this case the 
Commission committed a manifest error of calculation which is beyond the 
meaning and intent of the basic regulation. The EU’s AD law does not authorise 
to consider only the positive dumping trends while ignoring the negative AD 
trends. The consideration of only those transactions where NV is lower than EP, 
while ignoring transactions where NV is higher than export price is as unfair a 
practice. Majority of the WTO member states expressed their view that,  is an 
unfair practice and its use will not help to attain the objective of AD law, which 
was to curb unfair trade instead it will help to block competitive trade.72 
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The EU has now changed its investigative mechanism in order to avoid zeroing, 
since the WTO appellate panel destroyed its scope of use in fresh or review 
investigations.73 Hermann concluded that the European Court of Justice has 
apparently abolished the practice of zeroing to be exercised by the investigating 
authorities. Further, he thinks that under no possible circumstances could the 
practice of zeroing be considered as fair, at least not within the light of the Basic 
Regulation.74 
However, Vermulst established that, since promulgation of the WTO Panel’s 
report in the EC Bed Linen case, it no longer applies intra-model zeroing in its 
investigations. However, it continues to apply intra-model zeroing by comparing 
average NV to transaction-to-transaction based EP. In this process, it evaluates the 
price differences based upon different regions, customers and time of sale, and 
where the dumping margin will be high as compared to the dumping margin 
calculated without recourse to zeroing. This thesis agrees with his argument that 
although some researchers are of the view that zeroing is completely destroyed 
after the panel’s report in the EC Bed linen case, recourse to intra-model zeroing 
is still possible. It can however, be abolished by further tightening of Article 2.4.2 
of ADA.75 
It was held in Case T-633/1176 and Case T-462/0477 that as the investigative 
bodies enjoy discretionary powers in investigation process due to the complex 
economic factors involved, therefore a huge duty of care is also attached to them 
to act diligently. It is observed that, in majority of AD cases, the EU courts have 
restrained from active judicial review of exercise of discretionary powers by the 
institutions.  
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In certain cases, the courts have found, declining to interfere due to the complex 
nature of AD investigations and the economic calculations involved therein. 
However, in other cases they have found to exercise their jurisdiction to re-
evaluate the actions of the investigative authorities. Therefore, it is not clear 
where the EU courts draw a line, confirming where judicial intervention is 
required or unnecessary. 
The judicial review should not be restrained only on account of the Commission’s 
discretionary powers and its competence due to complex economic calculations, 
as in some cases the Commission may have departed from the express provisions 
of the applicable law. It might be in breach of general principles of law, e.g. equal 
treatment; in that case, the courts’ role is crucial to rectify that.78 The courts 
confine themselves to assess whether there is any manifest error of assessment 
committed by the institutions. However, the scope of ‘manifest error of 
assessment’ is unclear, as it has not been defined by the courts. 
Fritzsche established that two set of cases can be figured out from what the courts 
refer to as cases involving complex economic and commercial appraisals. It 
includes assessment of a complex factual background to the case, and the 
establishment of complex facts and their assessment in the light of relevant law, 
where no special expert’s assessment is involved. The connection between the 
necessity of complex economic assessments and necessarily limited judicial 
review has not been addressed by the courts.79   
He further adds that perhaps the judges have a sense of complexity when deciding 
on the extent of judicial review of institutions’ assessments. However, it remains 
debatable whether complexity of assessments should be considered as a 
reasonable ground for limited judicial review.80 Advocate General Jacobs 
advances the view that a comprehensive judicial review is appropriate, as the EU 
                                                            
78 Alexander Fritzsche, ‘Discretion, Scope of Judicial Review and Institutional Balance in 
European Law’ (2010) 47 (2) Common Market Law Review 361, 369 
79 Ibid 
80 Ibid; Van Woude, ‘The Court of First Instance: The First Three Years’ (1993) 16 (2) Fordham 
Intl. L.J. 412, 468 
110 
  
courts share the duty of application of law in state aids with the national courts of 
member states. A limited review by the Union courts will put them in a difficult 
position, when they will require the national courts to apply a full economic 
analysis of all relevant factors in certain cases.81   
3.6  DEFINITIVE ANTI-DUMPING DUTY IMPOSED ON 
COTTON-TYPE BED LINEN ORIGINATING FROM 
PAKISTAN 
On behalf of manufacturers constituting majority  of the total Union manufacture 
of bed-linen, the proceeding was initiated by the Committee of the Cotton and 
Allied Textile Industries of the European Communities ‘Eurocoton’ or ‘the 
complainant’ in November 2002. The complaint contained sufficient evidence of 
material injury resulting and dumping of the said product, which was considered 
adequate to justify the start of an AD investigation.82 
Sampling technique was applied considering the large number of exporters and 
importers involved. The six sampled organizations, which denoted more than 32% 
of Pakistan’s volume of exports of bed cloth to the Community amid the IP, were 
asked for to present an answer to the AD questionnaire. On the premise of the 
answers got from Union producers, the Commission chose five organisations in 
three member states. In the choice, the manufacturing and sales volume was 
considered, covering the most illustrative market size. In order to further 
scrutinize certain facets of dumping, injury, causal link and Union interest, no 
provisional AD duty was levied.83 
3.6.1 PRODUCT CONCERNED AND LIKE PRODUCT 
It was asserted by the Pakistani merchants that bleached bed linen sold to the 
Union ought not to be dealt with as product concerned; in this way it should be 
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excluded from the ambit of the inquiry. It was presented that bleached bed linen 
(i) has distinctive end users; (ii) is not substitutable by Union manufacture which 
depends on printed and/or coloured bed cloth; and (iii) is actually divergent from 
printed or coloured bed cloth.84 
The Commission’s examination uncovered that despite the fact that there are 
distinctive procedures for completing the fabrics (fading, colouring, and printing), 
results of all completions are substitutable and contend on the Community market. 
Furthermore, it was found that this type of the product concerned is not utilised 
solely by any specific group of consumers and that there is production of bleached 
bed linen in the Union. The Commission further contends that as all types have 
similar physical qualities and basically the same use, so every one of them 
constitutes one item within the end goal of this inquiry.85  
It was analysed if bed linen manufactured in Pakistan and sold on the Union 
business sector and on the local market, and bed linen created by Union producers 
and sold on the Union business sector, were indistinguishable to the product 
concerned. Article 1(4)86 of the basic regulation set the basic parameters for 
interpretation of the like product in this regard. The EU Commission, however, 
concluded that bed linen originating from Pakistan can be considered as like 
product within the meaning of Article 1(4).87 
3.6.2 VERIFICATION VISIT 
The pre-verification examination of the answers presented by the exporting 
manufacturers demonstrated that the majority of the sampled trading 
manufacturers reported belittled costs which brought about impossible and 
unusually high profits for sales of the item concerned to the Union. By contrasting 
the export price and the cost of manufacture reported by every organization, 
profits on sales of the item concerned to the Union went from more than 20% to 
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right around 40% per exporter, communicated as a rate of turnover, by and large 
more than 30%.This net revenue was in sharp difference to the 1.6% overall 
revenue on turnover  for exports of other textile items, including fundamentally 
the same items (prepared fabric, table cloth, window ornaments) with comparative 
cost structures, sold likewise to the same sort of customers, or even to the same 
customers.88  
The Commission has tried to check the exceptionally unrealistic figures reported 
in the answers. During check of the second exporter, the Commission got a 
unidentified life threatening letter actually tended to the Commission 
representatives. These circumstances considerably hindered the investigation. In 
this way, the verification visits must be impeded. Hence, it was only conceivable 
to complete an incomplete check at the premises of one exporter, while a full 
check at the premises of another foreign exporter was done. The fares of these two 
organizations speak to more than 50% of the aggregate CIF trade value to the 
Union of the examined foreign exporters.89 
The verification of the first organisation affirmed that deceptive data was 
submitted with respect to the organisation’s expenses and pricing policy. Along 
these lines, the Commission was compelled to reason that the data gave by the 
remaining selected exporters couldn't be confirmed, as the verification visits must 
be hindered. Thus the Commission established its conclusions based upon 
available information.90 
According to Article 18(1),91 fabricated or deceptive information will be 
overlooked, and findings may be based upon available facts. The Commission 
inspected the data accessible that would permit ascertaining the margin of 
dumping, i.e. the complaint; the replies of questionnaires given by the sampled 
foreign exporters and three other trading makers that had asked for individual 
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examination in accordance with Article 17(3); data provided by a few invested 
individuals; and official import statistics  from Eurostat.92 
3.6.3 NORMAL VALUE 
As required by Article 2(2)93, the local sales of the like produce by the exporters 
concerned could not be used as a valid critaria to determine NV where the firms 
nominated in the sample had not local sales of the like product constituting at least 
5% of export sales of the concerned product to the Union. In the absence of 
representative domestic sales made by other producers, NV was built by 
accumulating to the engineering cost of the exported types of the product 
concerned adequate profit margin and realistic sum for (SG&A) costs, determined 
according to Article 2(6)of fundamental regulation.94  
The Commission asserted that since no real information for SG&A and profit 
margin related to manufacture and sales of the like item were accessible for any of 
the foreign exporter under inquiry or for some other known exporters or makers, 
and since no such data was accessible for the same general classification of items, 
there was no other alternative but to utilize any other adequate method as 
indicated by Article 2(6) (c) to set up an amount for SG&A95 and for profits.96 
Keeping in mind the end goal to decide a sum for SG&A costs and for profit, the 
average of the sums reported by each of the six organisations initially chose in the 
specimen for SG&A costs and for benefit on local sales to unrelated clients, was 
utilised. This information were viewed as a fitting premise since they related to 
local sales to irrelevant clients of textile items and they were the only information 
accessible for local sales in Pakistan. As required by Article 2(6) (c),97 no 
information is available which could allow concluding that the profit so fixed 
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surpasses the profit usually earned by other manufacturers on sales of 
merchandises of the same general category in the local marketplace of Pakistan.98 
3.6.4 EXPORT PRICE 
The propriety of the export costs as reported by the foreign exporters was 
inspected. All the data accessible, including the partial verification visit completed 
in Pakistan and Eurostat data showed that these were precisely reported.99 All 
exporters made their export sales to the Union straight to independent retailers. 
Their export prices were therefore determined according to Article 2(8)100 based 
upon the prices factually waged by these independent importers. 
3.6.5 COMPARISON 
Due remittance in the form of adjustment was made pursuant to Article 2(10)101 
with the objective of guaranteeing a reasonable comparison among the export 
price and normal value. All exporters have asserted an adjustment for duty 
drawback under Article 2(10) (b). The Commission recognised the adjustment to 
the extent the sums requested were really borne by the like item and by materials 
physically consolidated inside, when expected for utilisation in the exporting 
state, and repaid in respect of the item exported to the Union.102 
The exporters contended that the duty disadvantage allowance ought to be 
allowed for everything discounted by the Government of Pakistan, autonomously 
of whether duties had been paid by the trading makers or by their related suppliers 
of materials. Be that as it may, no proof was accessible that the materials 
purchased from nearby suppliers did bear any import charges or aberrant duties. 
The contention was subsequently dismisses.103 
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3.6.6 DUMPING MARGIN 
The data presented by invested parties, and used to amend the reported expenses 
for each of the six selected traders, contained references to normal overall revenue 
on export of the item concerned of 2% to 5%. This conclusion was likewise 
affirmed by the exporters themselves. It was considered that this net revenue, 
though valid for all exporters, but would not inexorably mirror the net revenue of 
each of the organizations exclusively.104  
In the light of the fact that the information rendered allowed the Commission just 
to process an ordinary overall revenue on exports of the thing concerned, it was 
seen as suitable to figure one general dumping margin applicable to all the 
exporters. The exporters asserted that an individual dumping margin ought to have 
been built up for every organisation separately. It was expressed that the 
estimations demonstrated that the Commission could figure an individual 
dumping margin.105 
The Commission asserted that the need to ascertain an average dumping margin is 
the outcome of the accompanying contemplations. The overall revenues on export 
sales provided by the foreign exporters in their answers to the questionnaires 
could not be utilised and had in this manner to be adjusted. This adjustment was 
finished by utilizing for all exporters overall revenue on fare offers of 3.5%. The 
fact that a normal profit margin must be utilised as facts available for all traders 
was a noteworthy explanation behind touching base at the conclusion that it is 
improper to indicate singular duty rates for every individual trader.106 
In pursuance to Article 2(11), the amount of dumping was determined based upon 
the comparison of the weighted average export price of each produce type with 
the weighted normal value of the equivalent produce type. On this basis, the 
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overall average dumping margin applicable to all Pakistani exporting producers 
was 13.1%, of the export price at Union market.107  
3.6.7 CAUSAL LINK 
Effects of other known factors including, subsided imports originating in India, 
contraction of demand, imports originating in third countries other than India and 
Pakistan, imports by the Community industry were analysed to establish the 
causal link between alleged injury and dumped imports. Similarly, the export 
performance by the Union industry, and the productivity of the Union industry 
were also observed.108  
3.6.8 UNDERTAKING 
The Pakistani traders have displayed a proposition for a price undertaking. 
Notwithstanding, there were more than 170 exporters included in this procedure, 
and bed linen is classified by many various item sorts, with a few qualities not 
unquestionably evident upon importation. To build up significant minimum prices 
for every item type which could be appropriately observed by the Commission is 
however difficult to do. The large number of traders would also reduce the 
monitoring of a price undertaking unpractical. Under these conditions, it was 
considered that a price undertaking was unviable and should not be 
acknowledged.109 
3.6.9 ANALYSIS 
Thus the Commission’s decision to consider unbleached and bleached cotton-type 
bed linen under the same product category is in conformity with the Article 1(4) 
of the basic regulation. In Case T-394/13110 the applicant objected the grouping of 
product concerned, as done by the Commission alleging that, it will led to 
comparison of products which have considerably different characteristics. The EU 
                                                            
107 Council Regulation (EC) No 397/2004, art 1 (1) and 1 (2) 
108 Above (n 83) Para 116 
109 Ibid, Para 135-137 
110 Case T-394/13, Photo USA Electronic Graphic, Inc. v Council of the European Union [2014] 
OJ C 274, Para 59 
117 
  
institutions can also form a group of products for the purpose of fair comparison, 
where a large number of different products are involved in an investigation. 
Moreover, under the meaning of Article 1(4) of the basic regulation, a product 
could be considered like product if it met with either of the following two 
conditions:  
1. It is identical to the product concerned in all respects; or 
2. It is not identical but has significantly similar characteristics.  
It is found that although bleached, dyed and printed bed linen are not identical, 
they met with the second part of the Article 1(4), as commission claimed that, 
they have meaningfully similar characteristics. However, none of the Pakistani 
exporters later challenged the Commission’s claim at any point throughout the 
investigation.  
While defining the product having similar characteristics, the EU Court 
established in Case T-314/06111 that the European Union institutions may take 
account of a number of factors, for example: the physical, technical and chemical 
characteristics of the products; and their use, interchange ability, consumer 
perception, distribution channels, manufacturing process, costs of production and 
quality. However, the EU Commission’s findings reveal that the product 
concerned and the like product involved in this investigation share all the above-
mentioned features. 
According to Stanbrook et al., despite the existence of minor physical and 
technical differences between Union product and alleged dumped product, the 
institutions may consider them as one, or like products. These minor differences 
include the difference in shape or level of impurities of two pocket lighters, or 
whether they are made of nylon or plastic, unless they do not affect end users.112 
However it was also argued that outdoor shoes and slippers could not be 
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considered as a like product, as they are not interchangeable due to their different 
end use.113 
The determination of like product is one of the most difficult and controversial 
tasks in the AD investigation, as sometimes the Commission’s excessive 
discretion leads to absurd results, comparing apples with bananas. In the absence 
of the sale of identical product in the domestic market, it becomes difficult for the 
investigative authorities to choose a product having the same characteristics. 
Depending on the Union industry’s interest, the definition of like product can be 
too narrow or too broad.114 
In cases where it is defined broadly, the Commission has to examine a large group 
of products, and this may create difficulty for the Union industry in terms of 
proving injury. As injury caused to different groups of Union industry may have 
originated from different groups of products, it may become difficult for them to 
prove injury. The narrow definition of like product is less problematic; however, it 
may offer an opportunity of circumvention from one group of products to another, 
to avoid ADD.115 
The basic regulation is silent about the situation, where ‘product concerned’ and 
‘like product’ have the same physical characteristics but are made in different 
ways. In this area, the Commission decides according to its wide discretionary 
powers. However, it is established principle that, if a product has to go through a 
number of processing procedures and if that processing adds some value, then 
processed product and other product must be differentiated. But in the 
investigation under discussion and some other cases, the Commission has 
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considered as like products, products which have the same characteristics but 
which went through different processing procedures and had different designs.116 
If no more than a simple processing procedure is involved, then the two products 
can be considered as like products; however, if the processing procedure has 
added significant value, and thus made it technologically advanced, then it ought 
not to be considered as like product. In this case, bleached bed linen is not 
comparable with printed bed linen, as printed bed linen has added value and went 
through a significant processing procedure. Similarly, in another case, the 
Commission committed a manifest error of assessment by comparing slippers 
with shoes, although they have different uses and different manufacturing 
characteristics.117  
This dissertation doubts the manufacturing cost reported by Pakistani exporters to 
the EU Commission. The Commission’s argument is strong that it is highly 
improbable that Pakistani exporters are earning average 30% profit on exports of 
bed linen to the EU, while on the other hand the profit margin for curtains and 
table linen (having significantly same characteristics) is around 1.6%. The 
difference of 5% or even 7% may be considerable, but such a huge difference of 
profit margin of around 28% definitely affirms the Commission’s claim that 
Pakistani exporters reported erroneous figures about their profit margin. 
The General Court in Case T-406/09118 established that where the information 
submitted is not perfect in all regards, it should however  not be dismissed, given 
that it is not such as to bring about undue trouble in arriving at a sensibly exact 
finding. But unlike the circumstances mentioned in the above judgement, in the 
current investigation, the information provided by the Pakistani traders was 
unreliable, and might cause a reasonable delay to reach an accurate calculation 
and conclusion for the EU Commission. 
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It was ruled by the EU Courts in Case T-407/06119 that the sample must be 
representative within the meaning of Article 17(1). As far as the current 
investigation is concerned, initially a sample of six manufacturers was 
representing about 32% of exports of Pakistani manufactured bed linen to the EU. 
However, a sample representing only 32% of the bed linen producing industry of 
Pakistan might not be measured largest representative volume according to Article 
17(1),120 as it demands that the sample must be statistically effective, developed 
on the premise of the biggest representative volume of generation, sales or exports 
which can sensibly be explored inside of the time accessible or on the premise of 
data accessible at the time of the determination.121 
It is, however, recommended that Article 17(1) of the basic regulation only 
provides a general criterion for creation of a sample that is a sample should be 
sufficiently representative. It does not, however, pin-point the representation 
threshold for representation of domestic industry of the country under 
investigation as it is provided in Article 5(4), whereby it is required that Union 
industry representing at least 50% of the production of product concerned must 
support the continuation of the investigation. In the same way for the purpose of 
sampling, article 17(1) should provide that a sample should compose of traders 
having at least 50% of the total production of the product concerned in the 
domestic market of the country under investigation. 
Vermulst observed that the EU Commission uses different methodologies for 
sampling interested parties, as it also sends a sampling questionnaire to EU 
producers. However, similar sampling criteria should be used for all interested 
parties, as diverging sampling criteria is against WTO principles.122  
It is noted that previously (e.g. in the current case and in footwear with textile 
upper case) for the purpose of sampling, the Commission used to consider the 
                                                            
119 Joined Cases T-407/06 and Case T-408/06, Zhejiang Aokang Shoes Co., Ltd and Wenzhou 
Taima Shoes Co., Ltd v Council of the European Union  [2010] ECR II-00747, Para 84 
120 Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 
121 Ibid, art 17(1) 
122 Edwin Vermulst, EU Anti-dumping Law and Practice (2nd edition, Sweet & Maxwell 2010) 86 
121 
  
eligibility and/or ineligibility of foreign exporters on the basis of their detailed 
reply to the questionnaire. Thus it causes an enormous burden for foreign 
exporters. However, according to the current practice, sampling can be done on 
the basis of initial information obtained from foreign exporters within 15 days of 
publication of notices.123 
The calculation of highest dumping margin for exporters who do not properly co-
operate is a valid approach, as calculation of weighted average dumping margin 
for them will be rewarding them for their non-cooperation. However, it may cause 
problems, where product concerned is encompassed of many types, for example 
ball bearings and pipe fittings. In this case, dumping margin for co-operating 
exporters is calculated on the basis of weighted average dumping margin of all 
types of product involved.124 However, for non-cooperating exporters it is 
calculated on the basis of highest DM of an individual type. The Commission 
cannot be blamed for that, as it is the result of companies’ choice not to co-
operate.125 
In the current investigation, as, according to the Commission, Pakistani exporters 
furnished misleading information about the manufacturing costs and normal value 
of the product concerned, therefore, as an alternative, the EU Commission might 
have created a new sample, as provided by the Article 17(4). In case of non-
cooperation by a substantial number of exporters in the sample, Article 17(4) of 
the basic regulation provides for a discretionary power to the Commission, to 
create a fresh sample. Although it is purely the discretion of the Commission, and 
thus cannot be claimed as a matter of right, however, for the purpose of precise 
calculation of profit margin and dumping margin, this step may be taken by the 
EU Commission, which it has not taken in this investigation. However, it has been 
established by the General Court in Case T-633/11126 and Case T-462/04127 that in 
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case of absence of concrete and precise data relating to the profit margin, 
institutions can make use of information available. Verification visits conducted at 
an early stage of the investigation benefit all interested parties, as they help to 
calculate accurate provisional duty rate.128 
The verification visits could not be completed properly due to the improper 
security arrangements. Therefore, the information acquired through such defective 
and incomplete visits should not be used for calculating dumping margin and 
injury margin. Instead the Commission’s findings should rest on the basis of 
available information in the form of complaint, reply to questionnaires, 
information submitted by several interested parties and official import statistics 
from Eurostat etc. only.  
Alternatively, again although it cannot be claimed as a matter of right, as it is a 
discretionary power of the Commission, but due to the defective and incomplete 
verification visits at the premises of only two traders, verification visits might be 
conducted in other cities of Pakistan except Karachi, or alternatively they might 
be arranged even in a third country. However, Vermulst noted that verification 
visits at third countries are only possible if foreign firms give their consent and the 
proposed third country does not object.129 
As far as calculation of average dumping margin is concerned, the Commission 
was duty bound to calculate individual dumping margin for all the traders, who 
are the part of the sample. The only exception to Article 17 (3) is available in 
respect of non-participant traders, for whom an average dumping margin can be 
calculated if a large number of non-participant traders are involved in the 
investigation.  
However, in respect of sampled participants, the Commission is bound to 
calculate individual dumping margin by all means. And the same principle was 
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upheld by the General Court in Case T-407/06130 that where sampling is used, the 
traders who are not included in the sample may request for individual treatment. 
However, the basic regulation does not give an unconditional right to the traders 
who not included in the sample, an unconditional right to the calculation of 
individual margin. However, it is the settled principle of law that, Commission 
must calculate individual dumping margin in respect of participant traders, 
however non participant traders cannot claim it as a matter of right. 
As far as the Commission’s argument that calculation of average dumping margin 
is concerned that due to the circumstances of the case and course of investigation 
(misleading information furnished by the Pakistani exporters regarding 
manufacturing costs and incomplete verification visits at the premises of 
participants due to security reasons) led to the calculation of average dumping 
margin, this thesis contends that if misleading information was furnished by the 
Pakistani exporters, then resampling could be done with reference to Article 17(4) 
of the basic regulation, or verification visits could be conducted on a third host 
country. Although, Article 18(1) provides that where misleading information is 
submitted to the Commission, it can make use of facts available but it does not 
mean that this provision allows the Commission to calculate average dumping 
margin for all exporters. 
This dissertation establishes that this investigation generally, and calculation of 
dumping margin specifically, is poorly conducted. It may be said that not only the 
Commission but Pakistani traders are also responsible in this regard. Pakistani 
exporters provided misleading information, and it was their fault. Secondly, they 
could not ensure the proper security of the delegation conducting verification 
visits.  
On the other hand, due to the insufficient information available, the Commission 
calculated average dumping margin for all; however, in these circumstances the 
Commission might have used the option to restructure the sample or arrange the 
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verification visit in a third country in order to calculate precise individual 
dumping margin. 
It is justified to construct normal value by adding manufacturing cost, profit 
margin and SG&A costs of producers, as none of the participant producers had 
5% representative domestic sale of like product. It was ruled by the General Court 
in Case T-304/11131 that despite their low volume less than 5%, domestic sales 
may be made in the ordinary course of trade, if they nevertheless reflect the 
ordinary behaviour of the operators concerned. If normal value could not be 
calculated on the basis of actual price paid by consumers in domestic market, it 
should be constructed in a way that, as much as possible, it represents the 
domestic price of the product if its sale used to have been in ordinary course of 
trade.132  
 However, Article 2(3) and 2(6) have set the criteria that domestic sale 
representing at least 5% of the export can be used to calculate the NV. In recent 
practice, the EU institutions in some instances (for example in the current 
investigation) are also considering the domestic sales of like product, although it 
fails to fulfil the 5% representative threshold. According to Van Bael and Bellis 
the EU institutions rarely avoid the 5% representative rule.133 
Nevertheless, this thesis contends that there was no need to use an average of 
SG&A costs instead individual SG&A costs, for every exporter as reported by 
him should be used. The Commission itself admitted in Para 56 of Council 
Regulation 397/ 2004 that SG&A costs were in line with the audited accounts of 
the exporters, hence no corrections were made to them.  
Similarly, manufacturing cost of each trader may also be used individually instead 
of average, as the Commission claimed that a number of corrections, including the 
allocation of duty drawback and packing expenses, on the basis of the findings of 
the on-the-spot verifications and the analysis of the replies were made to the 
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manufacturing cost. As it was corrected by the Commission accordingly, then 
there was no point to use average of production cost for the whole sample.  
In the current investigation, the EU Commission rejected exporters’ request for 
duty drawback adjustment to the NV. However, Vermulst noted that the 
Commission has applied a restrictive approach to allowable duty drawback 
adjustments to normal value. Duty drawback adjustments are rejected on the basis 
of physical incorporation grounds. Although ADA has strengthened duty 
drawback adjustments within the scope of fair comparison, the EU Commission’s 
conclusion may, however, be challenged in the WTO Panel.134  
Within the meaning of judgements in Case T-385/11,135 Case T-107/08136 and 
Case T-167/07,137 the statement of reasons provided by the institutions for their 
decisions must be sufficiently clear so that the concerned party can defend their 
rights and judicature can appropriately review the conclusions drawn by the 
Commission. In Case T-310/12, the General Court annulled the contested 
regulation where it found that in light of inadequate statement of reasons about 
profit margin and adjustments to export price, the Commission could not provide 
sufficient statement of reasons about its injury margin calculation in the context of 
Article 296 TFEU.138 However, in this case the Commission has not provided 
adequate statement of reasons for use of average SG&A costs, despite the fact that 
information regarding individual SG&A costs of Pakistani exporters was admitted 
by the Commission to be correct and thus can be used.  
The EU Courts also held in Case C-166/95139 that, lack of adequate statement of 
reasons about dumping and injury establishment procedures constitutes a matter 
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of public interest, therefore, it must be raised by the EU Courts on their own 
motion. In Case C-56/93140 and Case T-290/93141, it was upheld that, the question 
whether statement of reasons provided by administrative institutions meet the 
prescribed requirements of Article 296 TEFU, depends not only upon the wording 
context of the said Article but it also depends upon all legal rules governing the 
subject matter. 
Mickus observed that the EU institutions’ practices in AD matters lack in terms of 
transparency, e.g. interested parties do not have recourse to the detailed calculated 
methods of NV, EP and adjustments etc.142 There is need of publication of more 
detailed information about investigations. Hearings are ex parte; details of legal 
representation are treated as confidential; similarly, verification visit reports are 
confidential. This lack of transparency grants excessive powers to the 
Commission.143 
Concluding, it could be said that this investigation and the calculations of 
dumping margin and normal value as calculated in it are unreliable, as they are 
based on limited information. The researcher contends that its responsibility lies 
both on exporters and the EU Commissions. If the Pakistani exporters had not 
provided misleading information, or if the verification visits were not interrupted 
due to the security threat, the outcome of the investigation might be different. 
Similarly, if the EU Commission had resampled or arranged verification visits at a 
third country, it might be in better position to calculate individual dumping 
margin based on individual SG&A costs. 
Lastly, it could be contended that in March 2002 the EU Council, by means of 
Council Regulation (EC) 160/2002, terminated the previously imposed AD duty 
through Commission Regulation (EC) 1069/97, as the EU Commission applied 
‘zeroing’ for the purpose of calculation of dumping margin in the later 
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investigation. Therefore, the Council had to review its calculation of dumping 
margin, as use of ‘zeroing’ was declared void by the WTO Panel. However, 
through review investigation (Council Regulation (EC) 160/2002 the Council 
terminated the existing measures as, excluding the  practice, it found negative 
dumping margin for all Pakistani exporters.  
Although in the case of withdrawal of complaint by the complainant, or 
termination of investigation without application of any protective measures, the 
complainant still has the right to file a fresh complaint, but in particular cases this 
may be regarded as harassment.144  
Therefore, it is understandable that after a few months of termination of previous 
investigation, in September 2002, the EU Commission on complaint of Eurocoton 
once again initiated investigation of alleged dumping of the same product (cotton-
type bed linen), and concluded it with calculation of positive dumping margin 
with rate of 11.3% of the export price. The researcher, however, found both 
actions (at the first instance termination of duty and initiation of fresh 
investigation) of the EU institution inconsistent with each other and it may be 
termed as harassment of foreign exporters. 
3.7  PARTIAL INTERIM REVIEW OF PROVISIONAL 
MEASURES IMPOSED ON PAKISTANI TEXTILE 
EXPORTERS 
On 3 August 2004, in accordance with Article 11(3) of Council regulation (EC) 
384/96, the Commission declared, in the wake of consulting with the Advisory 
Committee, the start of an ex officio restricted review. It was restricted to 
dumping, of the dumping duty levied by the definitive regulation. A notice of 
initiation of proceeding was issued to all concerned importers and exporters. 
Ninety-eight exporting producers replied to the questionnaires and were 
considered as co-operating. Given the large number of exporters, under Article 
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17(1) of basic regulation a sample of eight Pakistani exporters, representative of 
31% of Pakistan’s exports to the Union, was designated.145 
Twenty-two traders which were not included in the sample filed applications for 
the computation of an individual dumping margin. But due to the majority of 
producers involved and the of variety of products involved, such request was 
rejected. The item subject to re-examination was the same as in the original 
inquiry, i.e. bed linen. The Commission’s finding regarding ‘product concerned’ 
and ‘like product’ was the same as in the original investigation.146 
3.7.1 NORMAL VALUE 
As per Article 2 of the primary regulation, since the local sales volume of sole 
manufacturers out of the sampled manufacturers surpassed 5% of its aggregate 
export sales volume to the Union, thus the local sales of the like item were 
thought to be representative for this trader. As the domestic sales volume of other 
seven companies in the sample was less than 5% of export volume under the 
meaning of Article 2 (2), therefore it was settled that these sales were insignificant 
and might not be considered as representative.147 
Ordinary course of trade test was conducted by the Commission on domestic sales 
transactions of the product concerned in Pakistani markets.  For those item types 
where the expense of manufacture was equivalent to or over the weighted average 
price of that type, paying little heed to whether these sales were beneficial or not, 
normal value was constructed on the basis of weighted average of actual price 
paid by Pakistani consumers in domestic market. However, normal value was 
constructed in accordance of Article 2(3) of the basic regulation where weighted 
average price of product was found to be less than manufacturing cost. These 
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criteria were used to assess the representativeness of domestic sale and its sale 
within ordinary course of trade.148 
As per Article 2(6),149 normal value was developed by including an adequate sum 
for (SG&A) costs and for profit to the manufacturing expenses of the exported 
types. The Union industry asserting, that only beneficial transactions ought to 
have been utilised to conclude the rate of profit earned by the trader in the normal 
course of business, challenged the approach adopted by the Commission. This 
assertion was overruled, since it could not be concluded unfailingly if a specific 
transaction was moneymaking or not. Furthermore, it was recognised that 
generally the export transactions stood in the normal course of business.150 
Since none of the other seven sampled exporters had representative domestic 
sales, normal values for them must be constructed as per Article 2(3).151 For every 
one of these manufacturers, accordingly, normal value was developed by 
including an adequate sum for SG&A costs and for profits to the expense of 
assembling of every type exported to the Union, balanced where pertinent. As per 
Article 2(6) (c),152 the selling, general and administrative expenses and profits 
were likewise decided, on the premise of local sales of the two traders with local 
sales constituting 2.2 and 0.2% separately and the weighted average of the SG&A 
costs sustained and profit taken by the sole trader with representative sale.153 
The trader further contended that the SG&A and profit utilised for developing NV 
is taken from a trader with an alternate structure, ostensibly equivalent with a 
retail chain. It included that regardless of the possibility that Article 2(6) (c) of the 
fundamental regulation is applied, at any rate the SG&A and the benefit of the 
exporter itself ought to be utilised.  It ought to be noticed that the applicant 
manufacturer’s sales are genuinely little in volume and contain items which do not 
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even fit in with the same general class of items. Thus, it is not pragmatic to utilise 
SG&A and profit figured on such improper data.154 
3.7.2 EXPORT PRICE 
Seven manufacturing traders made their export sale directly to the independent 
customers. Therefore, export price for them was established on the premise of 
actual cost paid by those independent consumers on the Union markets, as 
required by Article 2(8) of the basic regulation. The eighth examined 
manufacturer had a related merchant in the Union. In this manner, according to 
Article 2(9) of the fundamental regulation the costs for these fares were 
ascertained on the premise of the costs at which the foreign items were first resold 
to an autonomous purchaser.155 
3.7.3 COMPARISON 
As per Article 2(10) due recompense as adjustments was allowed for 
dissimilarities influencing value and value comparability with a specific end goal 
to guarantee a reasonable comparison among normal value and export price. One 
Pakistani exporter the adjustments granted for commissions paid alleging that the 
related manufacturer was carrying out business within the capacity of an agent  
did not really carry on business of its own and was, in actuality, its very own 
minor extension of a trade office. However it was concluded that the related 
manufacturer was positively doing its own independent business exercises, for 
example the managing and acquiring of a portion of the quota, the adjustment was 
therefore confirmed and the claim rejected. The Commission asserted that such 
sales activities might not be carried out by the trader itself, and was sustaining 
considerable expenses in doing so.156 
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3.7.4 DUMPING MARGIN 
Accordance to Article 2(11),157 individual dumping margin (for the sampled 
trading makers) was set up on the premise of correlation of a weighted normal EP 
with a weighted average normal value. It varied from company to company as 
follows: Al-Abid Silk Mills Ltd, Karachi 3.9%, Gul Ahmed Textile Mills Ltd, 
Karachi 5.6%, Fairdeal Textiles (Pvt) Ltd, Karachi 1.3% Mohammad Farooq 
Textile Mills Ltd, Karachi 3.5%, Yunus Textile Mills, Karachi 8.5%, Nishat Mills 
Limited, Faisalabad 6.1%, Lucky Textile Mills, Karachi 7.2%, Chenab Limited, 
Faisalabad 5.7%.158  
According to Article 9(6), the dumping margin (for the collaborating 
manufacturers not chosen in the sample) was established on the premise of the 
weighted normal dumping margin of the traders chosen in the sample. This 
weighted normal dumping margin was computed at the rate of 5.8% of export 
price at the Union market.159 
3.7.5 ANALYSIS 
Under the meaning of Article 2(2) of the basic regulation, a domestic sale 
representing at least 5% of the export of like product can be used to calculate the 
normal value, however it is also provided by the same provision and by judgement 
in Case T-304/11160 that domestic sale of the like product representing even less 
than 5% of the export can be used to calculate normal value if that sale is in the 
ordinary course of trade. Despite their low volume, their sale can be in ordinary 
course of trade. Andersen refers to one case in Farmed Atlantic Norway where 
national statistics showed that total national volume of domestic sale was 5.2% of 
export sale, and the Council accepted less than 5% domestic sale of two 
exporters.161  
                                                            
157 Council Regulation  (EC) No 384/96 
158 Above (n 146) Para 57 
159 Ibid, Para 60 
160 Case T 304/11, Alumina d.o.o. v Council of the European Union  {2013] OJ C 226, Para 27-30 
161 Henrik Andersen, EU Dumping Determinations and WTO Law (Kluwer law International 2009) 
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However, in this investigation, as the domestic sale of seven Pakistani exporters 
was representing less than 5% of their export, therefore the Commission preferred 
to construct normal value by adding SG&A costs instead of relying on normal 
value reported by the exporters. 
 However, use of domestic sale representing less than 5% of export sale is pure 
discretion of the Commission within the meaning of article 2(2), and judgements 
of the EU Courts in cases. Therefore, use of domestic sale representing less than 
5% of export sale cannot be claimed as a matter of right by Pakistani exporters. It 
is established in Case C-105/90162 that normal value may be constructed by 
adding profit margin and SG&A costs only where there is no sale of the like 
product in the ordinary course of trade, or where such sale is insufficient or do not 
permit an appropriate comparison. Also sale cannot be considered within ordinary 
course of business if prices are artificially low, if there is barter trade and when 
there are non-commercial processing arrangements.163   
As far as the definition of ‘Same general Category’ is concerned, neither the basic 
regulation nor the WTO Agreement provides precise criteria in this regard. 
Instead it seems that the WTO intended to render discretion to investigative 
agencies and they can define it depending on the varying circumstances of each 
case. Not only in this case, but in many other ways too, EU laws specifically and 
the WTO Agreement generally have imparted vast discretion to investigating 
bodies due to the very complex commercial, economic and technical issues 
involved.  
The Judicature, however, restrained its jurisdiction to evaluate whether 
institutions have acted according to the relevant provision of basic regulation.164 
However, it is contended that the deficiency of precise definition of the same 
                                                            
162 Case C-105/90, Goldstar Co. Ltd v Council of the European Communities [1992] ECR I-00677, 
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163 Case T 84/07, EuroChem Mineral and Chemical Company OAO (EuroChem MCC) v Council 
of the European Union [2013] OJ C 117, Para 46 
164 Case T 633/11, Guangdong Kito Ceramics Co. Ltd v Council of the European Union [2014] OJ 
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general category renders significant opportunity for the investigative bodies to 
manoeuvre the course of calculation of normal value.   
The critical examination of this investigation as done by the EU Commission 
revealed that in this review investigation, the size of sample of exporters curtailed 
having share of only 31% out of the total textile industry of Pakistan, however, in 
the original investigation the sample was representing 35% of Pakistan’s total 
production of bed linen. Hence, in the same way as it was argued in the original 
investigation, it is to contend that the sample size in the review investigation was 
also small, insufficiently constituting Pakistan’s textile industry.  
Although Article 17(1) does not provide for any precise representation threshold, 
however it demands that a sample should be statistically valid or representing the 
majority of production from the country under investigation. However, according 
to the researcher’s understanding, a sample constituting at least 50% of domestic 
industry of product concerned may be considered as statistically valid and 
constituting majority of production. 
Article 11(9) and Cases T-169/12165 and Case T-143/06166 provide that if no 
significant change of circumstances occurred, in review investigation, the 
Commission is responsible to apply the same methodology as applied in the 
original investigation. However, the investigative institutions have wide discretion 
in this regard to decide that, if significant change of circumstances has occurred or 
not? Where the institutions conclude that no significant change of circumstances 
occurred Article 11(9) will not apply.167 
But in the current investigation, the provision of accurate information regarding 
profit margin and cost of production, and later verification of this information by 
the Commission, proves to be significant change of circumstances. Therefore, the 
EU Commission can duly use the different methodology in review investigation. 
                                                            
165 Case T 169/12, Chelyabinsk electrometallurgical integrated plant OAO (CHEMK), Kuzneckie 
ferrosplavy OAO (KF) v Council of the European Union, [2015] OJ C 165, Para 90-94 
166 Case T-143/06, MTZ Polyfilms Ltd v Council of the European Union [2009] ECR II-04133, 
Para 41-51 
167 Case T-143/06, MTZ Polyfilms v Council of the European union [2009] ECR-II-04133, Para 34 
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However, under the proposal for the Modernisation of the EU Trade Defence 
Instrument, adapting the trade defence instrument according to the current needs 
of the European economy, it proposes the deletion of Article 11(9) of the basic 
regulation.168  
Furthermore, it is noted that unlike the original investigation, the review 
investigation validly calculated individual dumping margin for all eight sampled 
exporters. Therefore, it could be established that the manifest error of assessment 
as committed by the EU Commission in the original investigation is duly rectified 
by the Commission itself in the review investigation. The calculation of dumping 
margin in the review investigation revealed that the average dumping margin 
calculated in the original investigation was significantly high, thus was 
insufficiently representing the actual level of injury caused by dumped imports 
from Pakistan.  
Vermulst noted that the EU Commission used to have recourse to two methods of 
calculation of injury margin: the price undercutting method and the price 
underselling method. Under the price undercutting method, the Commission 
compares prices of foreign exporters and local manufacturers at the EU market. 
The difference between them is the margin of price undercutting. Under the price 
underselling method, the Commission evaluates the pressure of foreign dumped 
imports on local industry to keep their prices low. For the price underselling 
method, the Commission makes use of constructed price (by adding 
manufacturing cost and reasonable profit) instead of relying on the actual market 
price of Union producers.169 
It is found that the calculation of a precise, relatively lower, individual dumping 
margin can possibly be calculated due to complete verification visits (as this time 
they were held in a third country), and unlike the original investigation, a good 
level of cooperation was rendered by the exporters. It could also be established 
that the erroneous calculation of average dumping margin at the rate of 13.1% in 
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Opinion of AG Cruz Villalon 
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the original investigation due to the poor cooperation by the sampled exporters 
and passive approach by the EU Commission to base its conclusion on precise 
information, tends to unduly prejudice many other cooperating producers which 
were not part of the sample, as they had to pay AD duty at the rate of 13.1% 
whereas the actual dumping margin was 5.8%. 
Another positive aspect of this investigation is that, unlike the practice of  zeroing 
as applied by the Commission in previous investigation (Council Regulation (EC) 
1069/97) regarding alleged dumped imports of same product from Pakistan, in 
this case the EU Commission rejected the Community manufacturers’ demand to 
consider only profitable domestic transactions  for the purpose of calculation of 
dumping margin.  
Thereafter, as the maximum time period of definitive AD Duty is up to five years, 
in this case the five years’ limit expired in 2009. Therefore, AD duty was declared 
to be expired through notice C 52 of 2009, as no expiry review was launched. 
Thus definitive measure expires with effect from March 2009.170 
3.8  CONCUSION 
The current chapter is linked with the previous and next chapter, as all these three 
chapters have attempted to establish the consistency and/or inconsistency of the 
EU institutions; in their application of basic regulation (research question no 1). In 
this chapter, the provisional, definitive and partial interim review of ADDs levied 
on cotton-type bed linen originating from Pakistan, has been examined. The 
findings and calculations (of the Commission and the Council) about normal 
value, export price, dumping margin and like product etc., have been analysed 
within the context of relevant case laws, basic regulation and the WTO agreement.  
This examination, however led to a conclusion that, on multiple occasions, the EU 
institutions were not adopting a consistent approach in their findings and 
interpretation of the basic regulation.  
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The next chapter, examines, the consistency of the EU institutions in their 
application of the basic regulation about AD investigations related to dumped 
imports of unbleached cotton fabric originating from Pakistan. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES IMPOSED ON 
UNBLEACHED COTTON FABRICS: CRITICAL REVIEW OF 
THE EU COMMISSION’S INVESTIGATIONS AND THE 
JUDGEMENTS OF THE EU COURTS 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
Along with the preceding two chapters, this chapter predominantly attempts to 
examine the Commission’s investigations which led to the imposition of 
safeguard measures on all other textile products except cotton-type bed linen, thus 
it is also linked with the first and primary research question of this study. Along 
with the Commission’s provisional measures and the Council’s definitive duties, 
the current chapter also attempts to explore the judgements of Courts whereby 
either of the parties challenged the institution’s findings in the EU Courts. Thus, it 
tends to cover all possible aspects of anti-dumping (AD) duty imposed on 
products originating from Pakistan, starting from the initiation of complaint up to 
the final judgement of the EU Court of Justice. 
4.2  IMPOSITION OF PROVISIONAL AD DUTY ON 
UNBLEACHED COTTON FABRICS THROUGH 
COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 2208/96  
The investigation was started following an application filed on behalf of the 
Union industry on 8 January 1996, by Eurocoton1. The complaint was supported 
by 21 Union manufacturers, representative of major percentage of Union 
manufacture of the like product. The complaint contained significant evidence of 
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material injury and dumping of the said product, providing sufficient justification 
for the initiation of investigation.2 
4.2.1 PRODUCT UNDER INVESTIGATION AND LIKE PRODUCT 
The product in question is produced in many different types or constructions. 
Constructions are defined by a combination of the following elements: the count 
(or weight) of the yarn used, the number of threads, and the way the yarns are 
interlaced. Domestic and export types of the product from the countries concerned 
were thought to be like products pursuant to Article 1 (4) of regulation (EC) No 
384/96, as there were no distinctions in the essential attributes of the diverse sorts 
and characteristics of grey cotton fabrics.3  
4.2.2 NORMAL VALUE 
It was found that only two exporters in the sample had representative local sales 
of the concerned product through the inquiry period. In the case of the first 
company, sales on the domestic market were representative and profitable. 
However, there was only one type sold domestically which was comparable to the 
exported type. Sales of this type, however, could not be considered representative. 
The other exporter had representative local sales of the product concerned, but 
those sales were all loss-making, and therefore might not be considered as being 
made in the normal course of trade. In those circumstances, the Commission had 
to construct normal value in all cases.4 
For the first trader, constructed NV was determined according to Article 2(6) by 
addition to the manufacturing cost of the exported models, the exporter’s own 
                                                            
2 Commission Notice of initiation of anti-dumping proceedings concerning imports of unbleached 
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local SG&A5 expenses and domestic profit margin earned on local sales of the 
concerned product.6 
For the other exporter, NV was constructed by addition of the production costs of 
the exported models, the exporters’ own SG&A expenses and the domestic profit 
margin of the producer which had profitable domestic sales. The other two 
exporters in the sample did not have local sales. Therefore, normal value for those 
traders was built by totalling to the engineering costs of their exported models the 
weighted average of the local SG&A expenses determined for the two exporters 
with domestic sales and the domestic profit margin determined for the exporter 
which had profitable domestic sales.7 
4.2.3 EXPORT PRICE 
In all those cases where sale of bleached cotton fabric was made to the 
independent customers, export price was established based upon the actual cost 
paid by those independent European consumers, pursuant to Article 2 (8)8 of the 
basic regulation. However, in those cases where export sales were made to the 
associated importers, export price was established on the basis of cost paid by the 
independent customers when the product concerned was for the first time resold in 
the Union market.9 
4.2.4 COMPARISON 
As per Article 2 (10) of the basic regulation, due stipend as adjustment was made 
for differences influencing comparison, keeping in mind the end goal to guarantee 
a reasonable comparison amongst  the normal value and export price. 
Conformities were allowed in all situations when a claim was made within 
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prescribed time limits set for that reason, and when the concerned party could 
exhibit the impact of any claimed difference on price comparability.10  
A request for a recompense for import charges, as per (2)(10)(b), was rejected as 
immaterial considering that the duty was excluded in the expenses of raw material 
utilized for the computation of constructed normal value (NV).11 
4.2.5 DUMPING MARGIN AND INJURY 
The Commission found that a comparison among an average export price and an 
average of the normal value of all the trades to the Union did not replicate the 
complete grade of dumping being experienced. It also found design of export 
prices which differed considerably between diverse consumers, time periods or 
regions. Therefore according to Article 2 (11),12 export prices were to be 
compared on a transaction-to-transaction basis to weighted average NV. In order 
to determine injury, Commission examined all relevant facts including Union 
consumption, volume and fair portion of the dumped imports, state of the 
Community industry and bills of the dumped imports.13 
Similarly, in order to establish the causal link, Commission examined all possible 
causes in this regard including effect of dumped imports from countries 
concerned, influence of other factors (imports from third countries and increase in 
raw cotton prices). Therefore provisional AD duty was imposed on Pakistani 
unbleached cotton fabric ranging from 17.0% to 30.6% differed from company to 
company, which were part of the sample.14  
4.2.6 LAPSE OF MEASURES 
Within six months’ time limit of the provisional measures, the Commission sent 
recommendation to the EU Council for adoption of definitive AD measures in this 
regard. But the 15-months deadline for the imposition of definitive AD duties was 
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lapsed but definitive ad valorem measures could not be adopted because the 
Council could not attain simple majority in favour of such measures. However, 
Eurocoton challenged (in the General Court) the failure of the Council to adopt 
definitive AD measures according to the proposal of the Commission.15  
4.2.7 ANALYSIS 
The EU investigative institutions have frequently used the asymmetrical method 
for comparison of constructed normal value and export price. Where the 
institutions used to make adjustments for rebates and indirect taxes to constructed 
normal value, they omitted to make similar justified adjustments to the export 
price. Where the institutions have avoided recourse to the symmetrical method 
without due cause, it has affected fair comparability between NV and EP. Waer et 
al. noted that this asymmetry method has led to calculation of artificial dumping 
margins (DM) with 10-20% higher rates.16 However, in 1995 this practice was 
adjudicated to be inconsistent with the GATT AD Agreement by a WTO Panel 
report in the audio tapes in cassettes case.17 Although in the current investigation, 
apparently, the asymmetrical method is not found to be practiced.   
It is found that the Commission Regulation (EC) 2208/96 does not precisely state 
the Union representative threshold of the 21 Union producers supporting the 
initiation of investigation. Under Article 5(4) of the basic regulation, an 
investigation cannot be initiated unless it is supported by Union producers 
representing 25% of total production, similarly an investigation cannot continue 
unless it is established that it is being supported by Community industry (it will be 
considered to be supported by Community industry if Union producers 
representing 50% of total production of product concerned in the Union support 
such investigation).  
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The Commission was, however, expected to state the precise representative 
threshold of Union industry. It is duly established by the EU Courts in Case T-
167/0718 and Case T-107/0819 that institutions should state adequate reasons for 
their findings and conclusions as, it provides an opportunity to interested parties 
to challenge their findings in the EU Courts. It would be unreasonable to require a 
detailed description of each fact underpinning the contested measures and other 
technical information. However, it should be sufficient enough to render an 
opportunity for all interested parties to understand the reasoning of outcome and 
ground on which decision is based.20 
Similarly, it is also not clearly stated whether the product concerned was placed in 
the same homogeneous group or divided in different types, as it differs on the 
basis of count (or weight) of the yarn used, the number of threads for both warp 
and weft, and the way the yarns are interlaced. It is also difficult to decide for an 
outsider if the product concerned and like product sold in the domestic market 
were comparable, as, the Commission established their comparability on the basis 
of having similar characteristics. Due to the non-availability of any consistent 
scale to judge the resembling characteristics, this is however the area where the 
Commission enjoys wide discretion to decide according to the circumstances of 
each case, thus sometimes it may tend to change the outcome of the investigation. 
As acknowledged by Merit Janow in the EC bed linen case, sometimes the 
investigative authorities define like product so narrowly that it becomes 
impossible for foreign exporters to escape from it.21 
The scope and definition of ‘like product’ can be narrow or wide, depending upon 
the Union industry’s interest. There are a number of cases where the Commission 
                                                            
18 Case T-167/07, Far Eastern New Century v Council of the European Union [2011] ECR II-
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proved that it has unlimited discretionary powers in terms of deciding about like 
product. A broad interpretation of ‘like product’ excluding market-based factors 
leads to a state where ADD is applied on products which were not even dumped, 
or were dumped at lower levels. The basic regulation lacks transparent and 
concise criteria for determining like product. Due to this gap, the Commission 
enjoys a wide discretion about determining the scope of like product.22  
The Commission’s interpretation of like product is mostly found to be focused on 
physical and technical characteristics. However, it does not pay heed to the 
competition and substitute ability of the product. It is crucial that only directly 
related and identical products should be compared, otherwise it will tend to 
calculate an artificial injury margin and arbitrary protective measures.23 
In the current investigation, Union importers argued that gauze should be 
excluded from the scope of the investigation, as it was not being produced by 
Union industry. But according to the EU institutions’ practice, this is not a 
sufficient reason for exclusion of certain products from the scope of the 
investigation, as non-production or low production of a product within the EU 
may have a connection with alleged dumped imports. However, if it is not the 
case, then ADD should not be placed, as Union industry cannot be injured if it 
does not have local production of a certain product.24  
Van Bael and Bellis established that EU institutions use same criteria (based on 
physical and technical characteristics) for their decisions about ‘like product’ and 
‘product concerned’. However, the practice of institutions signifies that the 
criteria used for the definition of ‘like product’ are less sophisticated and 
comprehensive than those used for ‘product concerned’. Once the EU institutions 
determine the ‘product concerned’, they invariably determine that a particular 
                                                            
22 Arturas Mickus, ‘Shortcomings of EU Anti-Dumping Law and Policy’ (2002) 4 (4) European 
Journal of Law Reform 525, 538 
23 Marco Broncken and Natalie McNelis, ‘Rethinking the “Like Product” Definition in WTO 
Antidumping Law’ (1999) 33 (3) Journal of World Trade 73, 78 
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product is like product of ‘product concerned’ being manufactured in Union 
industry.25  
Out of four exporters, only one exporter’s sale at domestic market was found to be 
in the ordinary course of trade and representative (5%) of export sale. However, 
the Commission did not calculate its NV according to Article 2(1) on the basis of 
actual price paid at the domestic market, as the Commission found that only one 
type of the concerned product was being sold on the local market, sale of this type 
however could not be considered as representative. Andersen contends that 
division of product concerned into different types in order to carry out the 5% 
ordinary course of trade test is in violation of Art 2.2 of the WTO law, as such 
division of product concerned is allowed only within particular aspects of the 
investigation, e.g. comparison of EP and NV.26    
However, while constructing the normal value, not only for this company but also 
for three other companies (whose domestic sale was found to be insufficient), 
according to Article 2(4) the Commission used the profit margin incurred on that 
particular type of the product concerned to construct the normal value of the 
whole homogeneous group of product concerned (which includes other types of 
the product as well having different profitability). 
Although the basic AD regulation does not provide for calculation of normal 
value where sale of only one type of product concerned is found to be 
representative, this thesis, however, contends that in accordance with Article 2(4) 
the Commission calculated the NV for all exporters on the basis of the same 
criteria (profit margin incurred on one type of product concerned sold by one 
trader), which was rejected (as it was considered non-representative) by it to 
calculate normal value on the basis of actual price paid on domestic market.  
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However, it was ruled by the EU Court in Case T-159/9427 that for the calculation 
of NV of the product concerned the institutions should construct normal value by 
adding SG&A costs and reasonable profit margin only if it could not be assessed 
on the basis of actual price paid on the domestic market. The method of 
construction of the normal value offered extensive debate about its efficacy and 
originality. Wenxi argued that alternative ways of construction of the normal 
value tend to create artificial and somewhat higher domestic prices of the like 
product as compared to the original price actually paid by consumers on the 
domestic market.28 
Lastly, it is also established that in this investigation both the EU Commission and 
the Council interpreted or determined the Community interest differently, as the 
proposal of the EU Commission to levy definitive duty with the average rate of 
32% of export price could not be adopted in the Council due to lack of a majority 
vote. Moreover, the big Union industries producing iron, textiles etc. were found 
to be more associated and united as compared to Union importers and consumers. 
Therefore, comparatively they are in a better position to safeguard their interest by 
using their influence, while the consumer’s interest is better protected by the 
Council as compared to the Commission.29 However, Katalin et al. advocates for 
the establishment of an association of consumers safeguarding their right to secure 
their interests and to file a complaint individually or in the form of association.30  
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28 Li Wenxi,  Anti-Dumping Law of WTO/GATT and EC: Gradual Evolution of Anti-Dumping Law 
in Global Economic Integration (PhD Thesis, Lund University 2001) 62 
29 Dirk De Bièvre, ‘Interest Groups and EU Anti-Dumping Policy’ (2011) 18(3) Journal of 
European Public Policy 339, 351; Edwin Vermulst, ‘The 10 Major Problems with the Anti-
Dumping Instrument in the European Community’ (2005) 39(1) Journal of World Trade 105, 112 
30 Katalin Cseres and Joana Mendes, ‘ Consumer’s Access to EU Competition Law Procedures: 
Outer and Inner Limits’ (2014) 51(2) Common Market Law Review 483, 499 
 
146 
  
4.3  CASE ANALYSIS OF CASE T-213/97 
4.3.1 BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE 
A definitive AD duty must be imposed within 15-months’ deadline from initiation 
of the proceedings, but in this case the deadline expired on 21 May 1997. 
Therefore, no definitive AD duty could be imposed due to the lack of a simple 
majority in the Council. Thus the applicants, Eurocoton and some other European 
companies, challenged the Council’s decision in the General Court and requested 
to Court to declare void the Council’s resolution to discard the Commission’s 
proposal for a regulation; first, collecting the provisional duty imposed by 
regulation No 2208/96, and second, levying a definitive AD measure on imports 
of unbleached cotton fabric originating from India, Egypt, China, Turkey, 
Indonesia and Pakistan.31. However, the Council argues that the Court should 
terminate the application as it is groundless and irrelevant.32  
4.3.2 ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES 
4.3.2.1 ARGUMENTS OF THE COUNCIL 
The Council submits that the provisional duties ceased to be applicable purely due 
to the expiration of the set period of six months from the date of the enforcement 
of the regulation, thus the conclusion of the written procedure did not constitute 
elimination of the provisional AD duties levied. It argues that the conclusion of 
the voting process of 16 May 1997 does not constitute a reviewable act within the 
domain of Article 17333 of the Treaty. 34 
According to the Council, the applicants’ petition on the ground that no reasons 
were given for the decision is in fact unfounded, as it is clearly impossible for the 
Council to offer such reasons, and the reasons why individual member states vote 
against a proposal may be quite diverse. Second, in the alternate, the Council 
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contends that the proposal might still have been approved by the Council under 
the conditions laid down by the Council’s Rules of Procedure, and Article 2(5)35 
thereof, as the negative conclusion of the written procedure does not constitute a 
decision conclusively rejecting the Commission’s proposal. The Council added 
that efforts were in fact made by the delegation of France to have the proposal 
debated again and approved, but they failed, as the conditions laid down by the 
Rules of Procedure were not fulfilled.36 
4.3.2.2 APPLICANT’S ARGUMENTS 
The applicant claims that the legal position of the applicants was unquestionably 
impaired by the failure of the Council to approve the definitive anti-dumping duty 
(ADD) proposed by the Commission. It further adds that complainants who 
initiate an AD investigation would be deprived of any judicial remedy where the 
Council fails to act, thus it would be conflicting both to wide-ranging principles of 
law and to the objective of the basic regulation.37 
The claimant further submits that where proceedings are terminated as a result of 
the expiry of the 15-month period, a particular remedy is essential. It follows that 
even if, as the Council proclaims, it could have implemented the Commission’s 
proposal after 16 May 1997, the fact is that it permitted the time-limit of 15 
months to perish and that amounts to a negative act endorsing its refutation of the 
Commission’s proposal. Negative acts, such as those at issue in the present case 
could not be excluded from judicial review on the basis of the mere fact that it is 
difficult for the Council to give reasons for its decision.38 
4.3.3 FINDINGS OF THE COURT 
The General Court established that, the Council of the European Union is under 
no obligation to necessarily act upon and adopt the proposed measures by the 
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Commission, as it can decide conversely based upon the majority vote. It follows 
both from the scheme of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.39 
Where the Council cannot act upon the Proposal of the Commission due to lack of 
simple majority favouring the adoption of Commission’s proposal, in such cases 
the Council’s failure to act cannot be considered as a reviewable act by the court. 
First, within the meaning of Article 17340 of the Treaty (now, after amendment, 
Article 263 TFEU) the mere statement that a simple majority could not be 
achieved as mandatory for the adoption of a proposal for an AD regulation is not 
in itself a reviewable act. Secondly, the Council has not adopted any measures yet 
which could be actionable before the court.41 
4.3.4 COMMENT 
The Council of the European Union being representative of the latter is expected 
to act in the largest interest of the whole Union; having said that, every member 
country through its specified votes can try to act in its own national interest. 
Therefore, all actions within the sphere of competition law are taken by simple 
majority. As the successful adoption of the Commission’s proposal through 
simple majority cannot be called into question in the same way, if the Council 
cannot uphold the Commission’s proposal due to the lack of a simple majority in 
the Council, it should not be challenged either. Nordström noted that the member 
states via the Council cannot be deprived of their right to criticise or call in 
question the findings made and conclusions drawn by the Commission about 
injury margin or Community interest etc.42 
With reference to the applicant’s argument that they will not have any legal 
protection if current plea is considered to be inadmissible; it could be argued that 
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the review by the Court sought by the interested parties must align with the nature 
of powers reserved by the EU institutions as regards AD measures, as it was duly 
established in case Fediol v Commission.43 Moreover, a legal protection can only 
be given if one’s legal right is infringed through any wrongful act of the 
institution. However, such legal protection cannot be extended up to the valid 
actions and due jurisdictions of the institutions. 
As far as the applicant’s argument that the Council does not properly state the 
reasons for its decision is concerned, it could be stated that the Council’s 
statement that measures could not be adopted due to the fact that countries 
opposing these measures are in a majority and the countries supporting it are in a 
minority should be considered sufficient. There is no further need of any specific 
statement of reason.  
Moreover, it should be noted that it is the EU Commission which is under 
obligation to state reasons for all of its decision, as it enjoys wide discretion due to 
the complex economic consideration in AD cases. However, the same is not 
required in case of the Council, as voting in the Council speaks by itself for the 
Council’s decision and actions or refusal to act. In case Air France v 
Commission44 it was established that the outcome of the voting procedure does 
not constitute a reviewable act. Whether the statement in issue establishes an act 
against which an action for annulment may be carried, it is essential to inspect the 
degree to which the statement yields legal impact. 
4.4  APPEAL IN FRONT OF EU COURT OF JUSTICE CASE C-
76/01 
4.4.1 JUDGEMENT 
The EU Court of Justice established that the expiration of the 15-month period 
prescribed in Article 6(a) of the basic regulation, together with the failure to 
                                                            
43 Case 191/82, Fediol v Commission of the European Communities [1983] ECR 2913, Para 29 
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accept the proposal for a regulation levying a definitive ADD submitted by the 
Commission, which established conclusively the Council’s locus in the 
concluding stage of the AD proceedings, possesses all the features of a reviewable 
act inside the sense of Article 173 of the Treaty now Article 263 TFEU.45  
The Court further added that AD proceedings are comparable in numerous ways 
to an administrative practice. In these cases, the Council acts within the rules of 
the basic regulation which give procedural protections to the economic operatives 
concerned and to their professional connotations, and set well-defined parameters 
to the commands of the institutions.46 
It follows that decisions of the Commission or the Council to close AD 
investigation without imposing AD duties, as well as regulations levying 
definitive AD duties adopted at the end of AD proceedings, could be the subject 
of actions before the Union Courts. The Council must deliver an acceptable 
statement of reasons where it chooses not to embrace a proposition for a 
regulation levying definitive AD duties. And this statement of reasons must show 
evidently and unequivocally why, within the meaning of the provisions of the 
basic regulation, there is no necessity to approve the proposal.47 
Where the facts as finally settled demonstrate that the Union interest calls for 
mediation as per Article 21, or that there is dumping and harm brought about 
along these lines, consistency with the obligation to state reasons involves the 
demonstration by which the Council chooses not to acknowledge a proposition for 
a regulation demanding conclusive duty to indicate that the Union interest does 
not call for intervention on its part, or that the supposed dumping is not causing 
material injury to the EU market.48 
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4.4.2 COMMENT 
It may be stated that Council of the EU as a legislator has altogether different 
functions, procedures and powers; therefore it should not be confused with the EU 
Commission, which being an investigative body is responsible to state adequate 
reasons for its decisions. Moreover, in the cases which gave rise to the judgements 
in Fediol v Commission49, Automec v Commission50 and Lilly Industries v 
Commission51, the Commission adopted official decisions, while in this case the 
Council has not adopted any decision. It is the Commission which adopt 
regulation terminating the proceedings if it could not establish the alleged 
dumping or if definitive AD measures could not be approved by the Council.  
As established in case Case C-121/8652 that decision of the EU Commission and 
the EU Council not to adopt measures are as reviewable before the Judicature as 
their decision to adopt measures are reviewable. But it is submitted that, as a 
matter of fact, the above-mentioned situations are not comparable. In the case of 
adoption of definitive measures the aggrieved party is equally powerless to 
challenge the Council’s adoption on grounds related to the Council’s reasons for 
attaining the simple majority to support such adoption. But as a matter of fact the 
aggrieved party challenge the procedures of the EU Commission in carrying out 
its investigation, for example, the method of calculation of normal value or 
dumping margin.  
Nordström concluded that the Eurocoton judgment established that the EU 
Council cannot reject the Commission’s proposal by will. It can only do so, if it 
has sufficient reasons to explain its rejection in the light of the basic regulation.53 
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However, this thesis contends that, the Council’s decision not to approve 
definitive ADD is not reviewable, instead it is a legislative act based on the will of 
the majority of the Union. There is no need for any specific statement of reasons, 
as lack of simple majority in favour of the proposed measures established that the 
Union in majority think that implementation of definitive duty will not be in the 
wider interest of the Community.  
Moreover, if it is accepted that non-adoption of the Commission’s proposal due to 
lack of simple majority is reviewable, and due to such action of the Council the 
applicant’s interest is deteriorated, the question may arise: what would be the 
possible outcome of such judicial review? Is it possible for the Court to declare 
voting process of the Council as null and void and order a second vote? 
If majority of the member states within the Union announce that adoption of such 
measures is not in their interest, while minority of the member states within the 
Union establish that adoption of such measures is necessary as it is damaging their 
local markets, what can the Council do in this regard, and how this action of the 
Council stands reviewable by the Judicature? The new threshold test incorporated 
in the Lisbon Treaty related to member states representing 65% voting rights 
within the Council further legitimise the vote in the Council making it still less 
appropriate for review by the Courts.  
4.5  PROVISIONAL ANTI-DUMPING DUTY IMPOSED ON 
UNBLEACHED COTTON FABRICS THROUGH 
COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) NO 773/98 
The investigation was started as a result of a complaint filed by (Eurocoton) on 
behalf of Union manufacturers constituting a major percentage of Union 
manufacture of the like product. As numerous exporters, importers and 
complainants involved, sampling techniques were applied. The concerned product 
(unbleached cotton fibres) is produced in a great diversity of types or assemblies, 
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according to a grouping of the count (weight) of the yarn used, the number of 
threads used, and the way yarns are interlaced.54 
4.5.1 NORMAL VALUE 
 After assessing the overall representativeness of domestic sales, type 
comparability and type-specific representativeness, and after performing the 
ordinary-course-of-trade test, the Commission found that three companies in the 
sample had representative local sales of the product concerned during the IP, 
while differentiating the ordinary trade of business from minimum quantitative 
threshold 5% of domestic sale.55  
The representative domestic sales of the three companies were found to be in the 
ordinary course of trade. However, for one company, there was only one type sold 
domestically which was comparable to the exported types, whereas for another 
company, two types sold domestically were comparable to the exported types. 
The third company had no comparable type. In those circumstances, the 
Commission concluded that normal value for Pakistan should be constructed in all 
cases except for one type for one company and two types for another company, 
which are founded on the prices, paid in the normal course of business by the non-
related consumers in the exporting state.56 
For all but three types of the concerned product sold for export to the Union by 
the four cooperating traders selected, normal value was calculated pursuant to 
Article 2(3) on the basis of constructed value. In the case of the three companies 
with local sales, this was done in accordance with Article 2(6)57 by adding the 
                                                            
54 Commission Notice of initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of 
unbleached cotton fabrics originating in the People's Republic of China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, 
Pakistan and Turkey 
[1997] OJ C 210 /09  
55 Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/98 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports 
of certain unbleached cotton fabrics originating in the People's Republic of China, Egypt, India, 
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56 Ibid, Para 126 
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exporters’ own domestic SG&A expenses and domestic profit margin to the 
manufacturing cost of the exported types.58 
The other cooperating company in the sample did not have domestic sales. In 
accordance with Article 2(6), normal value for these exporters was calculated by 
addition to the production costs of their exported types the average of the local 
SG&A costs and the local turnover margin determined for the three companies 
with representative and profitable domestic sales.59 
4.5.2 COMPARISON 
An adjustment to normal value was claimed by all Pakistani exporters/producers 
in respect of import charges and duties borne by materials, physically 
incorporated in the like product which was refunded on export of the product 
under consideration. However, the investigation revealed that the amounts of 
import charges and duties refunded exceeded the amounts actually included in the 
cost of raw materials utilised. Therefore, according to Article 2(10) (b), the 
adjustment was restricted to the amounts actually included in the price of the raw 
materials.60  
4.5.3 DUMPING MARGIN 
The comparison shows the presence of dumping in export transactions of all the 
exporters in the sample. The DM stated as a proportion of the EP at Union market 
are the following: 
(I) Sapphire Group (Diamond Fabrics Ltd, Amer Fabrics Ltd) 15.6% 
(II) Nishat Group (Nishat Mills Ltd, Nishat Fabrics Ltd) 32.5% 
(III) Kohinoor Raiwind Mills Ltd 11.7% 
Participating traders get the normal dumping margin of the specimen. 
Communicated as a rate of the EP at EU market, the margin is 19.2%. In 
perspective of high level of collaboration by Pakistani exporters, the DM for non-
collaborating traders was established at the level of the margin of the trader with 
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59 Above (n 55) Para 129 
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the most higher dumping margin in the specimen communicated as a rate of the 
export price at EU border, the margin is 32.5%.61 
4.5.4 ANALYSIS 
It could be concluded that the domestic sale of three traders out of total five was 
found to be in the ordinary course of trade and representative (5%) of export sale. 
However, NV could not be calculated on the basis of actual price paid on local 
market, as one trader was selling only one type, the other was selling only two 
types (out of five) of product concerned on the domestic market, while the third 
exporter was not selling any type of product concerned on domestic market. 
Hence the question may arise that if the third exporter was not selling any type of 
product on the domestic market, then how its domestic sale may be considered as 
representative of export sale? 
Therefore, the Commission in accordance with Article 2(6) decided to construct 
the normal value for all three traders and for all other types of product concerned 
except three types whose sale was found to be sufficient on domestic market. 
Thus in respect of first trader, the normal value of other four types (out of five) of 
product concerned, and with respect to the second trader the normal value of other 
three types of product concerned were constructed by adding their own SG&A 
costs and profit margin incurred on one type of product concerned and two types 
of product concerned respectively. 
In US-Softwood Lumber V (Art. 21.5-Canada)62, the appellate body concluded 
that Article 2.2 of the WTO Agreement63 does not restrict the division of the 
product concerned into different categories for different procedures through the 
investigation, for example comparison of the NV and EP.64 However, Vermulst 
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62 WT/DS264, Panel Report, United States-Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber 
from Canada (Adopted 13 April 2004) 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds264_e.htm  Accessed on 30th June 2016 
63 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (“GATT 1994”) (15th April 1994) 
<https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_e.pdf> accessed 10 June 2015 
64 Henrik Andersen, EU Dumping Determinations and WTO Law (Kluwer law International 2009) 
136 
156 
  
argues that less than 5% ordinary course of trade rule, does not imply that the type 
to type based test may be carried out. Thus, the EU investigative bodies’ practice 
of applying the 5% test on each type of product individually may violate WTO 
law.65   
The methodology adopted by the Commission to construct normal value involves 
many arbitrary decisions and choices. The evaluation of reasonable profit margin 
is tricky. Likewise, calculation of SG&A costs may also be contaminated in 
various ways. Thus constructed normal value may tend to calculate artificial NV 
which may not sufficiently represent the actual NV paid at the domestic market.66 
It is unclear whether division of product concerned into specific product control 
numbers (PCNs) and then usage of arbitrary methodologies to calculate their 
injury margin and dumping margin finds its basis from ADA. Due to the 
widespread usage of CNV methodologies, it is crucial to evaluate the desirability 
of the investigators to the exclusion of 20% below cost sale on a PCN basis. To 
bring more consistency, the method of calculation of ‘reasonable profit margin’ 
for calculation of CNV also needs to be reviewed.67 
The EU Courts held in Cases T-394/1368 that substantial differences may also be 
noted between all the products included in the definition of the product concerned, 
therefore the institutions by grouping them under the same category do not 
commit manifest error of assessment. The European Union institutions may take 
account of a number of factors when defining the product concerned, among 
which the physical, technical and chemical characteristics of the products are 
naturally important, but without necessarily having priority (Case T-314/06).69 
                                                            
65 Edwin Vermulst, The WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement (Oxford University Press 2005) 30, 32 
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67 Ibid  
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However, the profitability of all five types of product concerned may significantly 
vary, thus usage of profit margin incurred on one type to construct the normal 
value of other four types may challenge the accurate calculation of profit margin 
for other types. Moreover, as the third trader does not sell any type of product 
concerned, it is not clear which profit margin was used (as the Commission 
claimed to use its own SG&A costs and profit margin) to calculate its normal 
value.  
However, according to Article 2(6) (c) it may be the profit margin incurred on any 
other product of same general category being sold on domestic market by that 
trader. Alternatively, in accordance with Article 2(3), the Commission also had 
the option to calculate normal value on the basis of EP, in the normal course of 
business, to a suitable third country. The author, however, suggests that instead of 
calculating NV on the basis of same general category, the Commission may have 
recourse to the price paid in appropriate third country. However, Van Bael and 
Bellis note  that in order to construct NV the EU institutions (the Commission 
and the Council) have rarely used the actual prices paid by consumers in the third 
country.70 
The EU Courts held in Case C-633/1171 and Case T-192/0872 that Article 18(1) of 
the basic regulation allows the institutions to use the facts available where 
concerned party refuse to provide relevant information otherwise, the information 
provided by the trader is not appropriate or misleading and no other viable source 
of collection and verification of information is available. And the institutions have 
wide discretion in AD investigations due to the complex economic factors 
involved however, the judicial review is restricted to evaluate that if applicable 
law is applied correctly and if the facts relied upon are stated correctly. 
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Consequently, the EU courts have predominantly restrained themselves from 
active judicial review, excusing the Commission on the grounds of complex 
economic calculations involved. However, the review of investigations of the 
Commission and judgments of the court reveals that EU courts hardly ever 
encounter complex economic calculations and rarely define ‘complex economic 
calculations’.73 Mostly, the aggrieved parties challenged the inappropriate 
application of the basic regulation in front of the courts. 
For example, in the Gul Ahmed case (discussed in Chapter Five), the courts were 
asked to review the interpretation of ‘other known factors’ as made by the courts. 
Similarly, the practice of zeroing in bed-linen cases, as adopted by the institutions 
were challenged by foreign exporters, and in the ‘unbleached cotton fabric’ case 
the issue was raised of the reviewability of the Council’s failure to adopt the 
Commission’s proposal. Similarly, issues about the definition of ‘Community 
industry’ and required representative threshold of the Union industry have been 
called in question by the parties. 
In other investigations too, the contested parties were mostly found to disagree 
about the definition of ‘like product’, calculation of ‘normal value’ and ‘dumping 
margin’. In the majority of cases however, there was no need of appraisal of 
complex economic indices by the courts. Instead, they had been called to assess 
the proper interpretation and application of the basic regulation, as made by the 
investigative authorities. 
However, Lenaerts argued that judicial scrutiny, in terms of readiness of the 
courts to evaluate the factual context of cases, has substantially increased over 
time.74 A major shift took place with the establishment of the Court of First 
Instance, which was constituted on the demand of member states, with the 
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objective of active judicial protection in cases that involved complex factual 
assessments.75 
Another point of view is that the courts have not applied the standard of review 
consistently, even in investigations involving similar questions of law and fact. 
According to Advocate General Cosmos, the intention of the courts does not seem 
to restrain its scope of intervention exclusively in Union investigations. The 
courts, however, want to remain their own masters: to decide in which matters 
they want to interfere or refrain.76 Therefore it is observed that in some cases, 
where limited judicial review was expected, the courts comprehensively evaluated 
the institutions’ practices; while in other cases the courts did not justify their 
limited judicial review.77 The scope of judicial review and discretion is further 
discussed in section 5.6. 
Additionally in the current investigation, it is found that the Commission had 
initiated AD investigation about alleged dumped imports of same product 
(unbleached cotton fabrics) originating from the same countries (China, India, 
Pakistan, Indonesia, Turkey and Egypt) 17 months prior to the current 
investigation. It was, however, lapsed due to the lack of simple majority in the 
Council supporting imposition of definitive duty. Hence, it is noted that just two 
months after expiry of the 15 month deadline to adopt definitive measures, the 
Commission initiated a fresh investigation. 
Furthermore, it is noted that in both investigations the same Pakistani cooperative 
traders were included in the sample. However, the Commission calculated 
significantly varying dumping margins for them under both investigations. Thus, 
for Sapphire group of industries the dumping margin calculated in later 
investigation through Commission regulation (EU) 773/98 is found to be a bit 
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lower (15.6%)78 as compared to DM (22.3%) calculated in the former 
investigation through Commission regulation (EU) 2208/96.  
For Nishat group of industries the dumping margin was significantly increased 
from 17% to 32.5% in the latter investigation.79 In the same way for Kohinoor 
industries, the dumping margin was reduced from 30% to 11.7%.80 This drastic 
increase and decrease of dumping margin for the same traders in a limited time 
period also raises questions about the consistency of Commission’s calculation 
methodology.  
Under Article 6(9) of the basic regulation AD investigations will be concluded 
within 15 months from the date of initiation of the proceedings. Just as the former 
proposal of imposition of definitive duty was lapsed, the current proposal also 
lapsed due to the lack of simple majority in the Council supporting the imposition 
of definitive duty. In the present case, the 15 months deadline ended on 11 
October 1998. As a consequence, the provisional duties collected pursuant to 
Regulation (EC) No 773/98 were released. 
4.6  CASE ANALYSIS OF CASE T-192/98 
4.6.1 FACTS 
The facts of this case were same as were of Case C-76/0181 and Case T-213/9782. 
The Commission levied provisional ADD on imports of unbleached cotton fabrics 
originating from Pakistan, UAE, Indonesia and Turkey by the above-mentioned 
Commission Regulation (EC) 773/9883. Thereafter the Council failed to adopt 
definitive AD measures due to the lack of majority. The appellant of this case 
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however filed petition in the General Court and pleaded for the annulment of the 
Council’s decision as it did not state adequate reasons for its decision.84 
4.6.2 JUDGEMENT 
While referring the judgement of the Court of Justice in case Eurocoton and 
Others v Council,85 the General Court established that where the Council elects 
not to implement a proposal for a regulation commanding definitive AD 
measures, it must offer a satisfactory statement of reasons which demonstrates 
evidently and unambiguously why, there is no need to adopt the proposal. 
Consistence with the obligation to state reasons in this way includes the 
demonstration being referred to bring up the absence of dumping or resultant 
harm, or that the Union interest does not call for imposition of such definitive AD 
duty.86 
The only reason provided by the Council regarding failure to adopt the 
Commission’s proposal to levy definitive ADD is the lack of a simple majority in 
the house. In accordance with the findings of the Court of Justice in Eurocoton 
and Others v Council87, such a statement does not satisfy the obligation to state 
reasons and such reasons must be appropriate to the act at issue.. Consequently, 
the contested decision should be annulled on the same ground of the Council’s 
failure to state reasons in the decision rejecting the proposal for a regulation 
submitted to it by the Commission.88 
4.6.3 COMMENT 
The researcher submits that as discussed above in Case T-213/9789 and Case C-
76/01, the plea of the applicant should not be admissible, as the Council’s failure 
to adopt the Commission’s proposal is not reviewable. Being the legislative act if 
it is admitted that it is reviewable, it would mean to curtail EU Council’s powers 
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by means of extra active judicial review. It also means to take decision power 
from EU member countries which declare their common will by majority vote and 
to grant it to the Judicature. 
This thesis contests the applicant’s assertion that the EU Council does not have 
any power to reject the Commission’s proposal. The Council is an independent 
institution which acts in the largest interest of the Community. It has all due 
authority to review the proposals of the EU Commission. If it cannot reject the 
Commission’s proposal, then there is no point for the existence of this institution; 
instead the Commission should be considered sufficient in this regard. 
Evenett and Vermulst interpret this case as a confrontation between the EU 
institutions and the member states. They establish that, after the failure of the 
Commission’s proposal to adopt definitive measures against cotton fabric (due to 
lack of simple majority in the Council), the EU Commission launched a fresh 
investigation, this time targeting only unbleached cotton fabric. After the failure 
of the second proposal, Eurocoton challenged the decision in the ECJ. The Court 
proclaimed that the EU Council was under obligation to state reasons for its 
failure to adopt definitive measures. Evenett et al., find the Court’s interpretation 
a compulsion upon the Council. The EU Council thus cannot disagree with the 
Commission, and it will have to act upon the proposal of the Commission, 
otherwise it will have to state reasons for its failure.90 
The Council’s statement of reason that the proposal cannot be adopted due to the 
lack of majority in the Council should be considered sufficient in this regard. 
There may be no more adequate reason for non-adoption of Commission’s 
proposal. It should be sufficient to understand and explain that majority of the 
member states do not want the imposition of definitive measures on unbleached 
cotton fabrics importing from Pakistan. The Court cannot simply oversee this 
reason provided by the Council and analogue that no specific reason for failure to 
adopt certain measures is provided.  
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As in Case C-76/01,91 the Court of Justice has already established that lack of 
simple majority cannot be considered as sufficient reason, therefore being the 
subordinate Court, the general Court in this case has just upheld the decision of its 
superior Court. As the facts and questions of law are overwhelmingly the same in 
both judgements, therefore the general Court cannot give an inconsistent verdict, 
because as a matter of legal principles the decisions of the higher Courts have 
binding effect for the subordinate Courts if the same question of law is involved in 
both cases. 
Lastly, it was already decided in Case C-76/0192 by the EU Court of Justice that 
lack of simple majority cannot be considered as a sufficient statement of reason 
for failure to act upon the Commission’s proposal. Surprisingly, despite the said 
judgement, the Council did not specifically state that the measures could not be 
adopted because the Community interest does not call for intervention etc. 
whatever was the possible reason. It was already known that failure to state any 
such reason may again call for judicial intervention. 
However, Sapir93 and Wellhausen94 noted that the Community interest test is 
hardly ever invoked to reject proposed protective measures. In most cases, once 
the alleged dumping and material injury is proved, and measures are expected to 
relieve the complainant industry, it is automatically presumed that Community 
interest calls for the imposition of safeguard measures.   
Having said that regarding the Court’s decision that the Council must state that 
there is no dumping or causal link between alleged dumped imports and the injury 
caused, or it is not in the Union interest to adopt particular measures, it should be 
stated as possible adequate statement of reason. It could be submitted that it is not 
the Council’s obligation to establish the Community interest, dumping or 
existence of causal link; instead all these facts are established by the Commission.  
                                                            
91 Above (n 81) 
92 Above (n 84) 
93 Andre Sapir, ‘Some Ideas for Reforming the Community Anti-Dumping Instrument’ (2006) 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/august/tradoc_129815.pdf> accessed 30th June 2016 
94 Marc Wellhausen,, ‘The Community Interest Test in Antidumping Proceedings of the European 
Union’ (2001) 16(4) American University International Law Review 1027, 1046 
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Therefore, it should not be expected from the EU Council to state any of the 
above particular reasons as a reason for their failure to adopt the Commission’s 
regulation. However, the very fact that a minority of the member states are in 
favour of the Commission’s proposal should be considered as sufficient reason for 
the Council’s failure to adopt the Commission’s regulation. 
To sum up, the result of the written procedure of 16 May 1997 does not establish 
a reviewable act within the meaning of Article 17395 of the Treaty and as it was 
established in Case T-3/9396. It does not constitute a measure in the expressions of 
the judgements in both above-mentioned cases. In fact there was no act at all, as 
the Council confined itself to doing nothing. The Commission’s provisional 
regulation did not expire due to any act of the Council; instead it expired as its 
maximum term of six months was expired. 
4.7  COMPLAINT FOR IMPOSITION OF PROVISIONAL 
MEASURES ON CERTAIN SYNTHETIC STAPLE FIBRE 
ORIGINATING FROM PAKISTAN  
The Commission has received a complaint alleging that imports of certain 
synthetic staple fibre fabric being imported from Pakistan, Thailand, India and 
Indonesia are dumping the EU market thus triggering material injury to the Union 
industry concerned.97  
4.7.1 ALLEGATION OF DUMPING 
As attempts, documented by the complainant, to obtain reliable sales prices on the 
domestic markets of India, Indonesia, Pakistan and Thailand proved unsuccessful, 
and given that there are allegedly no price-lists or official publications available of 
prices of the concerned product in the four abovementioned countries, the 
allegation of dumping is founded on a comparison between constructed NV in the 
                                                            
95 Article 173 of the treaty establishing the European Community [2002] OJ C 325 
96 Case T-3/93, Air France v Commission of the European Communities [1994] ECR II-121, Para 
44 
97 Commission Notice of initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of certain 
synthetic staple fibre fabric originating in India, Indonesia, Pakistan and Thailand [1994]  OJ C-
17/04, Para 2 
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exporting markets concerned and export prices to the Community for selected 
product types, allegedly representative of imports of the product concerned.98 
4.7.2 NORMAL VALUE 
The normal values have been constructed by adding raw material costs based on 
the market prices of polyester fibre in each of the exporting countries; labour costs 
per country, as annually reported by an international consulting company; other 
costs such as energy, fuel, water, auxiliary materials, spare parts and depreciation 
obtained through international experts; and a profit margin of 5%. On this basis, 
the estimated dumping margins alleged by the complainant are significant.99 
4.7.3 ALLEGATION OF INJURY 
With respect to injury, the complainant has given adequate proof that the imports 
in question have increased from 38 700 tonnes in 1989 to 71 433 tonnes in 1992, 
an increase of 85%. It is alleged that this represents a development in the 
Community market share from 18.5% in 1989 to 37.5% in 1992. It is furthermore 
alleged that the prices at which these imports are sold in the Union significantly 
destabilise the prices of Union manufacturers and forced the latter to lower their 
prices to levels that no longer permit the recovery of their costs of production.100 
4.7.4 WITHDRAWAL OF COMPLAINT 
Having decided, after consultation, that there is adequate proof to legitimise the 
start of a procedure, the Commission has initiated inquiry according to Article 7 
of Council regulation (EEC) No 2423/88 (l). However, no further proceedings 
were held in this regard, as the complainant (Eurocoton) withdraw its complaint.  
4.7.5 ANALYSIS 
This regulation, however, does not contain comprehensive information about the 
investigation conducted by the Commission in this case. Thus, it is not known 
                                                            
98 Ibid, Para 4 
99 Ibid, Para 5 
100 Ibid, Para 6 
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how the Commission calculated the normal value and dumping margin. The 
regulation states that normal value was constructed by adding the raw material 
costs, profit margin and SG&A costs, but it is not clear which factors forced the 
Commission to construct normal value; probably none of the companies may have 
representative sales. Kapteyn et al. contend that AD laws may appear simple and 
clear, but actually they are complex in their application. It has never been 
straightforward to calculate normal value and export price through AD 
investigations.101 
Similarly, the regulation does not discuss the mechanism of calculation of 
dumping margin. It is not known if average EP was compared to the average NV, 
or individual export price on transaction basis was compared to the average 
normal value. Moreover, fair comparison, adjustments (rebates, taxes, duty draw-
backs), whether they were granted or declined is not explained in the regulation. It 
lacks plenty of necessary information particularly about the calculations of injury 
margin, dumping margin etc. and generally about the whole investigation, which 
should be available to all concerned parties. 
One of the structural problems with the EU’s injury margin and dumping margin 
calculations originates from the confidential nature of relevant data relied upon to 
establish material injury. As no interested party (except the Commission itself) 
can have access to pricing information, it is impossible to verify injury margin 
calculations carried out by the Commission. Thus there is no other alternative but 
to rely upon the calculation skills and good faith of the Commission case handlers. 
Empirical evidence shows that, in cases where higher dumping margins are 
calculated, injury margins are lower than calculated dumping margins.102 
In the past, after initiation of investigation, the withdrawal of complaint by the 
complainant was quite rare. However, in recent times, the transfer of information 
by the Commission to the complainant about lack of sufficient evidence about 
                                                            
101 Pieter Kuijper, ‘External Relations’ in Paul Kapteyn et al. (eds), The Law of the European 
Union and European Communities (4th edition, Kluwar Law International 2008) 1320 
102 Above (n 66) 105, 111 
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alleged dumping and injury was found to be an important reason for withdrawal 
of complaints.103  
In this case, the researcher finds Eurocoton’s withdrawal of complaint, a very 
unexpected and unreasonable step in this regard as the Commission concludes in 
its findings that during the last three months Pakistani export of staple fibre fabric 
increased by 85% (from 38,000 tons to 71,000 tons), which was really a huge 
increase in such a short span of time. And it was also established through the 
investigation that due to price undercutting, EU industry has suffered significantly 
and European exporters were forced to keep their prices lower, which does not 
even cover their cost of production.  
If the Commission’s findings are admitted to be true, then the withdrawal of 
complaint by the complainant is unthinkable. If the EU industry was actually 
suffering as heavily as reported by the figures of increased market share of 
Pakistani exports, then why will Eurocoton go for withdrawal of the complaint? In 
other words, such withdrawal means that EU industry, knowing that they are 
being substantially injured by Pakistani exports, allowed more injury to them. 
According to Beseler, Union manufacturers may withdraw their complaint for 
three possible reasons: (i) the complainants realised that their complaint is ill-
founded, thus they prefer to go for cartel arrangements with the foreign exporters; 
(ii) the complaint was filed to exert pressure on the foreign exporters to enter into 
such arrangements; (iii) or the exporters/importers or their authorities exert 
pressure on Union manufacturers to withdraw their complaint.104 In such cases, 
the Commission may notify to continue the investigation even after the 
withdrawal.105   
                                                            
103 Edwin Vermulst, EU Anti-dumping Law and Practice (2nd edition, Sweet & Maxwell 2010) 41 
104 Johannes Beseler and Neville Williams, Anti-dumping and Anti-subsidy Law: The European 
Communities (Sweet & Maxwell 1986) 1-16 
105 Above (n 70), 350 
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In this case, one of the reasons may be that EU industry may not be injured in 
such a degree as it was reported to the EU Commission. In other words, erroneous 
figures regarding local production, export price or proportion of Pakistani exports 
were reported to the EU Commission. However, whatever was the reason, this 
investigation exposes the vulnerability of the investigating bodies to change its 
findings as per the highly implausible and unreliable figures reported to it. In the 
same way it also explores the in-efficiency of the EU Commission to verify the 
figures and calculate original dumping margin, which is not solely dependent 
upon figures reported to it but also cross-checking them on its own as well. 
4.8  CONCLUSION 
The current chapter, along with the previous two chapters has attempted to answer 
the first research question of this study. It has examined the provisional ADDs 
imposed on unbleached cotton fabric, originating from Pakistan. Through this 
examination, the Commission’s findings have been corroborated and contrasted 
with the applicable provisions from basic regulation and cases, as decided by the 
EU Courts. It has been identified that, excessive discretionary powers, available to 
the institutions, led to controversial conclusions drawn by them; which are mostly 
found to be in favour of the Union’s manufacturers. In other words, the AD 
measures have been found to be applied strategically instead of competitively. 
Moreover, this chapter has identified, the inconsistent approaches adopted by the 
General Court, and the EU Court of Justice regarding reviewability of the 
Council’s failure to adopt definitive measures, based upon the proposal of the 
Commission. Within the context of other case law, it is however established that, 
the General Court’s verdict was more logical and legally founded. On the other 
hand, the upper court’s judgement declaring reviewability of the Council’s failure 
to act upon the Commission’s proposal was found to be controversial and 
challengeable. This chapter is linked with the next chapter, as the next chapter 
examines one of the prominent cases related to Pakistan, where both the General 
Court and the EU Court of Justice adopted inconsistent interpretations of Article 
3(7).
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Table 4.1: Anti-dumping duties imposed on textile products originated from Pakistan 
Source: Developed by author 
Product Internal 
Case 
Number 
Country Status Original Investigation Measures in force Interim Review Corrigenda, Other 
types of reviews 
Observations 
Initiation Prov. 
measures 
Def. 
measures 
Terminati
on 
Type of 
measures 
Level 
(Min-
Max) 
Initiation Outcome OJ 
Reference 
 
Bed Linen AS464 
R345 
Pakistan Expired C316, 
18.12.2002, 
p. 6 
 L66, 
04.03.20
04, p. 1 
 Ad- 
valorem 
0%-
8,5% 
C196, 
3.8.2004, 
p.2 
Amendm
ent of 
measures 
L 121, 
06.05.2006, 
p. 14 
Amendment new 
exporters L202, 
03.08.2007, p. 1. 
 
Bed Linen AD 359 Pakistan Terminat
ed 
C266, 
13.09.96, 
p.2 
L156, 
13.06.97, 
p.11 
L332, 
04.12.97, 
p.1 
L26, 
30.01.20
02, p.1 
Ad-
Valorem 
0%-
6,7% 
   Corrigendum L19, 
24.01.98, p.83 
Termination L26, 
30.01.2012, p.1 
 
Cotton 
fabrics 
(unbleached) 
 Pakistan Terminat
ed 
C210, 
11.07.97, p. 
10 
L111, 
09.04.98, p. 
19 
Corrected 
by L 154 
28-05-98, 
p.37 
        15-month due 
date to force 
authoritative 
measures 
terminated 
before the 
Council 
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Cotton 
Fabrics 
(Unbleached) 
 Pakistan Terminat
ed 
C17, 
20.01.94, p. 
6 
         Withdrawal 
of complaint 
Cotton 
fabrics 
(unbleached) 
 Pakistan Terminat
ed 
C50, 
21.02.96, p. 
7 
L295, 
20.11.96, p. 
7 
        15-month due 
date to force 
authoritative 
measures 
terminated 
before the 
Council 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CASE ANALYSIS OF CASE T-199/04 AND 
CASE C-638/11 
5.1  INTRODUCTION 
To evaluate and analyse the application of anti-dumping (AD) laws by the EU 
Institution on Pakistani or other exporters, the best source is to analyse the case 
law, as it is enriched with legal debate, legality of issues and philosophy of law. 
Therefore, the writer decided to write a chapter on Gul Ahmed Textile Mills (Pvt) 
Ltd. v Council, giving an analytical analysis of the legal issues arising in this 
particular case, of which Article 3(7) of the Council Regulation (EC) No 
1225/2009 and Article 3.5 of the WTO Agreement form the subject matter. 
The whole discussion in this case revolves around the meaning and scope of 
‘other known factors’ and ‘Causal link’. As a matter of fact, in 1996 on complaint 
of European Federation of Cotton and Textile Industries (Eurocoton) and after 
consulting with the Advisory Committee, the EU Commission launched 
Regulation EC No 1069/97,1 through which it levied a provisional AD duty on 
cotton-type bed linen originating in Pakistan, Egypt and India. The provisional 
duty later transformed into a definitive duty via Council regulation EC No 
2398/97.2  
Later in 2002 the EU, through its regulation 2501/2001, granted Generalised 
System of Preference (GSP) status to Pakistan, which results in benefit to the 
textile industry of the latter. However, upon the complaint of Eurocoton, the EU 
via the Council’s Regulation No 397/2004 again imposed dumping duties on 
                                                            
1 Commission Regulation (EC) 1069/97 of 12 June 1997 imposing a provisional anti-dumping 
duty on imports of cotton-type bed linen originating in Egypt, India and Pakistan [1997] OJ 
L156/11 
2 Council Regulation (EC) 2398/97 of 28 November 1997 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty 
on imports of cotton-type bed linen originating in Egypt, India and Pakistan [1997] OJ L332/1 
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Pakistani cotton-type bed linen, comprising the investigation period (IP) from 
2001 to September 2002. 
Thereafter Gul Ahmed Textile Mills Ltd challenged the alleged dumping duty. 
However, in Gul Ahmed Textile v Council, the Court of First Instance held that 
while evaluating the influence of dumped imports on the Union industry, Union 
institutions must also analyse the impact of other known factors. And the 
association representing the Pakistani textile exporters duly drew the attention of 
EU institutions that the alleged injury to the EU market has its origin in removal 
of recent AD duties on Pakistan and grant of GSP status to Pakistan instead of 
imports from Pakistan. Thus the Court annulled the Council’s Regulation No 
397/2004. 
During an appeal made by the European Council before the Court of Justice; Fifth 
Chamber, the Court set aside the judgement of the General Court while reinstating 
the Council Regulation No 397/2004.3 The Court established that, in assessing the 
causal link, it is not disputed that the EU institutions did not examine the two 
measures, i.e. the abolition of previous AD duty and grant of GSP status to 
Pakistan. They further held that the legislative amendments and the grant of GSP+ 
status could not be separated from the dumped imports, and the effect of the 
legislative amendments was on the dumped imports themselves instead of the 
Union market.  
Moreover, under the meaning of Article 3(7) of the basic regulation, only those 
other known factors may be considered which are directly causing material injury 
to the Union. Hence the Court of Justice overturned the General Court’s 
judgement. 
Thus this chapter aims to analyse the interpretation of ‘other known Factors’ and 
causal link in the context of the relevant Articles of the EU Regulation and the 
WTO Agreement. Moreover, the author has looked into the meaning of the above-
mentioned terms as defined by other case law and WTO Panel reports, and hence 
                                                            
3 Case C-638/11, Council of the European Union v Gul Ahmed Textile Mills Ltd [2013] OJ C 9, 
Para 39 
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has tried to establish the consistency or inconsistency of the application of laws by 
the EU institutions. 
5.2   HOLDING (THE APPLIED RULES OF LAW) 
While determining the material injury or threat of material injury, the absolute 
increase in the volume of dumped imports or relative increase as compared to the 
production or consumption in the union shall be considered. While assessing the 
effect of dumped imports on prices, it would be analysed if there was substantial 
price dislocating by the dumped imports as compared to the price of like product 
manufactured by local producers, or if such imports are cause to depress prices 
and stop them increasing while they would otherwise have increased in normal 
course of business. However none of these factors can have conclusive effect.4 
5.2.1 OTHER KNOWN FACTORS ARTICLE 3(7) 
To guarantee that harm brought about by other factors is not credited to the 
dumped imports, these known elements other than the dumped imports which in 
the meantime are harming the Union business should be analysed. Factors which 
may be considered in this appreciation incorporate compression in demand or 
changes in the pattern of utilisation; volume and costs of imports not sold at 
dumping costs; improvements in technology and export performance; restrictive 
trade practices of, and competition between, third nation and Union makers; and 
profitability of the Union business.5 
5.2.2 ARTICLE 3(4) (b) OF THE EC REGULATION NO 1225/2009 
All or a combination of any of the above-mentioned economic factors, or any 
other appropriate relevant factor, which could give decisive effect, must be 
established in order to prove dumping. And such impact must exist to a degree, 
that it could be regarded as material. In other words it should be so evident and 
                                                            
4 Council Regulation (EC) 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against dumped imports 
from countries not members of the European Union [2009] OJ L343/51, art 3(3) 
5 Ibid, art 3(7) 
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exploratory that the existence of other prejudiced elements may be easily ruled out 
by the relevant institutions.6  
5.3  CASE ANALYSIS OF GUL AHMED TEXTILE (PVT) Ltd V 
COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION CASE T-199/04 
5.3.1 THE FACTUAL CONTEXT OF THE CASE 
The applicant, Gul Ahmed Textile Mills Ltd (Gul Ahmed), is a firm incorporated 
under Pakistani law, whose listed office is in Karachi (Pakistan). It is involved, in 
particular, in export sales and selling of bed linen. The applicant manufactures 
that merchandise in Pakistan and exports it to the European Union. It does not 
trade any bed linen on the local market in Pakistan, though it does vend various 
commodities there. On 30 July 1996 (Eurocoton)7 filed a complaint against the 
said exporter; which concluded in the form of levy of definitive AD duty through 
Council regulation (EC) No 2398/97 on imports of Cotton-type bed linen 
originating from Egypt, India and Pakistan.8 
On account of transitional arrangements in the field of market access for clothing 
and textile products in between the European Union and the Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan, an MOU9 was signed in Brussels on October 2001. Further, in 
December 2001, Council Regulation (EC) 2501/2001 was adopted, which granted 
generalised scheme of preferential tariff arrangements for the period from January 
2002 to December 2004; Pakistan began to benefit from that scheme in-so-far as it 
applied to countries combating drug production and trafficking. Resultantly, since 
January 2002 Pakistani textile products began to enter European Union free of any 
dumping duty.10 
                                                            
6 Above (n 4) 
7 The Committee of Cotton and allied Textile Industries of European Union 
8 Case T-199/04, Gul Ahmed Textiles (pvt) Ltd v Council [2011] ECR II-00321, Para 1-2 
9 Memorandum of understanding 
10 Above (n 8) Para 3 
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The preceding AD duties were eliminated as from 30 January 2002, in relation to 
Pakistani producers, by Council Regulation (EC) No 160/200211 of 28 January 
2002 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2398/97.12 On November 2002 
Eurocoton, on behalf of manufacturers constituting a major percentage of Union 
industry, once again lodged complaint regarding breach of AD law. Hence once 
again Commission initiated AD investigation against exporters of Cotton-type bed 
cloth originating from Pakistan. The examination identifying with the dumping 
and resultant damage secured the period from 1 October 2001 to 30 September 
2002. The examination of the developments pertinent for the calculation of injury 
enclosed the period from 1999 to the end of the investigation period (IP).13 
The Commission made a sample of six companies for the purpose of 
investigating, constituting more than 35% by volume of Pakistani exports of 
cotton bed linen to the companies. A questionnaire was sent to the said six 
companies inviting them to reply the questionnaire. All the Pakistani exporting 
manufacturers included in the sample provided answers to the questionnaire, as 
did the five Union producers behind the complaint included in the sample. In 
addition, answers to the questionnaire had also been provided by two independent 
importers in the Union, and by three Pakistani exporting producers not included in 
the sample who had requested individual treatment.14 
In a document ‘observation on injury’, the association representing the Pakistani 
textile manufacturers disputed the substance of material injury and alleged 
dumping. It also argued about the absence of causal link between alleged injury 
and export from Pakistan. In order to verify the information it had received in the 
                                                            
11 Council Regulation (EC) 160/2002 of 28 January 2002 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 
2398/97 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of cotton-type bed linen originating 
in Egypt, India and Pakistan, and terminating the proceeding with regard to imports originating in 
Pakistan [2002] OJ L26/1 
12 Council Regulation (EC) 2398/97 of 28 November 1997 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty on imports of cotton-type bed linen originating in Egypt, India and Pakistan [1997] OJ 
L332/1 
13 Above (n 8) Para 4-6 
14 Ibid, Para 7 
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replies to the questionnaire, the Commission carried out verification visits at the 
premises of the exporting producers as per Article 615 of the basic regulation.16 
However, the Commission received an unidentified letter addressed individually 
to the officials in charge for the verification visits, while carrying out verifications 
at the second exporting producing company, Al-Abid Silk Mills, Karachi, 
threatening them with death. Therefore, the verification visits had to be 
interrupted. Thus it was only possible to conduct a full verification at the 
properties of one exporting manufacturer, namely Gul Ahmed, and a partial 
verification at the sites of another exporting manufacturer. The exports of those 
two companies represent more than 50% of the total CIF value of exports to the 
Union by the exporting producers in the sample.17 
On 2 March 2004, the Council assumed regulation (EC) No 397/200418 levying 
definitive AD measures on imports of cotton-type bed linen originating in 
Pakistan. By the challenged regulation, the Council levied AD duty of 13.1% on 
imports of bed linen of cotton fibres bleached, dyed or printed, pure or mixed with 
man-made fibres or flax originating from Pakistan. Subsequently, the contested 
regulation was amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 695/200619 of 5 May 
2006, in relation to the applicant. The amending regulation established the rate of 
definitive AD duty applicable to the products concerned manufactured by the 
applicant at 5.6%.20 
                                                            
15 Above (n 4), art 6 
16 Above (n 8) Para 10 
17 Ibid, Para 11 
18 Council Regulation (EC) 397/2004 of 2 March 2004 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
imports of cotton-type bed linen originating in Pakistan [2004] OJ L66/1 
19 Council Regulation (EC) No 695/2006 of 5 May 2006 amending Regulation (EC) No 397/2004 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of cotton-type bed linen originating in 
Pakistan [2006] OJ L121/14 
20 Above (n 8) Para 15-17 
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5.3.2 ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES 
5.3.2.1 PLEA AND ARGUMENTS OF GUL AHMED 
On the basis of the above-mentioned facts, the claimant sought the annulment of 
the contested Regulation, while the Council, supported by the Commission 
applied for the dismissal of the plea.  
The applicant relies on five pleas in law in support of its application for 
annulment, which are as follows:- 
1. Infringement of the 1994 AD Code, with regard to calculation of the 
normal value and manifest error of assessment and infringement of Article 
2(3) and (5) and Article 18(4) of the basic regulation. 
2. Infringement of the obligation to state adequate reasons under Article 253 
EC, with regard to drawback adjustment in the comparison of the export 
price and normal value and infringement of Article 2(10) of the basic 
regulation, of the 1994 AD Code.21 
3. With regard to the determination of material injury, manifest error of 
assessment and infringement of Article 3(1), (2), (3) and (5) of the basic 
regulation, and of the 1994 AD Code. 
4. With regard to the establishment of a causal link between the suspected 
injury and allegedly dumped imports, manifest error of assessment and 
infringement of Article 3(6) and (7) of the basic regulation, and the 1994 
AD Code.22 
The Court considers it appropriate to rule first on the fourth part of the plea.  
The applicant alleges, in crux, that the Council made a manifest error of law by 
neglecting to watch the impact of the execution of a scheme of GSP for Pakistan 
towards the beginning of 2002, and that the end of the preceding AD duty on 
products from Pakistan had the effect of breaking the causal connection between 
                                                            
21 Ibid 
22 Ibid, Para 28 
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the suspected dumped imports and the injury professedly endured by the Union 
business.23 
Firstly, according to the applicant, neither the list provided in Article 3.5 of the 
1994 AD Code or in Article 3(7) of the basic regulation is exhaustive. The 
rationale followed by Article 3.5 of the WTO Agreement24, which is to guarantee 
that the effects of other factors triggering the injury sustained by the national 
industry are not accredited to the imports under inquiry, would fail if the 
Council’s proposed interpretation of Article 3(7) of the basic regulation was 
followed.25 
Next, concerning the Council’s statement that three of the six exporters forming 
the subject-matter of the sample taken into account in this case had not been 
subject to previous AD duties, the applicant replies that the whole sample 
constituted only one-third of the imports at issue during the investigation period. 
And that the proportion of imports not affected by the Ad measures was relatively 
low, and the abolition of ordinary customs duties under the GSP scheme in favour 
of Pakistan had, in itself, the effect of significantly reducing the price of imports 
of Pakistani origin, of the order of 10%, which the Council did not take into 
account. Moreover, even the complainants acknowledged, in their complaint, the 
effects of that abolition of duties on the sudden increase of imports from 
Pakistan.26 
The claimant further argues that the injury suffered by the Union industry was 
concentrated between the end of 2001 and the end of the IP, that is to say after the 
legislative framework applicable to the Union market had already changed; the 
same fact is evident from several economic indicators put forward by the Council 
in support of its claims, such as the prices of the Union industry, the fall of its 
profitability level, sales volume and the market share of the imports concerned. 
                                                            
23 Case T-199/04, Gul Ahmed Textiles (pvt) Ltd v Council [2011] ECR II-00321, Para 31 
24 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (“GATT 1994”) (15th April 1994) 
<https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_e.pdf> accessed 10 June 2015 
25 Above (n 8) Para 40 
26 Ibid, Para 42 
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The applicant thus argues that the Council has not established the existence of a 
‘negative trend’ during the period considered, which cannot be explained by the 
abolition of the duties in question.27 
With reference to Article 3(7) of the Council regulation (EC) 384/96, the 
association representing Pakistani textile manufacturers and exporters (APTMA) 
maintained in particular that the alleged damage to the EU industry instigated by 
the evolution of the market might not be credited to imports originating in 
Pakistan subject to the AD proceeding. Moreover, the fact that the surge in 
imports of bed linen from Pakistan during the first quarter of 2002 was helped by 
another EU concession granted to Pakistan of benefiting from a duty-free access 
to EU bed linen market under the anti-drug GSP special regime has been affirmed 
by the claimant (Eurocoton). It was therefore clear that instead of dumping, the 
abolition of previous duties was the reason behind the increase in magnitude of 
exports from Pakistan to EU.28 
The associations representing Pakistani exporting producers argued that imports 
from Pakistan are not considered as the cause of an injury sustained to Union 
commerce by Union producers in their observations submitted to the Court. 
According to European producers, the industry had to fight low prices arising, 
inter alia: first from the elimination of the preceding measures on imports from 
Pakistan, whether ordinary customs duties or AD duties; and secondly, from the 
comparative advantage of developing countries like Pakistan.29 
5.3.2.2 LEGAL BASIS OF COUNCIL’S ARGUMENTS 
In the first place, under the significance of Article 3(7), the Council argues that 
regulatory procedures do not constitute ‘known factors’ except of the dumped 
imports which are damaging Union business simultaneously. Under the meaning 
of the said Article, ‘other known factors’ are not the amendments to the regulatory 
framework of the market, but only the developments or conduct on the market. 
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The Council adds that since the introduction or reduction of the duties applied 
only to imports, they can have an impact only on the volume and price of the 
dumped imports, not on the Union industry. Moreover, at the time of the 
determination of the cause of the injury, those economic indicators had already 
been taken into consideration.30 
In the second place, the Council argues that even if the grant of preferential tariff 
arrangements in favour of Pakistan and the abolition of the previous AD duties 
could be regarded as known factors other than the dumped imports which are 
damaging the Union business simultaneously, those factors could not break the 
causal link referred to above, as they were not relevant in this case.31 
The Council argues that the previous AD duties were not abolished until 30 
January 2002, and that the relevant clause of the scheme of generalised tariff 
preferences did not enter into force until 1 January 2002. As the IP ran from 1 
October 2001 to 30 September 2002, both those elements could not explain the 
negative trend during the period considered, at most they could have an impact on 
part of the investigation period. Furthermore, three of the six Pakistani exporters 
included in the sample, including the applicant, had not been subject to AD duties 
under the previous regulation.32 
The Council further argues that the prices of the Union industry remained stable 
or increased, following the elimination of the preceding AD measures and the 
entry into force of the GSP+ scheme in favour of Pakistan, which showed that 
none of those events had a notable effect. Lastly, the Council submits that the 
applicant failed to raise that point during the administrative procedure The 
applicant replies that the distinction made by the Council when interpreting the 
expression ‘known factors’, except for the dumped imports which are damaging 
the Union business concurrently, between, on the one hand, market-related 
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developments or conduct, and on the other, amendments to the legislative context 
of the market, is doubtful, as it finds no support in the applicable legislation..33  
However, the Council further argued that the performances of European 
undertakings could not be directly affected by the legislative amendments. In 
order to determine whether the causal link between the damage sustained by the 
Union business and the dumped imports from Pakistan had been broken, only the 
conduct on the market, subsequent to those amendments, should be taken into 
consideration.34 
5.3.3 JUDGEMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT 
5.3.3.1 RATIO DECIDENDI  
The General Court held that the factor consisting in amendments to the legislative 
framework was known to the EU institutions not later than the date of the lodging 
of the complaint in the investigation in question. Therefore, it is necessary to 
assess the arguments of the applicant concerning the third part of the fifth plea. 
As regards, more particularly, the consequences of a possible abstention by the 
EU institutions charged with the AD investigation to examine all the known 
factors except of the dumped imports which are simultaneously harming Union 
commerce pursuant to Article 3(7)35, it must be held that if the damaging impacts 
of those different factors are not legitimately isolated and recognized from the 
harmful impacts of the dumped imports, the institutions will not be in a locus to 
determine that the injury which they attach to the dumped imports has in fact been 
caused by the dumped imports, instead of other factors.36  
Thus, the institutions (without such partition and qualification of the different 
harmful impacts) would have no objective premise to infer that the imposition of 
anti-dumping duty (ADD) is justified, as the dumped imports are indeed causing 
injury. That separation of the injurious effects due to factors other than the 
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35 Council Regulation (EC) 1225/2009, art 3(7) 
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dumped imports requires a concrete analysis of the nature and importance of the 
factors in question. Moreover, that analysis cannot be based on the simple 
hypothesis that the factors other than the dumped imports do not cause the injury 
and do not contribute to it.37 
The Court further held that as regards the distinction established by the Council 
between, on the one hand, amendments to the legislative framework of the 
market, and on the other hand market-related developments or conduct, it should 
be noted that that distinction does not follow either from Article 3.5 of the WTO 
Agreement38 or from Article 3(7) of the basic regulation. In any event, the 
distinction put forward by the Council cannot be deduced either from any 
common features presented by the known factors expressly listed in those 
provisions.39 
In fact, firstly, as is apparent from the very wording of those two provisions, the 
enumerations of ‘known factors’ other than the dumped imports, contained therein 
are not exhaustive but, on the contrary, indicative, as is shown by the use of the 
word ‘include’ introducing the list of factors which may be regarded as relevant. 
Secondly, far from establishing a distinction between, on the one hand, 
amendments to the legislative framework of the market, and on the other hand 
market-related developments or conduct, the common objective of Article 3.5 of 
the WTO Agreement and Article 3(7) of the basic regulation is to ensure that the 
possible negative effects of other factors having an impact on the injury suffered 
respectively by the Union or national industries, could not be attributed to imports 
forming the subject-matter of the investigation.  
The EU institutions had to consider other known factors during their investigation, 
in the setting of Article 3(7) the reality of the causal connection between the 
damage endured by the Union business and the imports from Pakistan of the item 
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concerned, framing the subject matter of the AD inquiry. It follows that the 
abolition of the previous AD duties and ordinary customs duties under the 
preferential tariff arrangements were known factors within the meaning of said 
Article. The obligation arising from that article of its useful effect in 
circumstances such as those in this case, where the question concerning the effects 
of amendments to the legislative framework had been clearly raised in the 
administrative procedure, may be wasted if a contrary conclusion is drawn.40  
The impact of the two measures referred to above on the causal link amid the 
imports from Pakistan of the product concerned and the damage sustained by the 
Union business, and which were the subject-matter of the AD investigation, even 
though the amended legal regime applied during the greater part of the 
investigation period. In those circumstances, it must be held that the EU 
authorities did not effectively conduct the determination of the said causal 
connection. And the same fact is not denied by the Council itself in its 
observation. The Court further refers following paragraphs from Case C-358/89 
falling in similar circumstances:41  
Contrary to the arguments put forward by the Council at the hearing, the Court 
finds that it cannot be presumed, through a mere hypothesis, that the impact of the 
legislative amendments in question was, in any event, only delayed. And that it 
did not explain the previous negative trends or that it concerned only a negligible 
part of the investigation period.42 
As regards the Council’s argument that the ending of the former AD measures 
were not able to break the causal connection among the imports from Pakistan and 
the damage endured by the Union business as half the exporting producers in the 
sample, including the applicant, were not subject to those duties. The Court finds 
that as to the question whether or not the EU institutions entrusted with the 
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investigation failed to fulfil their obligation to examine all the known factors, as 
per Article 3(7) of the basic regulation such argument is irrelevant.43 
Finally, it is apparent from recitals 104 to 109 of the contested regulation that, as 
regards the volume of imports from Pakistan, the share of the Union market held 
by those imports and the price of the latter, to overall economic indicators and not 
to data specific to the undertakings in the sample, should be considered while 
establishing the causal link as provided by Article 3(7) of Council regulation (EC) 
384/96.44 
The EU institutions could not be exonerated from examining the impact of the 
abolition of those duties on the injury caused to the Union industry, and thus 
assessing whether or not the causal link had been broken as a result of that 
measure, by the mere fact that three exporting producers in the sample, including 
the applicant, had not been subject to the previous AD. Moreover the conclusion 
that the institutions entrusted with the investigation had not fulfilled all their 
obligations under Article 3(7) by the mere fact that they have failed to take 
account, under the heading known factors other than the dumped imports which 
are concurrently hurting Union commerce, of the elimination of customs barriers 
of the order of 12% following the introduction in relation to Pakistan of the 
scheme of generalised tariff preferences.45 
Finally, concerning the Commission’s claim at the hearing that it took account of 
the amendments to the legislative framework in question in particular when it 
analysed the CIF values of the products concerned, the Court considers that mere 
reference to import prices, or more generally to volumes, market shares and prices 
of imports from Pakistan, are not sufficient to demonstrate that the impacts of the 
legislative amendments on the Union industry were taken into account by the 
institutions entrusted with the investigation.46 
                                                            
43 Ibid, Para 75 
44 Ibid, Para 79 
45 Ibid, Para 81 
46 Ibid, Para 82 
185 
  
Moreover, a necessarily comparative analysis of a series of relevant indicators 
which vary over time, must be assessed in such a way as to permit a 
differentiation and distinction between the various potential causes of the alleged 
injury, while examining the other economic indicators, on which the analysis of 
the damage suffered by EU business and of the causal link depends. 
More particularly, what the damage suffered by Union commerce would have 
been in the absence of any dumping, that is to say what would have been the 
injury arising merely from the entry into force of the scheme of generalised tariff 
preferences and the closure of the former AD measures, are factors which are not 
apparently  analysed  by the EU institutions in this case, even in the form of a 
mere estimate whether in terms of loss of market share, reduction in profitability 
or performance of the industry referred to above, of renunciation of lower 
segments of the market or any other relevant economic indicator.47 
“The third part of the fifth plea is therefore well founded. Secondly, one 
cannot exclude the possibility that without the error of law in question, the 
Council would not have determined the existence of a causal link between 
the imports forming the subject-matter of the AD procedure and the 
damage suffered by the Union business, the contested regulation must be 
annulled in so far as it affects the applicant, without there being any need 
to examine its other pleas and arguments.48” 
5.3.3.2 OBITER DICTUM 
However, the Court held that in the first place it should be noted that it is 
sufficiently clear from the documents in front of the Court that as from the start of 
the administrative procedure, the associations representative of exporting 
manufacturers of Pakistani bed linen duly drew the consideration of the EU 
institutions to the fact that the harm supposedly suffered by the EU industry had, 
in any event, its origin not in the dumping of products originating in Pakistan, but 
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in the ending of the foregoing AD measures and ordinary customs duties in the 
context of the scheme of generalised tariff preferences in favour of Pakistan.49 
In particular, where Union legislations are intended precisely to implement an 
international agreement concluded by the Union in that respect, first of all, it 
should be noted that the Union texts must be interpreted, so far as possible, in the 
light of international law, as is the case with the basic regulation, which was 
adopted in order to satisfy the international obligations flowing from the 1994 AD 
Code.50 
The EU institutions must, in principle, take into consideration the data concerning 
the exports of all the undertakings in the sample, where sampling is carried out as 
per Article 17 of the basic regulation. It follows that in this case, they should have 
assessed whether, for three of the six undertakings in the sample, there had been, 
as from 30 January 2002, any effect on prices of the ending of the foregoing AD 
measures; and if there is any reduction in the export price corresponding to the 
rate of the previous anti- dumping duties to which they had previously been 
subject.51 
That conclusion is, moreover, confirmed by the fact that the evolution of the 
economic factors presented in the contested regulation shows that the Union 
market and the Union industry experienced a significant deterioration in its 
position and that the imports from Pakistan made their greatest progression on the 
Union market between the end of 2001 and the end of the IP. The possibility that 
taking account of the effects of the two legislative amendments in question could 
have had a significant impact on the conclusion of the EU institutions as to the 
causal link referred to above could not be precluded by anyone.52 
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5.3.4 COMMENT 
Causation analysis requires the investigative bodies to establish a cause and effect 
relationship between dumped imports and alleged injury caused to the local 
industry. Establishing a causal link between dumped imports and injury caused to 
Union industry is central to decision of imposition of ADD. Although apparently 
it is an easy task but factually it has always been subject to controversy, as no 
explicit criteria for establishment of such causal link has been provided in laws.53  
The researcher submits that the list of factors provided in the Article 3(7) is not 
thorough and comprehensive, instead it is standard. The factors mentioned in the 
Article are just indicative and exemplary, and it does not mean that factors other 
than those mentioned in Article 3(7)54 could not be considered. However, in order 
to interpret Article 3(7), it is necessary to understand the purpose and objectives 
for inclusion of this specific provision in the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT). It was definitely to conduct a non-attribution analysis, thus 
segregation of damage caused by dumped imports from damage produced by 
other known factors. 
It was also established in Case C-341/95 and Case C-76/0055 that the Union 
legislation should (so far as possible) be interpreted in a manner which is 
consistent with international law, in particular where its provisions are anticipated 
precisely to give effect to an international agreement concluded by the Union.56 
However, Dider observed that the EU institutions are now paying more attention 
to injury caused by ‘other known factors’; their approach was, however, different 
prior to the adoption of the Uruguay round. Though since the adoption of 
strengthened policy towards segregation of injurious impact of dumped imports 
from injury due to other factors, have the institutions found ‘other known factors’ 
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breaking the causal link between dumped imports and injury caused to the Union 
industry only in a few cases.57 
In another judgement of Case C-149/9658 and Case T-192/0859, the court set the 
parameter to judge the legality of the Union institution’s actions taken within the 
context of an international agreement. It ruled that the efficacy of the EU 
institution’s actions will be reviewed by the courts in the light of the WTO 
Agreement, through which the investigative institutions seek power. In the same 
way the interpretation of Article 3(7) as done by the EU Council shall be cross-
checked against not only the text of Article 3.5 of the WTO Agreement but also 
the intent and rationale of legislators behind the incorporation of Article 3(7). 
Simon Lester discusses three possible options where causation analysis could be 
considered satisfied. First, if it is established that increased imports are the only 
cause of injury to the local industry; second, if dumped imports do not solely 
cause material injury but their contribution to the injury is huge; third, causation 
test is satisfied, when increased imports analysed in isolation are contributing to 
the injury caused to local industry.60   
However, it may be submitted that, the other known factors may be different and 
versatile depending upon the nature of the dispute and circumstances of each case. 
Therefore, if one applies literal or mischief rule of interpretation, considering the 
purpose of the Article, which was to avoid the calculation of injury in a dumping 
case which instead was due to other known factors, in either case the wording of 
the Article seems to be inclusive rather than conclusive. 
The text of Article 3.5 of the WTO Agreement and Article 3(7) of the EU’s basic 
regulation indicates that the list of other possible causal factors enumerated in that 
                                                            
57 Pierre Didier, ‘The WTO Anti-Dumping Code and the EC Practice- Issues for Review in Trade 
Negotiations’ (2001) 35 (1) Journal of World Trade 35, 45 
58 Case C-149/96, Portuguese Republic v Council of the European Union [1999] ECR 1-8395, 
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provision is illustrative. Thus, while the listed factors in Article 3(7) might be 
relevant in many cases, and the list contains useful guidance as to the kinds of 
factors other than imports that might cause damage to the local industry, the 
specific list in Article 3(7) is not itself mandatory.61  
Mickus argues that an anti-dumping duty can only be imposed if it is found that 
Union industry is being injured by these imports. As a common practice, the 
Commission is found to establish this causal link on two grounds: firstly, drastic 
increase in foreign imports; and secondly, depreciation of prices of Union 
industry.62 Therefore, causation would be established where the Union market is 
being injured and this injury coincides with increase in imports and reduction of 
prices.63  
It is also evident from the WTO Panel report WT/DS122/R where it was held that 
Article 3.5 therefore mandates the investigating authorities to examine other 
known factors and gives an illustrative list of such factors. In addition, it mandates 
the authority not to associate to dumped imports damage produced by such other 
factors.64 Similarly, in another report ADP/97,65 the WTO panel established that 
the examples of other known factors as given in Article 3.5 of the WTO 
Agreement must be used as examples. As depending upon the complexity of the 
economic and commercial issues involved in each investigation it was not 
possible for the legislators to give an exhaustive list of other known factors. 
However Prost et al. contend that on a larger scale, the Panel and the appellate 
tribunal has not sufficiently determined the methodology used by the national 
investigative bodies to establish a causal link. However, while reviewing the 
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determinations of the national investigative bodies they have revealed two 
standards: (i) coincidence in time and correlation standards; and (ii) condition of 
competition slandered.66    
Article 3.5 of the WTO Agreement quoted a few examples of other known 
factors, and the rest is left up to the investigative bodies to analyse the injury 
caused by all differing and possible other factors affecting the local industry. The 
wide discretion available to the Commission in injury determination is 
automatically extended to causation analysis. However, the researcher suggests 
that the discretion given by Article 3.5 of GATT should not be misinterpreted by 
the signatories of the Agreement and should not lead to a conclusion that it is up 
to the national investigating bodies to adjudicate which factors need to be 
considered and which do not need to be examined. It may further be asserted that 
the rationale of Article 3.5 of the WTO Agreement and Article 3(7) of the basic 
regulation should not be overridden by the grant of discretion to investigation 
institutes. 
Another problem associated with causal link analysis is the precise calculation of 
injury caused by dumped imports and injury caused by ‘other known factors’, 
where both factors are causing injury simultaneously. In the Upland Cotton case, 
the Appellate Body established that although ‘other known factors’ may have 
been causing price suppression, the injury originating from these factors cannot 
break the genuine causal link between the United States’ significant price 
contingent-subsidies and significant price cutting.67 Sapir et al. are mostly 
satisfied with the AB’s findings about causation analysis they found that the AB 
should have provided more specific information about non-attribution analysis.68   
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It is further submitted that the nature of the list of other known factors provided in 
Article 3(7) is exemplary and suggestive. However, some judges in their 
judgement (or parties in their arguments) claimed that due to the complex 
economic and commercial calculations involved in AD cases, the legislators grant 
wide discretion to the investigative agencies to decide the relevance of other 
known factors as per the changing circumstances of each case; the same was held 
in Case T-462/04,69 Case T-385/1170 and case T-633/1171.  
Prost et al. argued that non-attribution analysis and establishment of a causal link 
between dumped imports and material injury caused to Union industry is a 
difficult and complicated practice, which tend to exert extra burden on 
investigative bodies. The insufficient separation between dumped imports and 
injury has been a common reason for inconsistency of the adopted regulations 
with the WTO Agreement.72 However, this thesis contends that AD measures 
adopted by the national investigative bodies are not controversial due to lack of 
competence of the institutions or complexity of the causation analysis. Instead this 
is due to the profound arbitrary decisions drawn by the investigative agencies 
caused by ambiguous wording of the applicable provisions of international and 
national AD frameworks.   
Although it is established that it was impossible for legislators to include an 
exhaustive list of other known factors in Article 3(7) of the basic regulation, it 
seems to be unjust to establish the preference of the Literal rule over the Mischief 
rule of interpretation of Article 3(7). However, it is crystal clear that the rationale 
of Article 3(7) is to restrict the protection of local industry beyond what is 
necessary.   
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 In order for this obligation to be caused, Article 3.5 requires that the factor at 
issue: 
(a) Be ‘known’ to the investigating authority;   
(b) Be a factor ‘other than dumped imports’; and  
(c)  Be harming the local commerce at the same time as the dumped imports. 
This thesis establishes that in order to maintain the inclusion or exclusion of any 
injurious factor within the meaning of other known factors, all three above-
mentioned conditions must be met. If any of them could not be established, then 
such factor may not be considered as other known factor. For example if a factor 
is known and separate from dumped imports but it is not causing injury, then it is 
not another known factor.  
Similarly, if a factor is separate from dumped imports and it is also causing injury 
but it is not known to the investigative agencies, then it failed the test of other 
known factors. In the same way if such a factor is known and causing injury to the 
local market but is not separate from the dumped imports, in that case as well it is 
not able to be considered.  
Keeping in view the above-mentioned pre requisites of application of Article 3(7) 
of the Regulation, if one analyses the current case, one must admit that the subject 
matter of this case fulfils all terms and conditions to be considered as other known 
factors, as the legislative amendments and grant of preferential tariff arrangements 
by the EU institutions was a factor known to the EU institutions. And in the 
author’s opinion, these legislative amendments were a separate factor from 
dumped imports.  
But the other school of thought opines that the effect of legislative amendments 
was not on the EU market but on the dumped imports themselves. Thus the injury 
suffered by the EU is not due to the amendments but to the dumped imports 
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themselves.73 However, in the writer’s opinion the legislative amendments and 
grant of special tariff arrangements was a known, separate factor causing injury to 
the EU market. Hence, it should be interpreted and included within the meaning 
of other known factors as described by Article 3(7) of the Regulation.  
Additionally, the author suggests that as held by the EU Court in Case T-299/0574  
the basic purpose of adoption of AD laws and the imposition of AD duties, has 
been to restrict unfair trade and practices while ensuring a fair comparison among 
NV and EP considering all those factors affecting price the comparability. 
Therefore, if the Council’s argument is accepted that the origin of injury is in 
dumped imports instead of legislative amendments, then the question may arise 
why the EU institutions adopted regulations which provide for concessional 
arrangements for developing countries and ultimately result in the form of 
material injury to the Union industry? Meanwhile the consequences of lifting 
previous AD duties and the grant of preferential tariff arrangements to Pakistan 
were already known: that ultimately it will result in the form of benefit to 
Pakistani exporters in terms of their cost of production. 
Similarly, Article 15 of ‘SCM’75 requires the segregation of injurious effects 
caused by subsidised imports from injury caused due to subsidy. In a dispute 
between Korea and Japan about ‘countervailing measures on dynamic access 
memories from Korea’, the Appellate Body disagreed with Korea’s argument that 
injurious effects should be segregated, and thus upheld the Panel’s findings.76 The 
AB concluded that it would imply an additional burden on investigative bodies: 
first, to inquire the purpose of subsidy as granted by the exporting country; and 
secondly, to evaluate whether in the absence of subsidy the exports would have 
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been in the same volume or at the same prices. However, Article 15 does not 
require two inquiries.77  
Crowley and Palmeter argue that the AB’s conclusion would weaken the 
causation test between subsidies and countervailing measures as required by 
Article 15. It would render protection beyond necessity to the local industry. The 
AB has not interpreted Article 15 within its whole context and ignoring its 
purpose. The AB’s contention that the Korean argument offers two additional 
tests to be carried out by the investigative bodies is not substantial. It overlooks 
the way in which burden of proof moves during legal proceedings.78  
In Case T-410/0679 and Case T-138/0280 the General Court held that it must first 
be pointed out that the adoption of AD duties is not a penalty for earlier behaviour 
but a protective and preventive measure against unfair competition resulting from 
dumping practices. In order to be able to determine the AD duties appropriate for 
protecting the Union industry against dumping, it is therefore necessary to carry 
out the investigation on the basis of information which is as recent as possible. 
 It seems to be a sweeping statement by the Council that even if legislative 
amendments could be regarded as other known factors, even then they could not 
break the causal relationship. The author is not sure on what basis the Council can 
claim this. However, it is suggested that, if the Union market has suffered 
materially due to exports from Pakistan, and injury margin is increased after the 
withdrawal of previous AD duties on Pakistan and grant of generalised tariff 
preferences to Pakistan, then there would be sufficient reasons to believe that the 
causal link may have been broken. At least it would require deep analysis of the 
facts to reach a conclusion about what percentage of material injury originated 
from legislative amendments and how much originated from the dumped imports. 
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The investigative bodies are required to state explicit, unambiguous and reasoned 
explanation about causation analysis. In this regard, the investigative bodies 
should conduct a proper economic analysis. Similarly, the Panel in the US-Steel 
established that a thorough quantitative analysis is required for adequate non-
attribution analysis. However, it is maintained that specific economic or 
quantitative model is the discretion of national investigative agencies.81 
 Vermulst noted that only a few ‘other known factors’ have been able to break the 
causal link between dumped imports and injury caused to Union industry. These 
factors include: de minimis dumping margin; de minimis market share of the 
dumped imports; de minimis injury margin; and lack of interest of Union 
industry.82 However, the current case is unique in its nature, as admissibility of 
legislative amendments under the scope of Article 3(7) has not been argued 
before. Also, there is a dearth of legal literature on this specific point.   
Moreover, the investigation period includes three months when previous AD 
duties were in place. The two-year investigation period also includes almost nine 
months when Pakistani exports were benefiting from the EU’s preferential tariff 
arrangements approved for Pakistan. Therefore, it is evident that the two principal 
policy changes in the EU’s trade policy relating to Pakistan in the form of removal 
of previous AD duty and approval of GSP status for Pakistani imports also 
emerged in the overall calculation of normal value, and export price etc. through 
the investigation period. As a matter of fact, however, the period through which 
Pakistani industry benefited by removal of duties and grant of GSP status should 
not be part of the investigation period.  
It is submitted that it is right to say that the applicant, i.e. Gul Ahmed, was not 
subject to the AD duties levied by the previous regulation, hence it should not 
affect applicants’ exports. But as a matter of fact another factor, i.e. grant of 
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preferential tariff arrangements, is also under consideration, which definitely 
benefited Pakistani exports, including the exports of Gul Ahmed. Resultantly, 
their cost of production decreased due to the reduction of duty and concessional 
arrangements for developing countries like Pakistan. 
However, it is submitted that it is challenging to recognise how come EU 
producers can submit in the Court that origin of injury caused to the Union is in 
the legislative amendments and grant of special tariff arrangements to Pakistan; 
while on the other hand it was Eurocoton itself that launched the complaint of 
dumped imports from Pakistan. If such statement of association representing 
Pakistan is right and well-founded, then it may cause serious questions regarding 
the validity of issues.  
Thus case decided in favour of Gul Ahmed against the Council; however, the 
Council went for appeal in the Court of Justice, where the judgement of the 
general Court was overturned. The Court of Justice does not agree with the 
General Court in terms of its interpretation of causal link and other known factors 
as per Article 3(7) of the basic Regulation. It further ruled that legislative 
amendments cannot be considered as other known factors under the meaning of 
Article 3(7) of the basic Regulation.83 
5.4 APPEAL IN FRONT OF THE EU COURT OF JUSTICE CASE C-
638/11 
5.4.1 ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES 
5.4.1.1 COUNCIL’S ARGUMENTS 
The Council submits that by misconstruing the concept of ‘other factors’ provided 
for in that provision, the General Court infringed Article 3(7) of Regulation No 
384/96. The Council further states that the General Court correctly found that 
Article 3(7) requires, in principle the injury caused by the dumped imports to be 
detached and distinguished from the damaging effects of other known factors. 
However, while concluding that the two factors at issue, namely the 
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implementation of the GSP+ scheme and the elimination of the earlier AD duties, 
constituted other factors inside the significance of Article 3(7) of basic regulation, 
the General Court made a manifest error of interpretation.84 
The Council contends that under the meaning of Article 3(7), other known factor 
is that which is unrelated to the dumped imports. However, the two factors in this 
case are directly related to dumped imports from Pakistan. As any injury that 
results from an increase of the dumped imports is caused by the dumped imports, 
not by the factors facilitating the increase in dumped imports, therefore a factor 
that merely facilitates an increase in the dumped imports is not itself a separate 
factor causing injury.85 The same interpretation was made by the WTO report on 
28 October 2011 titled: ‘European Union - AD Measures on Certain Footwear 
from China’ (WT/DS405/R).86 
The Council further plead that although the list of other known factors provided in 
Article 3(7) is not exhaustive, legislative amendments could not be considered 
within the meaning of the said Article. It could be included within the meaning of 
other known factors only if directly affected the EU market. But in this case the 
two factors can only have an effect on the dumped imports itself.87 
5.4.1.2 GUL AHMED’S ARGUMENTS 
Gul Ahmed argues that there is no basis for an arbitrary limitation of the factors 
whose injurious effects are to be taken into account, as the objective of Article 
3(7) is to ensure that no injury is to be attributed to dumped imports that results 
from another cause. The Council is invalidly restricting the scope and meaning of 
Article 3(7), which aims to consider all other known factors except dumped 
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imports causing injury to the market. There is no basis for an arbitrary limitation 
of the factors whose injurious effects are to be taken into account.88 
The European Union’s correction of the invalid imposition of measures in 1997 
was reflected by the removal of the previous AD duties, and had nothing to do 
with dumped imports, whether during the investigation period or before. The 
grant of special tariff arrangements as from 1 January 2002 to Pakistan was not 
only in respect of bed linen imports. The amendments to the legislative 
framework of the market were not ‘intimately related’ to actions of third country 
producers but due to the action of the European Union. Gul Ahmed Textile Mills 
maintains that the factors at issue directly affected the price levels of those 
imports on the European Union market by reducing the duty burden on all bed 
linen imports from Pakistan. To characterise these tariff changes as ‘only 
facilitating an increase in the volume of dumped imports’ is manifestly 
inaccurate.89 
Gul Ahmed further states that the EU producers were suddenly facing imports 
which entered the EU market at a price level very substantially lower than what 
they had been previously. And it was a direct result of the factors at issue, without 
any change to the prices of the Pakistani producers. Therefore the economic 
circumstances considered in the determination of injury and of causation between 
that injury and dumping, were directly affected by changes to the legislative 
framework.90 The Court therefore, held as follows. 
5.4.2 JUDGEMENTS OF THE EU COURT OF JUSTICE CASE C-
638/11 
In assessing the causal link between the dumped imports and the injury sustained 
by the Union business, it is not disputed that the EU institutions did not examine 
the two measures in question, that is the abolition of the ordinary customs duties 
under the scheme of generalised tariff preferences and the abolition of the 
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previous AD duties. It is clear that the abolition of import duties of, first, 12% 
and, second, 6.7%, could have had the effect of facilitating and promoting the 
imports of the products concerned. However, the effect was on the dumped 
imports themselves.91 
While establishing the scope of Article 3(7) of the Regulation, the Court held that 
only those factors could be interpreted within the scope of other known factors, 
which are directly causing injury to market. Therefore, the measures at issue 
cannot be regarded as ‘other factors’ within the meaning of Article 3(7) of 
Regulation No 384/9692, as they are facilitating and promoting imports only 
indirectly.93 However, the Court submits that in the present case, the changes to 
the legislative conditions under which the dumped imports take place cannot be 
regarded, as such, as causing injury. It is the imports themselves which are 
causing injury. The dumped imports and the legislative conditions under which 
they take place are inseparable. 
That interpretation is consistent with the report of the WTO Panel of 28 October 
2011, titled: ‘European Union - AD Measures on Certain Footwear from China’, 
which examined the issue of the causal link between the lifting of an import quota 
and injury in the light of Article 3.5 of the 1994 AD Code. At point 7.527 of that 
report, it was found that the lifting of an import quota, which allows for an 
increase in the volume of dumped imports, is not itself a factor causing injury.94 
In those circumstances, the General Court erred in law in holding that the two 
factors at issue constitute ‘other factors’ within the significance of Article 3(7) of 
basic regulation.95 
5.5  OPINION OF THE ADVOCATE GENERAL 
However, it is worth considering the opinion of the Advocate General. This was 
delivered by Advocate General Sharpston on 25 April 2013. Sharpston took the 
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view that whether a duty on imports is higher or lower, it can have no adverse 
effect whatever on the domestic industry concerned unless goods are actually 
imported. The same is true of a removal or reduction of duty. There can be no 
situation in which the removal of a duty on imports can cause material injury to 
the domestic industry in the absence of imports. Whatever effect it has is 
inextricably bound up with the effect of the imports whose price it influences, 
whether those imports are dumped or not. Where the effects of all known dumped 
or un-dumped imports are examined, then the effect of any application or removal 
of duty influencing the price of those imports has also been examined.96 
In the present case, the institutions examined the imports from Pakistan, which, 
they concluded, were all dumped. That conclusion must be assumed to be correct, 
for the purposes of this appeal. They examined also the effects of subsidised 
imports from India, imports by the Union industry and imports from third 
countries other than India and Pakistan. Gul Ahmed has not alleged that the 
effects of any other imports should have been examined. It seemed to the 
Advocate General, therefore, that there was no possible scope for the institutions 
to examine the removal of the previous duties independently, as a possible 
separate factor which was at the same time injuring the Union industry.97  
Sharpston further took the view that an AD duty is not a sanction designed to 
punish a dumping exporter for his behaviour. It is rather a mechanism designed to 
redress, as nearly as possible, an imbalance considered unfair to the domestic 
industry. Viewed in that light, the fact that a removal of previous duties is 
unrelated to the conduct of any dumping exporter can be seen as of no relevance 
when deciding whether its effects should be separated and distinguished from 
those of the dumped imports.98  
Finally, in the present case, the removal of the previous duties affected the price 
not only of the dumped imports but also of other imports that were not dumped. 
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The dumped imports were found to cause injury. The others were not. She thus 
reached the view that the General Court erred in considering that the removal of 
the previous duties should have been examined as a separate factor other than the 
dumped imports in the context of Article 3(7) of the basic regulation.99 
To conclude, it could be said that according to the Advocate General, only those 
‘other known factors’ are necessary to be examined and separated from the injury 
caused by the dumped imports, which are inflicting direct damage to the Union 
industry. Therefore, the impact of removal of previously imposed AD duty is on 
the dumped imports themselves instead of the Union industry. The Advocate 
General’s arguments are evaluated in the next section. 
5.6  COMMENT 
The Commission is duty bound to analyse the injurious impact of ‘other known 
factors’. However, the Commission acquired wide discretion about it, as the 
phrase ‘other known factors’ attracts multiple interpretations.100 The burden of 
proof is on parties concerned to prove that other factors apart from dumped 
imports are also causing injury to local industry.101 The author suggests that the 
lists of other known factors as provided by Article 3(7) of the basic Regulation 
and Article 3(6) of GATT Agreement are as vague and general as to have only a 
guiding and exemplary impact. It does not mean that factors other than those 
mentioned in those lists cannot be considered. After setting the principal forms of 
other known factors, the applicable legislations left it upon the concerned 
institutions of the States’ which factors come within the scope of Article 3(7). 
The EU institutions’ practices reveal that in the majority of cases, the concerned 
parties’ arguments about breaking the causal link between dumped imports and 
injury due to ‘other known factors’ has been rejected. Some of the key examples 
where these factors were not considered within the scope of ‘other known factors’ 
are as follows: Community producers’ self-inflicted injury by importing from the 
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countries concerned; injury originated from inefficiency of Union producers; the 
Union market suffered due to an increase in labour costs; market growth is 
misjudged by Union industry and they invested at the wrong time.102 
Some other examples include: the injury was caused by non-cooperating Union 
producers who were selling at lower prices; Union industry suffered due to an 
increase in raw material cost; the injury originates from fluctuation of exchange 
rates; the Union industry suffered due to competition among Union producers; the 
injury is caused by weak export performance of the Union industry.103 The grant 
of preferential arrangements and withdrawal of previous ADDs can also be added 
to the list of factors which were not considered inside the scope of Article 3(7). 
“Damages produced by other factors should not be credited to the dumped 
imports. In determining the injury, the institutions are thus under an 
obligation to consider whether the injury actually derived from dumped 
imports and must disregard any injury deriving from other factors, in 
particular from the conduct of Union producers themselves.104 
However, as far as the Council’s interpretation is concerned, that only those other 
known factors are obliged to be considered which directly affect the Union 
market, therefore as the legislative amendments are indirectly affecting the Union, 
thus it is not necessary to be considered. Otherwise Article 3(7) of the basic 
Regulation does not draw any distinction between other known factors directly 
affecting local market and other known factors indirectly affecting the Union 
market. It just states as follows: 
Known factors other than the dumped imports injuring the Union industry 
contemporarily shall also be inspected to confirm that injury instigated by these 
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other factors is not credited to the dumped imports. Moreover, if one goes beyond 
the objective behind the said provision, such classification of directly affecting 
and indirectly affecting other known factors does not get any basis from Article 
3(7) of Regulation (EC) 1225/2009105. 
Additionally, in Case T-190/08106 and Case C-13/12,107 the EU Courts held that 
the analysis of causation does not necessarily have to be carried out at the level of 
the Union industry as a whole, with no possibility of taking into consideration 
injury caused to a single Union producer by a factor other than the dumped 
imports.108 The honourable Court in this case established the significance of non-
attribution analysis, that if only a single Union manufacturer’s production is being 
affected by other known factor, it is required to be segregated from the injury 
caused by the alleged dumped imports. The rationale of Article 3(7) of the basic 
regulation is to stop investigative bodies from penalising foreign exporters for 
wrongs they have never committed.  
Article 3(7) of the basic regulation does not state that that examination must take 
account only of injury caused by the other factors to the Union industry as a 
whole. In the light of the purpose of that provision, which is to ensure that the 
institutions separate and distinguish the injurious effects of the dumped imports 
from those of the other factors, it is possible that in certain circumstances, injury 
caused individually to a Union producer by a factor other than the dumped 
imports must be taken into consideration, where it has contributed to the injury 
observed in relation to the Union industry as a whole.109 
While criticising the role of the EU Commission based on a case study, Hindley 
shows quite clearly that EC AD is still a problem. The Commission’s arguments 
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about what has caused injury are still inconsistent, and it still employs biased 
methods of calculation.110 
However, in the author’s opinion, there is a cause-and-effect relationship between 
legislative amendments and alleged dumping. If the EU Council had not 
withdrawn its previous AD duties imposed on Pakistan and had not granted 
preferential tariff arrangements to Pakistan, then definitely the export magnitude 
from Pakistan to EU had not been increased. Thus the Union market would not 
have suffered material injury. Both factors are inter-related and inter-dependent, 
therefore this dissertation suggests that it would be in appropriate to analyse any 
of the above-mentioned factors separately while focusing on one and ignoring the 
other altogether. 
In case T-410/06, the General Court held that where after the lapse of quantitative 
restrictions, the Commission finds an increase in the imports which have been 
subject to quantitative restrictions before. The Commission may take account of 
this element while assessing the injury caused to the domestic industry.111 In 
another Case C-535/06112 it was adjudicated that, , known factors other than the 
subsidised imports are also to be examined in order to confirm that damage 
produced by those other factors is not accredited to those imports. Thus, the 
objective of that rule is to avoid granting the Union industry protection beyond 
that which is necessary”.113 
Likewise, the EU institutions (Commission and Council) were familiar with the 
effect of the withdrawal of previous AD duties and grant of preferential treatment 
to Pakistan: that it will result in increase in export magnitude from Pakistan, and 
thus it may exert pressure on local manufacturers in terms of price competition 
and cause material injury to the Union. In other words the alleged dumping was 
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foreseen by EU institutions while making legislative amendments in their laws. 
Hence, as the consequences were foreseen and predetermined, so it was better 
they did not grant preferential tariff arrangements to Pakistan in the first place. 
Although in Case T-58/99114 and Case T-633/11115 the General Court held that the 
question whether a Union industry has suffered injury, and if so whether that 
injury is attributable to dumped or subsidised imports, involves the assessment of 
complex economic matters in respect of which the institutions enjoy a wide 
discretion. However, it may be submitted that there must be a mechanism to check 
whether institutions are using their discretionary powers fairly and consistently, as 
absolute power corrupts absolutely.  
Schueren concluded that, although, current AD framework provides detailed 
procedural descriptions, but still it remains vague in some areas instead it creates 
ambiguity in some new areas too. These unclear provisions led the investigative 
institutions to conclude questionable conclusions.116 There must be judicial 
review of any such assessment to ascertain whether the procedural rules have been 
complied with, and whether there has been any manifest error of assessment of the 
facts, or any misuse of powers. 
Judicial review and scope of the discretionary powers of the Council and 
Commission are to be considered as part of the principles of institutional balance. 
The competence of the other institutions in a specific subject matter should be 
recognised while exercising the judicial review.117 Advocate General Tizzano is 
of the view that assessment of the competent authorities (institutionally 
responsible for that purpose) should not be substituted with the assessments made 
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by the courts. The rule of separation of power does not allow courts to substitute 
the findings of the Commission.118 
This thesis, however, contends that, with reference to active judicial review, the 
concerns about substitution of powers by the courts are excessive. Under active 
judicial review, the courts are only expected to assess whether the investigative 
authorities are acting upon the letter and spirit of the basic regulation. Is there any 
profound breach of right of any interested party? Instead of interpretation of the 
ambiguous provisions of the basic regulation by the Commission, judicial review 
renders an opportunity to get the interpretation made by the courts, which are 
more competent to do it. It also provides an opportunity to get it verified, and to 
acquire a second opinion upon interpretations of ambiguous parts of law, as made 
by the institutions. 
In the Tetra Laval119 case the Court of Justice stated that as it recognises the 
discretionary powers of the Commission, however it does not mean that the 
General Court should refrain from reviewing the Commission’s findings. The 
Union courts should not only assess the validity and consistency of the facts relied 
upon by the Commission; they should also check whether the evidence relied 
upon contains sufficient and reliable information in order to assess complex 
economic situations, and whether it is capable of substantiating the conclusions 
drawn from it.120 
Cooke maintains that connecting the judicial review with the use of discretionary 
powers, and discretionary powers with the legal principle of institutional balance, 
means in consequence that judicial review should be discussed within legal 
discourse. He does not agree with some other researchers’ pragmatic approach to 
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judicial review, who consider that it should be adapted as the judges see fit in each 
case.121  
Be Vesterdorf (the former President of the CFI) has suggested the appropriate 
standards and nature of judicial review, and according to his standard it should be 
‘extensive and intense’. The General Court should check whether the Commission 
has disregarded, miscalculated or inflated the relevant economic data; adopted an 
erroneous approach to relevant facts; or drawn unconvincing conclusions on the 
basis of incomplete facts. In the absence of such errors, the court should uphold 
the findings and conclusion of the Commission.122 
Furthermore Brosmann et al. argue that the Commission’s discretionary powers 
are not unlimited; instead they are subject to the appraisal of certain paradigms in 
this case the basic regulation. More confined and tightly structured are the legal 
requirements, e.g. about construction of normal value, export price or calculation 
of dumping margin; more limited are the arbitrary powers of the Commission. As 
far as limitation of judicial review of administrative actions is concerned, the 
courts should not intervene as such, but they should cross check the appropriate 
application of legal requirements by authorities.123  
Additionally, referring to the fair use of its discretionary powers by the Council in 
another judgement of Case T-107/04,124 the General Court held that 
notwithstanding the wide discretion it has when determining, in the context of an 
AD proceeding, the existence of a causal link between the dumped imports and 
the material injury allegedly suffered by the Union industry, the Council will 
infringe the basic AD Regulation No 384/96, and more particularly Article 3(3), 
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(6) and (7) thereof, if it commits manifest errors of assessment by failing to take 
into consideration the necessary impact first, of the contraction in demand on the 
Union industry’s sales volume; and second, of the increase in its market share and 
its sales volume on the level of its prices.125  
The General Court has thus reaffirmed the argument that Article 3(7) of the basic 
regulation requires investigative bodies to separate the injury caused by every 
possible known other factor from alleged injury caused by dumped imports. It 
does not matter if it is the amendment in the regulatory framework or the conduct 
of the Union market, as Article 3(7) does not draw any such distinction. 
Bael et al. found that analysis of injurious impact caused by ‘other known factors’ 
is a difficult task, as it involves appraisal of complex economic analyses. 
However, if the institutions could not properly segregate the injurious effect of 
other known factors, the injury would be credited to alleged dumped 
imports.126The absence of a specific criterion for such segregation makes this 
process more complicated, as Muller et al. noted that although the basic regulation 
and the WTO Agreement provide for analysis of injury caused by other factors, 
they do not provide a certain standard for such segregation.127 
Similarly Simon Lester contends that threshold of substantial and genuine has 
never been defined by the WTO Agreement. The lack of clarity thus leads to a lot 
of uncertainty. This put an extra burden on investigative bodies in their 
investigation.128 While, this thesis contends that, it also used to render extensive 
arbitrary powers to the national investigative authorities resultantly, it tends to 
conclude controversial decisions.   
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The Advocate General has tried to make the point that withdrawal or reduction of 
AD duty does not have any impact on the Union’s industry unless it entered in the 
EU market, and the impact of approval of GSP status is on dumped imports itself 
instead of the Union’s market. But it is submitted that another perspective is if the 
EU does not lift the previous protective measure imposed on Pakistan. And if the 
EU Council had not given GSP status to Pakistan, there would neither be any 
dumped imports nor any injury caused to the Union industry. Pakistani exporters 
should not be penalised for the actions and decisions taken by the European 
Union. They should also not be penalised for the policy shift of EU towards 
Pakistan.129 
Moreover, the Advocate General has also overlooked the fact that before the grant 
of preferential tariff arrangement to Pakistan and the lifting of previous AD duties 
on Pakistani textile products, there was no complaint of injury caused to the 
Union industry. The applicant launched its application after the EU’s policy shift 
regarding application if its protective measures on Pakistan. The magnitude of 
textile imports from Pakistan rapidly increased after grant of preferential access to 
Pakistan. 
It is further submitted that supposedly the export price of Pakistani bed linen was 
£100/bundle before the lifting of previous AD duty, as Pakistani exporters were 
paying £15/bundle as a dumping duty. Therefore, as the previous AD lifted they 
started to export the same product at £85/bundle. Thus they were able to offer a 
cheaper and competitive price in EU market due to the relaxation and benefit 
given by the EU Council by its majority vote.  
The researcher contends that if EU institutions do not change their AD policy 
regarding Pakistan with specific reference to import of bed linen, then Pakistani 
exporters will have to sell at their previous rate of £100/bundle instead of the new 
rate of £85/bundle due to the special tariff arrangement from the EU. Moreover, 
imposition of AD duty was the decision of the EU Commission and EU Council. 
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Similarly, withdrawal of those duties with special market access arrangements 
was also the decision of EU institutions. EU institutions approved the GSP status 
knowing that it would make it possible for Pakistani exporters to sell their 
products at lower prices and thus may result in the form of injury to the Union 
industry. 
This analyses corroborates Patrick Tayal’s ‘but for’ test theory. This theory 
advocates that while assessing the substantiality and seriousness of injury caused 
to the local industry, the investigators should try to find out the root cause of the 
injury. He submitted that in some cases dumped imports are the root cause of 
injury but mathematically and technically it could not be considered as 
substantial.130 ‘But for’ test does not look for a genuine and substantial link 
instead; it makes investigative authorities to explore the other causes of injury 
caused to the local industry in the absence of increased dumped imports.131 
Tayal explains his theory with the help of following hypothesis. Supposedly, local 
market of country A is suffered by 2% due to the increased dumped imports from 
country Y.  The local industry of country Y revolted against this upsurge which 
led to the political instability which led to further decline of the local industry by 
10%. Mathematically the injury caused by the dumped imports cannot be 
considered as substantial within the meaning of Article 3.5 of the WTO 
Agreement but as a matter of fact it is the root cause of further 10% injury caused 
to the local industry. In such situation it is imperative to allow the country to put 
safeguard measures in order to protect its local industry from further 
deterioration.132 However within the meaning of current causation analysis 
requirement, the local investigative authorities could not do anything to save their 
local industry.  
                                                            
130 Patrick Tayal, ‘A New World of Causation in safeguards: Application of the ‘But for’ Test’ 
(2015) 10 (10) Global trade and custom journal 355, 361 
131 David Leys, ‘Does a Theory of Causation Exist under the WTO Safeguards Agreement?’ 
(2014) 9 (1) Global Trade and Customs Journal 10, 17 
132 Simon Lester et al., World Trade Law: Text, Materials and Commentary (2nd Edition, 
Bloomsbury Publishing 2012) 537 
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Although his analysis is in support of far reaching and open ended definition of 
injury caused by dumped imports but it gives a very helpful starting point about 
understanding the root cause of injury. Based upon the same principle, the EU 
institutions should have investigated the root cause of the injury caused to the 
Union industry, i.e. grant of preferential tariff arrangements to Pakistan and lapse 
of previously imposed ADD on Pakistan which led to the increased import of 
textiles from Pakistan. 
Furthermore, the researcher does not agree with the Advocate General’s comment 
that the analysis cannot be different if shipping costs are suddenly reduced, or if a 
duty previously imposed is removed. It is submitted that two aforementioned 
factors are not comparable, as reduction in shipping cost has a different origin and 
different significance. Unlike of the removal of previously applied duty and 
approval of preferential access, it is not sanctioned by the EU institutions. Neither 
has it represented the EU’s AD policy for Pakistan.  
However GSP status approved with the majority vote of the Council has an 
altogether different impact on mutual trade of EU and Pakistan. Similarly, unlike 
removal of previous AD duty, it does not convey a message to the Pakistani 
government and Pakistani exporters that you will be facilitated by preferential 
access arrangements and your export of cotton-type bed linen is welcomed in EU. 
As for the Advocate General’s opinion that legislative amendments are not a 
separate independent factor and its impact is on dumped imports instead of the 
EU’s market, it could be argued that it is a separate and independent factor indeed, 
as to unfairly dump on the Union’s market is the decision and action of foreign 
exporters, but to safeguard or allow foreign dumped imports in larger Community 
interest or to grant preferential arrangements to foreign exporters is the decision of 
the EU’s institutions. They are not the same; instead they are altogether separate 
and independent factors being controlled by different authorities. Moreover, if it is 
admitted that the impact of approval of GSP status is on dumped imports 
themselves, then it means that the EU institutions facilitated foreign exporters to 
dump on their market. 
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5.7 CONCLUSION 
The current chapter has evaluated the judgements of the General Court and the EU 
Court of Justice in Case T-199/04, and Case C-638/11. It is concluded that, the 
generality of Article 3(7) of basic regulation, and the absence of an exhaustive list 
of ‘other known factors’ in the said Article, led to inconsistent interpretations, as 
drawn by both courts. However, the interpretation of the Article 3(7), as drawn by 
the application of the ‘Mischief Rule’ of interpretation reveals that, the institutions 
must segregate the injurious effect of all other known factors from the injury 
caused by the dumped imports. 
The institutions however, should not stick to the list of ‘other known factors’ 
provided in the Article 3(7), as this list is exemplary instead of being conclusive. 
However, they should evaluate the injurious impact of all possible other factors, 
as these factors may vary depending upon the changing circumstances of each 
case; the same was established by the General Court. On the other hand, the 
verdict of the EU Court of Justice, claiming that, legislative amendments could 
not be considered as ‘other known factor’ within the meaning of the Article 3(7) 
has been challenged (in this chapter) within the context of other case laws.  
The next chapter answers the 2nd and 3rd research questions of this thesis, as it has 
evaluated the voting patterns and voting rationale of the EU member states (for or 
against the imposition of ADDs on imports originating from Pakistan). Similarly, 
on the basis of empirical data pertaining to the level of imports from Pakistan to 
the EU through last two decades; it investigates the impact of application of ADD 
on Pakistan’s imports. 
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CHAPTER SIX: EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE EU MEMBER 
STATES’ VOTING, RATIONALE OF VOTING AND IMPACT 
OF DUTIES ON FLOW OF IMPORTS FROM PAKISTAN 
6.1  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter deals with second and third (sub) research questions of the thesis 
whereby Sections 8.2 and 8.3 discuss the voting patterns of the EU member states 
and subsequent reasons for their unique voting styles. To examine the rationale of 
members’ voting trends, the examples of Denmark and Sweden are used and 
conclusions are drawn on the basis of empirical data provided by the 
aforementioned states. However, Section 8.1 deals with the second sub research 
question whereby it intends to examine the impact of imposition of anti-dumping 
(AD) duties on scale of imports from Pakistan. In this respect, conclusions are 
drawn on the basis of data extracted from the Eurostat website. Instead of analysis 
of impact of anti-dumping duty (ADD) on overall imports from Pakistan to EU, 
this section precisely evaluates and compares the level of imports (of those 
particular products which have been subject to duty only) before and after the 
imposition of duty. 
6.2  IMPACT OF IMPOSED DUTIES ON FLOW OF IMPORTS 
OF CONCERNED PRODUCTS FROM PAKISTAN 
6.2.1 IMPACT OF DUTY IMPOSED BY COUNCIL REGULATION 
(EC) NO 1467/2004 ON IMPORTS OF POLYTHYLENE 
TEREPHTHALATE 
It is confirmed that from 1999, or even before 1999 to 2000, there were no 
imports of polyethylene terephthalate from Pakistan to the EU. The imports, 
however, started in 2001, which later drastically (100 times) increased in 2002. In 
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2003 they further increased about 300%. From 2003 to 2010 the level of imports 
had been fluctuating, with significant reduction in level of imports in 2007 
(however above the level of imports in 2002), imports were at their highest level 
(through 16 years of imports from Pakistan to the EU) in 2008.  
However, after termination of the AD investigation due to the calculation of 
negative dumping margin for sole trader of Pakistan (Novatex Ltd), in 2010 anti-
subsidy duty was imposed on imports of same product from Pakistan. It resulted 
in a radical decrease in level of imports of polyethylene terephthalate from 
Pakistan. The scale of imports through the upcoming four years is comparatively 
found to be average ten times lower than the level of imports in 2002.  
Therefore, it could be established that the imposition of anti-subsidy duty on 
imports of polyethylene terephthalate has resulted in significant reduction of 
imports from Pakistan to the EU. However, Vandenbussche et al. studied 
empirically the effects of European AD actions on import deviation from 
importers in an AD inquiry. They find that, in contrast to the US, trade deviation 
in the European Union instigated by AD actions is relatively limited.1 
                                                            
1 Hylke Vandenbussche et al., ‘On Import Diversion Under European Anti-dumping Policy’ 
(1999) National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 7340 
<http://www.nber.org/papers/w7340> accessed 15 January 2015 
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Figure 6.1: Shows the level of trade of polyethylene terephthalate before and 
after imposition of Subsidy duty in 2010 
Source: Calculations based on Eurostat data 
 
 
Table 6.1: Describing import of polyethylene terephthalate from Pakistan to 
the EU through the last 16 years 
Source: Developed by the author based upon Eurostat data 
Year Trade Year Trade 
1999 - 2007 34200996 
2000 - 2008 87090719 
2001 22799 2009 66813814 
2002 24692445 2010 50300617 
2003 68059858 2011 9349700 
2004 54184384 2012 1564525 
2005 69525187 2013 797044 
2006 45559621 2014 5881047 
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6.2.2 IMPACT OF DUTY IMPOSED ON IMPORTS OF COMPACT 
FLUORESCENT LAMPS  
Drope and Hansen establish that increasing use of AD measures and their 
continued widespread use suggests that countries increasingly use AD measures to 
protect specific industries, and even negotiate ever more free trade agreements. 
They focus on and debate recent changes in the global use of AD policy as a 
probable tactical counterpoint to trade liberalisation. It seems to have contributed 
to an extraordinary number of countries handling more AD petitions and 
introducing more AD actions than ever before. These measures – and even the 
threat of measures – cause terrific levels of trade distortion in the form of reduced 
imports.2 
Figure 8.2 reveals that there was no import of compact fluorescent lamps (CFL) 
from Pakistan to the EU in 2000 or before. There is an important co-relation 
between imposition of AD duty on imports of CFL on China in 2001 and the start 
of imports of the same product from Pakistan in 2001. The Commission’s stance 
however, vindicated that imports from Pakistan were circumventing by means of 
transhipment and assembly procedures carried out in Pakistan, as the imports from 
Pakistan started just after the imposition of duty on Chinese imports.  
However, it is difficult to conclude that imports from Pakistan worth a few 
hundred thousand euros can cause material injury to EU industry, or can 
significantly impede the impact of AD duty imposed on China. It is, however, 
evident that the imports of CFL from Pakistan were almost stopped after 
imposition of circumvention measures on Pakistan in 2004. The fact that the 
imports of CFL did not resume even after the expiry of circumvention measures in 
2009 also establishes that imports from Pakistan were not genuine as, possibly 
after imposition of circumvention measures on Pakistan, the Chinese company 
decided to close its assembly procedure in Pakistan. 
 
                                                            
2 Jeffrey Drope and Wendy Hansen, ‘Anti-Dumping’s Happy Birthday’ (2006) 29 (4) The World 
Economy 459, 459-460 
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Figure 6.2: Differentiates the magnitude of import flow of CFL with and 
without the imposition of AD measures 
Source: Developed by the author based upon Eurostat data 
 
6.2.3 IMPACT OF AD DUTY IMPOSED ON IMPORT OF BED 
LINEN OF COTTON 
The data as prescribed in the following figure reveals that from 1994 to 1998 the 
scale of import has been increasing steadily. The imports had also been 
increasing from 1998 to 2002, despite the fact that AD duty was imposed by the 
EU on imports of bed linen of cotton through this period. Thus it could be 
established that in this case imposition of AD duty did not affect the flow of bed 
linen of cotton from Pakistan. After re-imposition of AD duty on imports of bed 
linen of cotton from Pakistan in 2004, the level of imports from Pakistan 
drastically reduced, and after 2005 no import of bed linen of cotton is seen from 
Pakistan to the EU, despite the fact that the rate of duty was reduced from 13.1% 
to 5.6% in 2006 through expiry review. 
 It is also noted that no imports of same product were seen even after expiry of 
AD measures in 2009. There must be some other reason for eradication of 
imports from Pakistan to the EU; the imposition of AD duty in 2004 could not 
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be a single reason, as previously from 1997 to 2002 it did not affect the 
magnitude of imports from Pakistan, despite the fact that the rate of duty was 
comparatively high at that time.  
The lower amount of import diversion in Europe can be due to the lower duty 
levels as a result of injury margin protection, as opposed to higher dumping 
margin protection.3 Unlike many other WTO member states, the EU has 
incorporated ‘lesser duty rule’ in its basic regulation, and it preferably used to 
have recourse to it. Therefore low duty rates calculated in all cases related to 
Pakistan (which are found to be less than 15% of export price) can be one of the 
significant reasons for lack of trade diversion from Pakistan. 
 
Figure 6.3: Shows the impact of imposition of anti-dumping duties on 
export of bed linen of cotton combined nomenclature (CN) Code 63023190 
from Pakistan to the EU 
Source: Researcher’s computations based on Eurostat data  
                                                            
3 Thomas Prusa and Susan Skeath, ‘On the Economic and Strategic Motives for Anti-Dumping 
Filings’ (2001) National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No 8424 
<http://www.nber.org/papers/w8424> accessed 5 January 2015 
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Table 6.2: Shows the flow of bed linen of cotton from Pakistan to the EU 
through the last 21 years-Value in Euros 
Source: Researcher’s computations based on Eurostat data 
Year Trade Year Trade Year Trade 
1994 16916316 2001 45866527 2008 - 
1995 20779155 2002 55823667 2009 - 
1996 31451256 2003 60852559 2010 - 
1997 35123389 2004 58851774 2011 - 
1998 38663372 2005 - 2012 - 
1999 51843279 2006 - 2013 - 
2000 41807707 2007 - 2014 - 
 
6.2.4 IMPACT OF AD DUTY IMPOSED ON IMPORTS OF BED 
LINEN OF COTTON MIXED WITH FLAX 
Similarly, a supplementary reason could be the absence of transparency and the 
larger extent of ambiguity regarding the actual levels of safeguard in Europe in 
contrast to the US, which could explain the comparatively small influence on 
non-named countries’ imports into the EU.4 
However, the analysis of current data established that import of bed linen of 
cotton mixed with flax was minimal from 1994 to 1997, although Pakistani 
exporters of bed linen had free access to EU markets. The negligible magnitude 
(below 0.2 million Euro) of imports in 1997, however, does not explain whether 
material injury could be caused to the EU market with this little scale of 
imports, as the EU Council in 1997 imposed definitive AD duty on imports of 
bed linen mixed with flax originating from Pakistan.  
However, it is noted that the level of imports increased marginally through the 
duty period. It is also found that in 2003 after expiry of previously imposed AD 
measures, the magnitude of imports increased almost 150% as compared to the 
                                                            
4 Above (n 1) 
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previous year. After re-imposition of AD duty on the same product in 2004, no 
imports of product concerned could be seen from Pakistan to the EU.  
 
Figure 6.4: Differentiates the magnitude of imports from Pakistan to the 
EU of bed linen of cotton mixed with flax (CN Code 63023110) with and 
without application of safeguard measures 
Source: Computations based upon Eurostat data 
 
Table 6.3: Shows the flow of bed linen of cotton mixed with flax from 
Pakistan to the EU through the last 21 years: Value in Euros 
Source: Author’s computations based on Eurostat data 
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Year Trade Year Trade Year Trade 
1994 138612 2001 482759 2008 - 
1995 771 2002 1357612 2009 - 
1996 46507 2003 1314346 2010 - 
1997 - 2004 1037007 2011 - 
1998 171887 2005 - 2012 - 
1999 103491 2006 - 2013 - 
2000 121194 2007 - 2014 - 
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6.2.5 IMPACT OF DUTY IMPOSED ON IMPORT OF BED LINEN 
OF MAN-MADE FIBRE 
 
Figure 8.5 explains that the magnitude of imports of bed linen of man-made 
fibre has been steadily increasing, and the imposition of duty from 1997 to 2002 
could not affect the level of imports, although after expiry of the measure in 
2003 and 2004 a drastic increase in imports can be seen. However, Lasagni 
noted that imports from targeted countries were reduced almost 50% after the 
imposition of duty, but in the case of price undertaking the results are not clear. 
Moreover, full trade diversion as a result of application of ADD could not be 
proved from their analysis.5 Similarly Vandesbussche et al. demonstrated that 
the EU’s anti-dumping policy is more effective as compared to the US, as it 
causes less trade diversion pursuant to imposition of protective measures.6 
It is also revealed that the re-imposition of AD duty from 2004 to 2009 
significantly reduced the volume of imports of bed linen from Pakistan. The 
volume of imports through the duty period (2004-2009) is found to be lower 
than the level of imports in 2002 (seven years ago).  
The reduction of duty rate from 13.1% to 5.6% through expiry review in 2006 
also could not show any positive impact on the scale of imports from Pakistan. 
It is further noted that after expiry of measures in 2009 the magnitude of 
imports from Pakistan has been significantly increasing every year from 2010 
to 2014, as no negative trend could be seen through this period. It could 
however be concluded that in the case of imports of this particular product, the 
imposition of AD duty is proved to be a vital factor for reduction in imports 
from Pakistan. 
 
                                                            
5 Andrea Lasangi, ‘Does Country-targeted Policy by the EU Create Trade Diversion’ (2000) 34 (4) 
Journal of World trade 137, 143 
6 Hylke Vandenbussche et al., ‘On Import Diversion Under European Anti-dumping Policy’ 
(1999) National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 7340 
<http://www.nber.org/papers/w7340> accessed 15 January 2015 
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Figure 6.5: Differentiates the magnitude of imports from Pakistan to the EU 
of bed linen of man-made fibres (CN Code 63023290) with and without the 
application of anti-dumping duty 
Source: Author’s computations based upon Eurostat data 
 
Table 6.4: Indicates the imports of bed linen of man-made fibre from 
Pakistan to the EU through the last 21 years: Value in Euros 
Source: Author’s computations based on Eurostat data 
Year Trade Year Trade Year Trade 
1994 2716423 2001 38125389 2008 55791012 
1995 1421490 2002 66181055 2009 75251950 
1996 4175119 2003 64697438 2010 96224863 
1997 7845158 2004 64551469 2011 114321763 
1998 10721873 2005 51648244 2012 110036191 
1999 18293767 2006 52042684 2013 115602819 
2000 26612777 2007 63854562 2014 141915979 
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6.2.6 IMPACT OF AD DUTY IMPOSED ON IMPORT OF 
PRINTED BED LINEN 
It could be established that imposition of AD duty on printed bed linen from 1997 
to 2002 has not affected the scale of imports, as imports could be seen to be 
flourishing significantly each year through the duty period. This increase in 
imports is as normal as in case of free trade access to EU market. Lasagni noted 
that the size of the anti-dumping duty can have a significant impact on the flow of 
trade. Thus, this minimal impact of EU duty on Pakistan’s imports could originate 
from lesser duty rates.7 However, it is noted that the second phase of duty from 
2004-2009 seriously affected the flow of imports of printed bed line, as no 
sufficient improvement in magnitude of trade could be seen through these five 
years.  
The size of imports in 2005, 2007 and 2008 is found to be even lower than in 
2000. However, a substantial increase in the imports can be seen after lifting of 
safeguard measures in 2009, with the highest-ever scale of imports of product 
concerned in 2014. The size of imports in 2012 and 2013 is yet found to be less 
than 2004, however, as discussed in the case of bed linen knitted or crocheted; in 
this case as well it may be due to the reduction in production capacity of Pakistani 
exporters due to the prevailing energy crises in Pakistan. 
 
 
 
                                                            
7 Andrea Lasangi, ‘Does Country-targeted Policy by the EU Create Trade Diversion’ (2000) 34(4) 
Journal of World trade 137, 157 
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Figure 6.6: Differentiates the magnitude of imports from Pakistan to the EU 
of printed bed linen of textile materials (CN Code 63022290) with and 
without application of anti-dumping duty 
Source: Author’s computations based on Eurostat data 
 
Table 6.5: Illustrates the import of printed bed linen of textile materials 
from Pakistan to the EU through the last 21 years: Value in Euros 
Source: Author’s computations based on Eurostat data 
Year Trade Year Trade Year Trade 
1994 13272964 2001 68630932 2008 61952094 
1995 15935043 2002 85661371 2009 72579571 
1996 23650001 2003 80965866 2010 83269033 
1997 34223005 2004 92028329 2011 96227707 
1998 41675666 2005 61079756 2012 82656976 
1999 56686446 2006 69649608 2013 79846140 
2000 68987267 2007 63276580 2014 114749296 
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6.2.7 IMPACT OF AD DUTY IMPOSED ON IMPORTS OF BED 
LINEN KNITTED 
The following data shows that imposition of AD duty on bed linen knitted or 
crocheted from 1997 to 2002 put a cap on the increase of scale of imports, as 
comparison of import magnitude from 1994-1997 (when Pakistani imports were 
eligible for free access to EU market) and imports from 1997-2002 (when AD 
duty was placed) reveals that the level of imports had been at a constant point 
through these eight years. However, normally it is observed that the magnitude of 
import improves on a yearly basis.  
The second phase of duty on the same product from 2004 to 2009 shows a 
marginal increase in the imports. After expiry of measure in 2009 a drastic 
increase can be seen through years 2010, 2011 and 2014. However, loss of 
imports can be seen through 2012 and 2014, as no AD duty was in place at that 
time; however, one of the possible reasons may be the loss of production capacity 
of Pakistani manufacturers due to the prevailing energy crises in Pakistan. 
 
 
 
226 
  
 
Figure 6.7: Differentiates the magnitude of imports from Pakistan to the EU 
of bed linen knitted or crocheted (CN Code 63022100) with and without 
application of anti-dumping duty 
Source: Author’s computations based upon the Eurostat data 
 
Table 6.6: Demonstrates the import of bed linen knitted or crocheted from 
Pakistan to the EU through the last 21 years: Value in Euros 
Source: Author’s computations based on Eurostat data 
Year Trade Year Trade Year Trade 
1994 72838134 2001 91559219 2008 172379409 
1995 90988056 2002 119371659 2009 176067015 
1996 88771196 2003 125999419 2010 211990530 
1997 90232194 2004 137349230 2011 222681531 
1998 95216796 2005 122583031 2012 170347886 
1999 103212225 2006 142367065 2013 174086560 
2000 92722985 2007 173000462 2014 243177917 
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6.3  VOTING IN THE COUNCIL FOR/AGAINST ADOPTION 
OR TERMINATION OF AD MEASURES RELATED TO 
PAKISTAN 
Figure 6.8: Voting patterns of EU member states for/against imposition of 
ADD on imports of polyethylene terephthalate (PET) from Pakistan  
Source: Developed by the author based on data provided by the General 
Secretariat of EU Parliament 
 
 
 
 
 
Finland 
Austria, Hungary 
Pie Chart 1: Closure of the written procedure for the 
adoption of a Council Regulation imposing a definitive 
anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the 
provisional duty imposed on imports of PET originating 
in Australia, China and Pakistan 
Yes No Abstained
Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
Czech-republic, 
Denmark, 
Estonia, France, 
Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, 
Luxemburg, 
Malta, 
Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, 
Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, UK 
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Table 6.7: Closure of the written procedure for the adoption of a Council 
Regulation imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting 
definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of polyethylene 
terephthalate originating in Australia, the People’s Republic of China and 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of polyethylene 
terephthalate originating in Pakistan and releasing the amounts secured by 
way of the provisional duties imposed 
Source: Developed by the author based on data provided by the General 
Secretariat of the EU Parliament 
Delegation Voting 
Pattern 
Delegation Voting 
Pattern 
Delegation Voting 
Pattern 
Bulgaria Yes Finnish No Austrian Abstained 
Cyprus Yes   Hungarian Abstained 
Czech-Republic Yes     
Denmark Yes     
Estonia Yes     
France Yes     
Germany Yes     
Greece Yes     
Ireland Yes     
Italy Yes     
Latvia Yes     
Lithuania Yes     
Luxembourg Yes     
Malta Yes     
Netherlands Yes     
Poland Yes     
Portugal Yes     
Slovakia Yes     
Slovenia Yes     
Spain Yes     
Sweden Yes     
UK Yes     
 
The data shows that a significant majority of member states voted in favour of 
termination of provisional measures imposed by the Commission on Pakistan for 
imports of polyethylene terephthalate. It includes all big European economies, e.g. 
UK, France and Germany. However, it is noted that the imports of polyethylene 
from Pakistan started in 2002, as before that there was no import at all. The 
member states which abstained from voting or voted against the termination of 
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proceedings against Pakistan were not having any imports from Pakistan before 
2004. But there are many other member states, including Germany, Ireland, 
Poland and Sweden which were not having imports from Pakistan but voted in 
favour of termination of investigation against Pakistan. 
It has been noted that the voting style of member states significantly depends 
upon the location of Union industry. The member states having the presence of 
Union industry within their territory will be more inclined towards rigorous 
protectionism. However, the member states which do not possess Union industry 
will potentially adopt a more flexible approach to cheap foreign imports.8 In the 
following examples, as the Union industry is concentrated in big European 
economies, therefore they have been supporting imposition of ADD on Pakistan. 
It is noted that, in this case, Finland abstained from voting. Before March 2004, it 
was the rule of the EU’s AD policy that abstentions from voting were counted as a 
‘No’ vote. However, under the current policy, abstentions are counted as ‘Yes’ 
vote. Thus any member state which is not supporting the imposition of ADD will 
have to say ‘No’ clearly. They cannot adopt the easy and diplomatic route of 
abstention. Evenett and Vermulst opined that this practice tends to inhibit small 
member states from opposing the proposed protective measures, as they cannot 
oppose the influential bloc of big and pro-duty member states.9   
                                                            
8 Themistoklis Giannakopoulos, A Concise Guide to the EU Anti-dumping/anti-subsidies 
Procedures (Kluwar Law International 2006) 64 
9 Simon Evenett and Edwin Vermulst, ‘The Politicisation of EC Anti-Dumping Policy: Member 
States, Their Votes and the European Commission’ (2005) 28(5) The World Economy 701, 705 
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Figure 6.9: Explaining the voting patterns of the EU member states 
for/against imposition of ADD on cotton-type bed linen of Pakistan 
Source: Developed by the author based on data provided by the General 
Secretariat of the EU Parliament 
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Pie Chart 2: Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) 
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Pakistan 
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Table 6.8: Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) 2398/97 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of cotton-type bed linen originating 
in Egypt, India and Pakistan 
Source: Developed by the author based on data provided by the General 
Secretariat of the EU Parliament 
Delegation Voting Pattern Delegation Voting Pattern 
Austria Yes Netherlands No 
Belgium Yes Swedish No 
Denmark Yes   
Finland Yes   
France Yes   
Germany Yes   
Greece Yes   
Ireland Yes   
Italy Yes   
Luxemburg Yes   
Portugal Yes   
Spain Yes   
UK  Yes   
While talking about voting patterns in the EU Council, Nordstrᴕm contends that 
the levying of AD measures on supposedly dumped imports to the European 
Union is essentially a political choice brought by the Council with simple 
majority.10 
In the official perspective, AD is a ‘specialized choice’. This may be valid to the 
extent that the Commission is concerned. In any case, when the proposal reaches 
the member states, governmental issues take the front seat. Their appraisals 
recommend that the votes are principally determined by a national interest 
approach, and inclinations as communicated in opinion polls and decision 
declarations. Member states that incline towards protectionism are fundamentally 
                                                            
10 Håkan Nordström, ‘On the Political Economy of EU Anti-Dumping Policy: Decoding Member 
States Votes’ (2011) National Board of Trade, Sweden Discussion Paper 
<https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/gtdw_e/wkshop11_e/nordstrom_e.pdf> accessed 10 
January 2015 
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more prone to backing AD recommendations than member states that incline 
towards unhindered commerce.11 
This thesis agrees with Nordström as far as it goes to identify member states tilted 
towards more protectionism and member states having more flexible approach to 
AD practices. The current data reveal that, Germany and France (Protectionists), 
the two largest importers of bed linen originating from Pakistan (Sweden and the 
Netherlands) voted against the imposition of protective measures on Pakistan’s 
textile imports. However, some other large trading partners of Pakistan, including 
the UK, Germany, France, Spain and Italy, voted in favour of imposition of 
safeguard measures. Therefore, trade partner loyalty could not be considered as an 
exclusive reason for the voting patterns of member states. Moreover, it is also 
observed that some member states, e.g. Portugal and Luxembourg, with whom 
Pakistan was not having any trade of textile products, or some member states 
(Greece and Ireland) with whom Pakistan was having nominal trade of textile, 
also voted in favour of imposition of AD duty. 
The existing literature suggests that the Community industry, being well 
associated, is proved to be more sucessful in securing its own interests. Moreover, 
it is best placed to obtain all the important information about activities in the 
member states, and thus to initiate the complaint. The importers and consumers 
are, however, found to be less effective in securing their interests.12 
                                                            
11 Ibid 
12 Johannes Beseler and Neville Williams, Anti-dumping and Anti-subsidy Law: The European 
Communities (Sweet & Maxwell 1986) 178; Katalin Cseres and Joana Mendes, ‘Consumer’s 
Access to EU Competition Law Procedures: Outer and Inner Limits’ (2014) 51(2) Common 
Market Law Review 483, 502 
 
233 
  
 
Figure 6.10: Explaining the voting patterns of the EU member states 
for/against imposition of ADD on cotton-type bed linen of Pakistan in 1997 
Source: Developed by the author based on data provided by the General 
Secretariat of the EU Parliament 
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Pie Chart 3: Proposal for a Council Regulation amending 
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Table 6.9: Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) 160/2002 amending 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2398/97 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty 
on imports of cotton-type bed linen originating in Egypt, India and Pakistan, 
and terminating the proceeding with regard to imports originating in 
Pakistan 
Source: Developed by the author based on data provided by the General 
Secretariat of the EU Parliament 
Delegation Voting Pattern Delegation Voting Pattern 
Austria Yes Belgian No 
Denmark Yes Spanish No 
Finland Yes French No 
Germany Yes Italian No 
Greece Yes Portuguese No 
Ireland Yes   
Luxemburg Yes   
Netherlands Yes   
Sweden Yes   
United Kingdom Yes   
 
It is observed that, around 2000, France was the largest importer of Pakistan made 
textile products, with an average import magnitide of around 50 million Euro. 
Despite this fact it opposed the proposal to terminate AD measures levied against 
Pakistan. However, the second largest trading partner of Pakistan (the UK) 
favoured such termination. It is also noted that Germany, having quite less import 
magnitude as compared to the size of its economy, also favoured the termination 
of AD duty imposed against Pakistan. 
Similarly, Spain and Italy were also having nominal import magnitude as 
compared to their economic size, while Portugal was having imports from 
Pakistan just in few thousand Euros. Some of the member states (the UK, the 
Netherlands and Sweden) who supported the termination of measures were having 
large import size from Pakistan, while Luxembourg was not having any imports 
from Pakistan, but it also supported the termination of definitive ADD. 
Evenett et al. have noted that five member states (France, Spain, Italy, Portugal 
and Greece) have supported the imposition of ADD with a huge rate of 85%. It 
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seems that these member states are the core supporter of imposition of ADDs. On 
the other hand, seven member states (UK, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Germany, 
Luxembourg and Netherlands) have less than 16% support ratio. However, it is 
noted that, the current preceding and forthcoming voting patterns of the member 
states seem to be in conformity with Evenett et al.’s findings. For example, the 
same five member states bloc was found to be a core supporter of the imposition 
of ADD on Pakistan’s bed linen. Nevertheless, of Germany’s below 15% support 
ratio, it is found that, in the case of application of ADDs on Pakistan, Germany is 
mostly found to be in favour.13 
 
Figure 6.11: Explaining the voting patterns of the EU member states 
for/against imposition of ADD on cotton-type bed linen of Pakistan in 2004 
Source: Developed by the author based on data provided by the General 
Secretariat of the EU Parliament 
 
                                                            
13 Simon Evenett and Edwin Vermulst, ‘The Politicisation of EC Anti-Dumping Policy: Member 
States, Their Votes and the European Commission’ (2005) 28(5) The World Economy 701, 710 
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Table 6.10: Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) 397/2004 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of cotton-type bed linen originating 
in Pakistan 
Source: Developed by the author based on data provided by the General 
Secretariat of the EU Parliament 
Delegation Voting Pattern Delegation Voting Pattern 
Austria Yes Danish No 
Belgium Yes Finish No 
France Yes Netherlands No 
Germany Yes Swedish No 
Greece Yes United Kingdom No 
Ireland Yes   
Italy Yes   
Luxembourg Yes   
Portugal Yes   
Spain Yes   
 Bièvre et al. argue that the current anti-dumping framework of the EU came 
under criticism when several protective measures imposed by the institutions 
gathered controversy among different stakeholders and member states. One of 
those cases was bed linen duty imposed on Pakistan, India and Egypt. During 
1996 to 2002, several anti-dumping complaints were filed by Eurocoton against 
those countries.14 
Dutta establishes that these several complaints filed by Eurocoton about the 
alleged dumping had caused significant controversy among southern producers of 
the bed linen, supported by the southern member states with such production and 
importers based in the northern member states. He further found that, in India’s 
case the vote was tied by 7-7, with Germany finally casting the tie-breaking vote. 
He found the same trend in Pakistan’s case.15 
                                                            
14 Dirk Bièvre and Jappe Eckhardt, ‘Interest Groups and EU Anti-Dumping Policy’ (2011) 18(3) 
Journal of European Public Policy 339, 351 
15 Shaswata Dutta,, ‘The Bed Linen Case - A Case Study’ (2006) 20 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=880347> accessed 15 March 2015 
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This thesis supports Dutta’s finding as far as it goes to expain the different voting 
trends of southern and northern member states,  as it gives one of the most 
important voting rationale of the member states. The detailed analysis of trade 
data related to imports of bed linen from Pakistan to the EU in 2003 reveals that 
the United Kingdom, being the largest importer of Pakistani bed linen with an 
approximate import magnitude of around 70 million Euros, and the Netherlands, 
being the fourth largest importer with an import magnitude of around 28.8 million 
Euros, voted against the imposition of protective measures against Pakistan’s 
textile imports. However, France, Germany and Belgium, being second, third and 
fifth largest importers respectively, voted in favour of the application of ADD.  
Additionally, Italy and Spain were having relatively less imports as compared to 
their economic size, but they also voted in favour of safeguard measures. It is also 
observed that Denmark and Finland, having nominal imports from Pakistan of 
even less than 0.5 million Euro, voted against the imposition of ADD. Therefore, 
apart from the UK and the Netherlands, all other member states showed a mixed 
trend, as trade partner loyalty could not be found to be the reason of their voting 
trend. However, the UK’s and the Netherlands’ extensive imports from Pakistan 
explains their rationale for opposing such measures. 
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Figure 6.12: Explaining the voting patterns of the EU member states 
for/against amendment of previously imposed ADD on cotton-type bed linen 
of Pakistan in 2006 
Source: Developed by the author based on data provided by the General 
Secretariat of the EU Parliament 
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Table 6.11: Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) 695/2006 amending 
Regulation (EC) No 397/2004 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
imports of cotton-type bed linen originating in Pakistan  
Source: Developed by the author based on data provided by the General 
Secretariat of the EU Parliament 
Delegation Voting Pattern Delegation Voting Pattern 
Austria Yes Czech Republic No 
Belgium Yes Greek No 
Cyprus Yes Spanish No 
Denmark Yes Lithuanian No 
Estonia Yes Polish No 
Finland Yes Portuguese No 
France Yes   
Germany Yes   
Hungary Yes   
Ireland Yes   
Italy Yes   
Latvia Yes   
Luxembourg Yes   
Malta Yes   
Netherlands Yes   
Slovakia Yes   
Slovenia Yes   
Sweden Yes   
United Kingdom Yes   
 
It is observed that after the imposition of definitive ADD at the rate of 13.1% in 
2004 on cotton-type bed linen, the import magnitude in 2005 significantly 
declined, as imports of Pakistan’s largest importer (UK’s) imports declined from 
71 million Euros to 32.1 million Euros. It is also found that import of one out of 
four types of the product concerned permanently stopped after 2004. All member 
states which opposed the reduction of duty rate from 13.1% to 5.6% through 
above voting were found to be having minimal import from Pakistan (on average 
less than 1 million Euros).  
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All large trading partners of Pakistan in the textile sector, including the UK, 
France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, in 2005 having import capital 
respectively 32.1, 36.3, 23.4, 26.8 and 20.3 million Euros, supported the reduction 
of duty rate for Pakistani textile imports. One of the possible reasons for the 
differing voting pattern of member states may be that those member states (e.g. 
the UK and the Netherlands) which are significantly dependent on textile imports, 
and thus do not have a local textile industry, usually oppose the imposition of 
measures within the Council. On the other hand, the member states having a 
significant local textile industry mostly tend to support the imposition of ADD on 
foreign imports. 
Evenett and Vermulst established that the accession of ten new member states can 
potentially have an impact on the EU’s trade defence policy. They analysed ten 
nations’ prior protectionist approach in order to assess their tendency towards the 
EU’s trade defence proposals. Only five nations out of ten had invoked AD 
measures during an extended period running from 1995 to 2003, while only two 
(Lithuania and Poland) out of these five countries had invoked more than one 
anti-dumping investigation. These statistics show that none of the newly joined 
member states will have a pro-protectionist tendency. Thus, they are more likely 
to join the pro anti-duty bloc within the EU.16 
However, in the case of Pakistan, with specific reference to the current voting 
patterns for the proposed reduction of ADD on Pakistan’s bed linen, it is found 
that out of ten newly joined member states, seven member states supported the 
reduction of ADD. However, three new member states (Lithuania, Poland and 
Czech Republic) showed a pro-protectionist tendency. As the majority of them 
have shown a more flexible and liberalised approach in this case, it could be said 
that this data confirms the findings of Evenett et al.   
                                                            
16 Simon Evenett and Edwin Vermulst, ‘The Politicisation of EC Anti-Dumping Policy: Member 
States, Their Votes and the European Commission’ (2005) 28(5) The World Economy 701 
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Figure 6.13: Explaining the voting patterns of the EU member states 
for/against imposition of ADD on unbleached cotton fabrics originated from 
Pakistan 
Source: Developed by the author based upon data provided by the EU 
Parliament about voting patterns of member states 
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It is noted that in the EU, unbleached cotton fabric was being produced in France, 
Italy, Spain and Portugal,17 while the rest of the member states depended on 
imports from Pakistan, India, China and Turkey. However, the voting pattern of 
the member states revealed that the member states which were relying upon 
imports opposed the imposition of ADD, while a small bloc of member states 
which have their own textile industry supported the imposition of protective 
measures.   
Evenett et al. discuss the politicisation of AD laws, and identify two blocs of 
member states depending on their voting behaviours for levy of AD duties on 
importing countries. They argue that, especially since 1997, the role of the 
member states in the EC AD system is substantial. In the late 1990s, a robust anti-
AD duties bloc seems to have developed among member states, and they 
increasingly challenge proposals for definitive duties made by the EC. This 
resistance also accorded with a sharp fall in the number of EC AD investigations 
from 1999. A shift has occurred towards a more member-state-dominated or 
‘politicised’ AD system from a Commission-controlled system.18 
They contradicted with the existing literature on political economy of EU’s 
protective measures, which have tried to establish the strong role of the 
technocrats on the dumping and injury investigations.19 The findings of Evenett 
and Vermulst are corroborated by this study, as it is found that in the case of the 
application of safeguard measures against textile products originating from 
Pakistan, whether bed linen or staple fibre fabric, two blocs of member states 
could be found within the Union. One relatively small group includes the UK, the 
Netherlands and Scandinavian countries, which usually oppose the application of 
measures; while the other relatively large group, mostly led by France, Germany, 
Italy and Spain, was often found to be supporting the application of ADD on 
textiles originating from Pakistan. Moreover, in the analysis of all voting patterns 
                                                            
17 Ibid, 701 
18 Ibid 
19 Angelika Eymann and Ludger Schukneckt, ‘Antidumping Policy in the European Community: 
Political Discretion or Technical Determination?’ (1996) 8(2) Economics and Politics 111 
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related to the application of ADD on textile products, a similar style of voting has 
been found throughout. 
6.4  THE RATIONALE OF EU MEMBER STATES’ VOTING 
FOR/AGAINST ADOPTION OR TERMINATION OF ANTI-
DUMPING MEASURES RELATED TO PAKISTAN: AN 
EXAMPLE OF DENMARK AND SWEDEN 
In this section reference is made to correspondence between the author and the 
permanent representations to the European Union of Denmark and Sweden 
(September 2015). This correspondence is recorded in full at Appendix III and 
Appendix IV to the present dissertation. 
6.4.1 POLYETHYLENE TEREPHTHALATE 
The national economic interest of the member states is one of the most significant 
rationales or reasons for their particular voting pattern, and the same is 
documented by the analysis of current data. However, Evenett and Vermulst 
recorded two types of third-party influences, including the influence of diplomats 
of a country whose imports are under investigation, and the influence of the EC 
itself.20 
They do not find any evidence of an EU attempt to reduce the level of support of 
member states in respect of a particular anti-dumping investigation. However, the 
Union institution has been found to use varying techniques to increase the level of 
support of member states in favour of certain AD measures. These include: 
reduction in the magnitude of proposed duty; narrowing the scope of the 
investigation; narrowing the definition of product concerned; and minimising the 
duration of definitive measures.21 
While Engering et al. established that it is not only the national interest of the 
member states that inclines them towards their specific voting pattern, it also 
                                                            
20 Simon Evenett and Edwin Vermulst, ‘The Politicisation of EC Anti-Dumping Policy: Member 
States, Their Votes and the European Commission’ (2005) 28(5) The World Economy 701, 712 
21 Ibid, 713 
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depends upon how they see the world trading system. According to the Dutch 
perspective, it is in the interest of all that; AD measures should be applied in a 
restrictive and transparent way.22 
In the same way, diplomatic action, lobbying and threat of retaliation are also one 
of the very significant rationales of member states for their particular voting 
pattern. This diplomatic influence may be exerted in different ways, including: the 
diplomats of the target country lobby member countries in the EU or through EU 
ambassadors; secondly, the trading partner agrees to restrict or reduce the level of 
imports; thirdly, the trading partner meets with Commission officials; lastly, the 
target country benefits from special tariff arrangements.23 
It is noted that newspaper reports suggest that Pakistan’s diplomats used their 
influence to lobby different EU member states in order to get GSP-plus status 
from the EU. The grant of status was supported by 406 members of the EU 
Parliament while 186 lawmakers opposed it.24 Latterly it was reported that after 
the grant of GSP-plus status, imports from Pakistan to the EU increased by 
$1bn.25 It is also noted that that Government of Pakistan asked its mission based 
in Brussels to kick-start lobbying in order to secure an extension in GSP-plus 
status.26  
However, the analysis of current data reveals that, trade partner loyalty are not 
found to be the reason for the voting of two member states. It appears that the 
revised proposal contained lower duties on imports from Australia and China than 
otherwise envisaged. Also, it would seem that the Commission had found at a late 
stage that there was no basis for imposition of measures against Pakistan. Thus, it 
could be established that member states decision to vote in favour of termination 
                                                            
22 Frans Engering, Hans Brabander and Edwin Vermulst, ‘EC Anti-Dumping Policy in a 
Globalising World: A Dutch Perspective’ (1998) 32(6) Journal of World Trade 115, 126 
23 Above (n  9) 714 
24 Dawn News, ‘EU Grants GSP Plus Status to Pakistan’ 12th December 2013 
<http://www.dawn.com/news/1072051> accessed 11th September 2016 
25 Dawn News, ‘Exports to EU increased by $1bln under GSP-Plus Status: Minister’ 9th February 
2015 <http://www.dawn.com/news/1162476> accessed 11th September 2016 
26 The Express Tribune, ‘Govt Starts Lobbying for Extension in GSP Plus Scheme’ 4th March 2016 
<http://tribune.com.pk/story/1058956/govt-starts-lobbying-for-extension-in-gsp-plus-scheme/> 
accessed 11th September 2016 
245 
  
of proceedings regarding alleged dumped imports of polyethylene terephthalate 
was based on the revised findings of the Commission which later resulted in the 
form of negative dumping margin for Pakistan.  
6.4.2 COMPACT FLUORESCENT LAMPS 
6.4.2.1 COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) 866/2005 
Vermulst objected to the quality of decision-making in the Council. He found that 
in some controversial and important cases, e.g. in Eurocoton (Case C-76/01), 
although the Commission found material injury caused to the Union industry and 
Union interest test calls for imposition of protective measures, even then measures 
could not be enforced because it all depends on the qualified majority vote of the 
member states in Council to approve or disapprove the proposed measures. The 
member states, however, may vote ‘No’ due to some unknown reasons or due to 
their national interest. Although it is good for exporters and end users, it makes 
the EU’s AD system transparent and arbitrary.27 
However from analysis of current data it is found that, two EU member states 
believe that imports from Pakistan Vietnam and the Philippines were 
circumvented, as imports from said countries started just after the initiation and 
later of the AD investigation against China. They further argue that although the 
magnitude of imports of CFL from Pakistan is small, it can cause undercutting 
effect on existing safeguard measures imposed on China. In this case as well the 
outcome of the investigation, as conducted by the Commission (regarding 
transhipment, and assembly procedures) is found to be the reason behind the 
voting of the two EU member states.  
This suggest that, in competition cases, the Commission acts on behalf of member 
states (principal) whereby the latter delegate powers to be exercised by the 
Commission on behalf of member states. However, it seems that in European AD 
framework the agent is more powerful as compared to its principal. The 
                                                            
27 Edwin Vermulst, ‘The 10 Major Problems with the Anti-Dumping Instrument in the European 
Community’ (2005) 39(1) Journal of World Trade 105, 113 
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Commission can initiate the proceedings by suo motu but it can also impose 
provisional measures which may last for a maximum 15 months. This blockage of 
trade by the Commission (with any significant trading partner of the EU) for 15 
months without the apparent consent of member states denotes the extensive 
powers available to the Commission.28  
Moreover, the principal being represented by the Council of European Union has 
to rely extensively on the findings of the Commission, as the Commission carries 
out the verification visits, thus the Council has to draw its findings on the basis of 
data generated by the Commission. Likewise, Dur et al. noted that, agent can 
exploit its principal where the member states have conflicting interests and thus 
give a vague mandate with equal votes in support and opposition of proposed 
measures.29   
6.4.2.2 COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) 1205/2007 
Both Denmark and Sweden believe that there were no sufficient grounds to 
continue the measures, as they believed this to be against Union interest. Denmark 
claimed to be dealing with a situation where many producers had already out-
sourced production to third countries. Secondly, they argue that measures were 
mainly put in place to offer protection to one European producer at the expense of 
European consumers, who would have to pay considerably more for the product. 
Furthermore, it did not appear that other European producers supported the 
measures. 
While discussing the politics of global sourcing, particularly with reference to the 
EU’s trade in bicycles with China and Vietnam, Eckhardt states that, during the 
most recent two decades, the quantity of makers in the European Union (EU) that 
have outsourced manufacture to Asia has expanded massively. In the meantime, 
there are likewise still a lot of firms that create their items in the EU. In this 
                                                            
28 Daniel Mugge, ‘The European Presence in Global Financial Governance: A Principal–Agent 
Perspective’ (2011) 18(3) Journal of European Public Policy 383-402  
29 Andreas Dur and Manfred Elsig, ‘Principals, Agents and the European Union’s Foreign 
Economic Policies’  (2011) 18 (3) Journal of European Public Policy 323, 330 
247 
  
manner, Eckhardt contends that these two groups of firms for the most part have 
altogether different trade policy inclinations.30  
The principal kind of firms would typically incline towards liberal EU trade 
policies versus Asian Countries, as they profit by the inflow of items made in 
Asia. However, the second kind of firms anticipated that they would support the 
levying of AD measures against Asian imports, as the net after-effect of expanded 
EU trade with Asia is in general negative to them. This division regularly prompts 
exceptional legal and political squabbling between the two contradicting sides.31 
This thesis supports and corroborates Eckhardt’s analysis, as in this investigation, 
discussed in detail in section 2.7.3; it was found that the manufacturers highly 
dependent upon outsourced parts (Philips) were against the imposition of ADD. 
However, the other manufacturers were in support. Therefore, in some cases, the 
voting of the member states also depends upon strong lobbying of particular 
groups of industry operating within it.32 
It could be established that throughout this investigation (from initiation of 
investigation till imposition of definitive measures), not only the EU member 
states but the Community industry as well seems to be divided in two groups, as 
member states having 56% voting rights abstained from voting, while members 
having 44% voting rights rejected the proposal. Similarly, complaint for initiation 
of proceedings could not be considered to be made on behalf of Union industry as, 
Union industry constituting 48% of total production of the Union supported the 
initiation of investigation, while Union industry constituting 52% of total Union 
production opposed the imposition of provisional measures. It could be 
considered as one of the debatable investigations as conducted by the EU 
Commission. 
                                                            
30 Jappe Eckhardt, ‘On the Politics of Global Sourcing: A Case Study of EU’s Trade in Bicycles 
with China and Vietnam’ (2011) Centre for International Management and Development Antwerp 
Discussion Paper No 79 < http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2005732> accessed 
10 January 2015 
31 Ibid 
32 Jorgen Nielsen and Gert Swendsen, ‘EU Lobbying and Anti-Dumping Policy’ (2012) 46 (1) 
Journal of World Trade 187-211 
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The healthy majority of members opposing the extensions of measures also reveal 
that the EU member countries opposing and supporting the measures had 
significant conflict of interest, and they interpreted the Union (Community) 
interest differently. The researcher assumes that there were two strong hold within 
the Union industry, one which was significantly relying on Chinese imports and 
the other relying completely on home production.33 The geographical existence of 
Union industry having varying interests insisted their respective governments 
speak for them in the Council. 
6.4.3 COTTON-TYPE BED LINEN 
6.4.3.1 PROPOSAL FOR ADOPTION OF COUNCIL REGULATION 
(EC) 2398/97 
Sweden opposed the actions for three main reasons, which also became the 
Swedish standpoint. First, the measures against India and Pakistan were subject to 
quantitative restrictions, which means that the calculation of the dumping and 
injury margins become uncertain, because the price picture is affected by the 
restrictions. Compelling reasons were also the principal Swedish objection to this 
double safeguard. 
Second, reference was made to the restructuring that took place in the field, so 
that the manufacture of basic bed linen was placed to third countries while 
product development, design and marketing remained in the Community. Thus, it 
should be in the interest not to hinder such a natural process through the 
introduction of protective measures. Thirdly, Sweden reasoned that the cost of AD 
measures would be passed on to consumers, and that the impact of this would not 
be only minimal, as the Commission claimed. 
Assembly and association of specific stakeholders (Union manufacturers) is one 
of the key reasons for the member states’ support of protective measures. Bievre 
noted that it is the local manufacturers who are assembled most appropriately in 
the form of effective and strong associations, for example the European 
                                                            
33 Case T 469/07 Philips Lighting Poland S.A. and Philips Lighting BV v Council of the European 
Union [2008] OJ C51 
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Federation of Cotton and Textile Industries (Eurocoton). It could be said that the 
big industries like steel, copper and textiles are more associated and united as 
compared to the small industries. The small industries are found to be fragmented, 
thus their filing ratio is low.34  
Peter Mandelson’s effort to reform the EU’s basic trade defence instrument failed 
because the proposal was blocked by lobbying of Union industry.35 The firm 
association among industries helps them in two ways: firstly, it is easy for the 
most associated industry to get the required number for the launch of 
investigations; secondly, they are in a better position to lobby within the EU 
institution and secure their interest.36  
On the other hand, it could be said that it is the consumers who are less united and 
thus very weak to protect their interest, as they are not assembled as are other 
stakeholders. Therefore, in the absence of an equal footing of all stakeholders it is 
very difficult to ensure the Community interest before the imposition of a duty, as 
the importers, consumers and small industries are not as united and strong as are 
the big industries like steel, iron and textiles. Interest groups lobby more 
politicians as compared to the executives, and protectionists lobby more 
effectively as compared to free trade-oriented groups.37 
                                                            
34 Andreas Dur, Protection for Exporters. Power and Discrimination in Transatlantic Trade 
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Denmark, however, supported the proposal to adopt definitive AD measures with 
respect to all three countries. The permanent representative of Denmark cannot 
explain why Denmark supported the proposal, as they cannot locate any record of 
this regulation, which is 18 years old.  
6.4.3.2 PROPOSAL FOR COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) 160/2002 
 Nordström recorded that vote trading can also be one of the possible reasons for 
specific voting of member states. In this case, member states lobby to get each 
other’s reciprocal support for certain measures. The member states may 
compromise their lesser interest in a specific case to get other member states’ 
support in another particular case, where its higher interest is involved. In these 
cases sometimes the EU Commission strategically presents two proposals 
simultaneously.38 
Bown and Blonigen hypothesised that threat of retaliation from the target country 
may also be one of the possible rationales for member states’ voting style.39 
Although there is a lack of significant data to prove these hypotheses, at least in 
the case of Pakistan it may be presumed that threat of retaliation is not a possible 
reason. The EU may be threatened with retaliation by its large trading partners 
such as China or the USA, however small economies like Pakistan may not have 
significant implications in this regard. 
However, the analysis of current data reveals that, the amendments concerning 
imports from Egypt and termination of measures on imports from Pakistan 
followed from an appellate body report and a panel report which had resulted in 
suspension of measures on imports of bed linen from India. The council had 
considered it appropriate to recalculate the dumping margins for Egypt and 
Pakistan without use of the ‘zeroing’ methodology. This resulted in no dumping 
being found on imports from Pakistan. Furthermore, measures on imports from 
                                                            
38 Håkan Nordström, ‘On the Political Economy of EU Anti-Dumping Policy: Decoding Member 
States Votes’ (2011) National Board of Trade, Sweden Discussion Paper 
<https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/gtdw_e/wkshop11_e/nordstrom_e.pdf> accessed 10 
January 2015 
39 Bruce Blonigen and Chad Bown, ‘Antidumping and retaliation threats’ (2003) 60 (2) Journal of 
International Economics 249, 251 
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Egypt were suspended. Evidently, measures cannot be in place when no dumping 
is found. Denmark therefore supported the amendments, including termination of 
measures against imports of bed linen from Pakistan. 
6.4.3.3 PROPOSAL FOR COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) 397/2004 
One of the possible rationales of voting styles of member states may be based on 
the geographical existence of the Union industry. If cotton industries do not have 
a presence in a certain member state, it will preferably say ‘No’ to the proposed 
imposition of ADD. Pollack argues that the big industries are strategically 
concentrated in large countries, as half of AD complaints receive support from 
Germany and one third of them are supported by French-origin companies. 
Similarly, the big industrial groups can strategically spread their network in most 
of the member states instead of being concentrated in a few states, as it will help 
them to get support from most of the members: wherever the big industries have a 
presence in the Union.40  
However, the analysis of the current data reveals the Danish reasoned that, 
according to the Commission’s own investigation, producers from Pakistan 
exported the product concerned to the EU with an average profit of 3.5%, and 
their increase in market share was relatively modest. Furthermore, EU industry 
had a healthy profit, and was able to increase its sales (although market share 
declined somewhat). Turnover, sales and prices showed a positive trend. Also, 
European producers could not satisfy demand in the EU for bed linen. Injury is 
therefore limited, and may be caused by other factors, in addition to which it may 
not be in the Union’s industry.  
Therefore significant doubts arise as to the appropriateness of measures imposed 
to protect an industry which appeared relatively healthy at the time. Similarly, 
Sweden opposes the Commission’s proposal for definitive AD duties on imports 
of bed linen from Pakistan due to the questioning of serious injury to the 
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Community industry and on causation with respect to imports from Pakistan. Both 
Sweden and Denmark, however, think that the alleged injury was not material 
within the meaning of the basic regulation. They also doubt the efficacy of non-
attribution analysis (segregation of other known factors from alleged dumped 
imports) as conducted by the EU Commission. 
6.4.3.4 PROPOSAL FOR COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) 1205/2007 
Denmark had not supported the imposition of AD measures against bed linen 
from Pakistan in 2004, and therefore welcomed the interim review and proposal to 
lower the duties on the products. Although it was not in favour of the measures, 
however, the lower duty of 0-8.5% constituted a significant improvement. 
Sweden was heavily dependent on imports of bed linen from Pakistan, and has 
also opposed the imposition of definitive measures against Pakistan. Sweden 
supported the Commission’s proposal to temporarily suspend the bulk of the duty 
to not over-compensate the protection of the Community industry introduced by 
the Council, and also to take account of the changed market conditions as the 
earthquake disaster in Pakistan caused. 
6.5 CONCLUSION 
To conclude, it could be said that a mixed trend is found about impact of 
imposition of duties on the flow of imports from Pakistan. Sometimes the imports 
of concerned products were found to be increasing through the duty period 
although; the ratio of increase is noted to be marginal. In the majority of cases it is 
established that imposition of duty kept the level of imports at a constant point 
(import magnitude is found to be same as it was five years before). However, in 
some cases it is found that the imposition of AD duty significantly deteriorated 
the scale of imports from Pakistan to the EU. Therefore, it could be established 
that imposition of AD duty on imports of concerned products originating from 
Pakistan has mostly affected the scale of imports from Pakistan, although there 
are some exceptions. 
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It could also be said that trade partner loyalty is not found to be the reason for 
specific voting trends of the EU member states. Their voting trends, however, 
were found to be associated with their consent or dissent with the findings of the 
Commission. Sometimes the member states are found to be unsatisfied with the 
calculation of material injury caused to the Union industry, similarly they were 
also found to be challenging the non-attribution analysis (segregating injury 
caused by other known factors from injury caused by alleged dumped imports) as 
conducted by the Commission.  
The most common and significant reasons to vote ‘NO’ for the Commission’s 
proposal to adopt definitive measures is found to be the varying Community 
(Union) interest calculation by the Commission and the member states. The two 
member states (Denmark and Sweden), however, were found to be opposing 
measures, arguing that imposition of measures will cause unreasonable expense 
for consumers. The geographical existence of Union industry complaining about 
alleged dumped imports is also a significant decisive factor for voting of the 
member states. If textile industry being totally absent in states D, E and F, 
dominantly exists in states A, B and C, it is more likely that states A, B and C will 
vote in favour of imposition of measures, while states D, E and F may have a lack 
of interest for such measures. 
Moreover, it is found that in the event of use of protection measures against textile 
products originating from Pakistan, whether bed cloth or staple fibre fabric, two 
alliances of member states could be found inside the Union. One moderately little 
group incorporates the UK, the Netherlands and Scandinavian nations, which 
normally contradict the use of measures, while the other generally huge group, for 
the most part led by France, Germany, Italy and Spain, is frequently observed to 
be supporting the utilisation of ADD on materials originating from Pakistan. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
7.1  INTRODUCTION 
This study was set to explore the application of European anti-dumping (AD) law 
in respect of Pakistan. It has examined all investigations conducted by the 
Commission whereby safeguard measures were applied against imports of certain 
products originating from Pakistan. Through such examination of the 
Commission’s investigations, this study has identified many occasions where the 
institutions acted inconsistently in different cases but having similar 
circumstances. This study sought to answer the following three research 
questions: 
1. How consistently do the EU institutions, including the Commission and the EU 
Court of Justice, interpret and implement their AD law with reference to Pakistan? 
2. What were the voting patterns of the EU member states in the EU Council for 
imposition of duties on Pakistan, and what were the reasons for those particular 
voting patterns? 
3. How does the imposition of AD duty affect the level of imports from Pakistan 
to the EU? 
Since no previous research has been done on the application of AD law by the EU 
related to Pakistani exports, this thesis originally contributes to existing 
knowledge by evaluating the calculations and findings drawn by the Commission 
through all investigations conducted by it during the last two decades.  
In this chapter each of the substantive findings made thus far will be reviewed. 
This will enable the various threads of argument to be drawn together. This 
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chapter is divided into five main sections, starting from an introduction; the 
second section is composed of the main findings of the study. Within the second 
section , a number of subsections summarise and unite all the recommendations 
and key findings based upon the analysis of the Commission’s investigations 
discussed in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, and the interpretation of other known factors as 
made by the EU Courts in the Gul Ahmed case (Chapter 5). The findings and 
recommendations about the subject matter of chapter 6 are sufficiently described 
in that chapter itself.    
7.2   RECOMMENDATIONS AND FINDINGS 
7.2.1 SECTION 2.1 
7.2.1.1 COMMISSION’S OBLIGATION TO GIVE ADEQUATE 
STATEMENT OF REASONS 
In section 2.1 it is noted that Article 2(4) of the basic regulation requires three 
conditions to be fulfilled in order to consider a transaction not in the ordinary 
course of trade. 
The review of the investigation revealed that the EU Commission reported 
fulfilment of only one condition, i.e. substantial trade in this case more than 20% 
of the total sale. However, the Commission could not confirm in the regulation 
whether such non-profitable sale had been continued for a prolonged period (at 
least six months). Secondly, the Commission must have to establish that such non-
profitable sale did not provide for recovery of cost of production within a 
reasonable time. The Commission may have established all these three conditions, 
but if it has done so it must explain and report the fulfilment of the other 
conditions.  
Conversely, if the EU Commission has failed to establish the fulfilment of all 
three conditions as provided by Article 2(4), and presumably it is a manifest error 
of assessment by the Commission. 
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7.2.1.2 EXCESSIVE DISCRETION IN ARTICLE 2(4) 
Moreover, this dissertation finds that under Article 2(4) of the basic regulation, to 
establish the sale below cost in substantial quantity the EU Commission can have 
recourse to two different checks. Therefore, if ‘substantial quantity’ does not meet 
with the 20% non-profitable threshold, the Commission may establish this by 
concluding that the average sale price is below the average cost of production. 
However, it is contended that, unlike this optional use of any test among two, the 
basic regulation should provide for a single criterion to establish the substantial 
quantity.  
7.2.2 SECTION 2.2 
7.2.2.1 MANIFEST ERROR OF ASSESSMENT COMMITTED BY THE 
COMMISSION 
In section 2.2, it was found that Commission committed manifest error of 
assessment by considering a single company as a separate albeit related company, 
despite the fact that both of them were sharing the same brand name, 
administrative staff, operating premises and directors. The author, however, 
argues that such manifest error of assessment is highly unlikely where exporters 
are fully cooperating, and information provided by them could be easily verified 
by verification visits. However, the positive aspect is that following the complaint 
by the exporter, the Council rectified the calculation accordingly.  
It is also found that both the EU Commission and the Council adopted different 
methodologies to calculate normal value in similar circumstances for the same 
trader, in breach of the equality principle. Out of five types of polyethylene 
terephthalate (PET) involved in the investigation, the Commission calculated 
normal value of four types of PET on the basis of actual price paid on domestic 
market in accordance with Article 2(1), while normal value of one type of PET 
was constructed in accordance with article 2(3) as, its sale on the domestic market 
was found to be insufficient (constituting less than 10% of exports of same 
product to the Union).  
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On the other hand, the Council finding insufficient sale of three types of PET on 
domestic market (representing less than 10% of exports), constructed their normal 
value. Resultantly, both institutions calculated highly varying dumping margins 
(14.8% of export price as calculated by Commission and 1.6% de minimis of 
export price calculated by the Council) for the same exporter. However, the 
positive aspect of this investigation is that the error of calculation regarding 
normal value was later rectified by the Council, and the duties paid by Pakistani 
traders in terms of provisional measures were released. However, this shows that, 
how vulnerable is the ‘constructed normal value’ phenomena. The WTO and its 
members need to tighten the conditions of Article 2(1) and (3). 
7.2.2.2 COMMISSION’S STATEMENT ABOUT NUMBER OF TYPES 
OF PRODUCT WHOSE SALE FOUND IN “ORDINARY 
COURSE OF TRADE” IS INSUFFICIENT 
For the purpose of calculation of ‘constructed normal value,’ the Commission, 
however, does not clearly state the number of types of PET whose sale was found 
to be in ordinary course of business (thus their calculation was based on an 
average of all sale transactions), and vice versa. For the understanding of all 
interested parties, it should be clarified accordingly, as both categories entail 
different methodologies for calculation of normal value; thus it can significantly 
affect the outcome of investigation. As it is said before, Article 2(1) and 2(3) of 
the basic regulation should offer more consistency and its generality should be 
narrowed.   
7.2.3 INCONSISTENT CALCULATION OF NORMAL VALUE 
AND DUMPING MARGIN AS PERFORMED BY THE 
COUNCIL AND COMMISSION 
In the current investigation, the product concerned was not divided into different 
types, rather it was placed under the same homogeneous group, thus instead of 
using different approaches to calculate normal value, a single method was used 
(on the basis of average normal price paid by consumers on domestic market, as 
domestic sale was found to be representative of export sale). Possibly this was 
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also the reason for calculation of varying dumping margin in both investigations 
(14.8% of the export price was calculated in the former inquiry, while 0.6% of 
export price was calculated in the latter). 
Moreover, it is noted that after termination of proceedings in 2010 bearing the 
calculation of negative dumping margin in respect of the sole Pakistani exporter, 
an anti-subsidy proceedings was initiated against the same exporter alleging 
subsidised imports of same product (polyethylene terephthalate), which resulted in 
imposition of anti-subsidy duty through Commission Regulation (EU) 473/10. 
The author however, suggests that, this open ended exit from AD proceeding to 
Anti-Subsidy proceedings should be closed.  
7.2.4 BREACH OF THE EQUALITY PRINCIPLE 
In section 2.4, it was seen how the complainants in this investigation (about 
alleged dumped import of ethyl alcohol) withdrew their complaint claiming that 
the level of imports from Pakistan had reduced due to the grant of Generalised 
System of Preference (GSP) status to Pakistan although these imports were still 
dumped. However, it is found that grant of GSP status apparently may not be 
cause for reduction of imports from Pakistan. The GSP status (a promise by the 
EU to liberalise trade and allow free trade access to imports from Pakistan 
through grant of preferential tariff arrangements) tends to increase the level of 
imports instead.  
The same issue was under consideration in Case T-199/04, where the Council of 
the EU argued that the impact of GSP status is on dumped imports themselves, 
and the conduct of the Union’s industry could not be affected by legislative 
amendments or grant of GSP status to Pakistan. 
The Commission’s argument was that, as combined data of alleged dumping was 
used to establish the injury to the Union’s market, therefore investigation should 
be terminated in respect of Guatemala as well. Therefore, the equality principle 
was breached because if the Union industry was being injured substantially, a 
fresh investigation however, might have been conducted based on exclusive data 
of injury caused to the EU due to alleged dumped imports from Guatemala.  
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7.2.5 SECTION 2.5 
7.2.5.1 VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5(4) BY THE COMMISSION 
In Section 2.5, it was found that the Commission’s statement (that the majority of 
the Community producers support the initiation of alleged circumvention 
investigation) is vague. The Commission is supposed to specifically state the 
percentage of Community producers supporting the complaint. Additionally, it is 
established that the original investigation (imposing AD duty on China) lacks 
50% (representative) Union industry threshold to initiate and continue the 
investigation. It is, however, found that Union producers constituting 48% of total 
production of product concerned in the Union were supporting the complaint 
while, Union producers having 52% share were opposing the investigation. The 
Commission however, violated Article 5(4) of the basic regulation which allows 
the initiation of inquiry only if at least 50% of union producers support such 
initiation. Therefore, there is persistent need of a WTO’s framework for observing 
the implementation of representative threshold as applied by its member states.  
7.2.5.2 COMMISSION’S NON COMPLIANCE WITH ATICLE 13(4) 
It was also concluded that one of the three necessary conditions to establish the 
existence of alleged circumvention is to prove that the parts constitute 60% or 
more of the total value of the parts of the assembled product, and the value added 
to the parts brought in during the assembly is less than 25% of the manufacturing 
cost of the product concerned. It is, however, not clear on what basis (data or 
information) the Commission established the above-mentioned facts, as Ecopak’s 
(Pakistani trader) accounts were found not to be in accordance with international 
standards, and thus the EU Commission had to rely on an alternative source.  
Moreover, it is concluded that the other two conditions of Article 13(4) were duly 
met, as it is evident from data (Eurostat) that the impact of AD duty imposed on 
PRC was lessened, as the quantity of imports from Pakistan increased 
significantly and Ecopak started to export to the EU just after the imposition of 
AD duty on China in 2001.  However, there was no import from Pakistan to the 
Union before 2001. The Commission, however, derogated from its responsibility 
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to state adequate reasons for its actions as required by the basic regulation. In 
many investigations and cases analysed in this thesis, contending parties are found 
complaining about transparency of investigations and Commission’s findings. 
Therefore, being fully agreed with Edwin A. Vermulst this thesis also calls for 
more transparency in AD investigations.   
7.2.6 SECTION 2.6 
7.2.6.1 MANIFEST ERROR OF ASSESSMENT COMMITTED BY THE 
INSTITUTIONS WITH REGARD TO ARTICLES 5(4) AND 9(1) 
In Section 2.6, it was tentatively concluded that the EU Council made a manifest 
error of assessment by initiating an expiry review of dumping measures imposed 
on imports of compact fluorescent lamps (CFL) from China, Pakistan and 
Vietnam. The basic objective of the legislator behind Article 5(4) is that if at any 
point in the investigation this express support of 50% is reduced, the investigation 
cannot continue. But there is an arguably inconsistent provision Article 9(1) in the 
basic regulation that if Community interest calls for intervention, the EU 
Commission may continue the investigation, instead of the fact that the complaint 
is entirely withdrawn. It could be recommended that the presence of both above 
mentioned provisions cause confusion, therefore if the EU Parliament wants to 
grant wide discretionary power to the Commission then Article 5(4) of the basic 
regulation should be amended accordingly.  
Secondly, it is found that in this case the Council used Article 9(1) by analogue, 
although it was not related to the issue at hand. Article 9(1) of the basic regulation 
authorises the EU institution to continue the investigation on the ground of 
Community interest demand, although the complainants have withdrawn their 
complaint. This Article was not applicable in the current case, as unlike the fresh 
complaint as discussed in Article 9(1), the current case is related to the expiry 
review.  
Moreover, if investigative bodies start applying different provision of the basic 
regulation on cases having different circumstances, it may tend to seriously 
challenge the consistent application of law. Although the Council’s argument is 
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strong, to the extent that if the institutions can continue the investigation in case of 
complete withdrawal of the complaint, it means they can also continue if its 
support from the Community interest is reduced. But it does not mean that the 
institutions can interpret the legal provision, and apply them by analogue. Instead 
in these circumstances institutions are expected to have recourse to the Judicature.  
7.2.6.2 COMMISSION’S EXCESSIVE DISCRETION AND USAGE OF 
DIFFERENT METHODOLOGIES IN INVESTIGATIONS 
REACHING THE OPPOSITE CONCLUSIONS 
It is found that the Commission has used a different methodology in expiry review 
and original investigation regarding definition of Community industry. According 
to the interpretation as made by the EU Courts, institutions can use different 
methodologies in review and original investigation if circumstances have 
significantly changed. However, it is found that no significant shift of 
circumstances occurred through original and expiry review investigation.  
It could also be established that often the EU Courts have vindicated the EU 
institutions’ claim and actions. The judgements of the EU Courts by their 
interpretations have far extended the discretionary powers of the institutions from 
those discretions given by the basic regulation. Although discretionary powers are 
sometimes necessary due to the varying circumstances of the cases, these 
discretionary powers should not be used as a matter of option, instead only in case 
of necessity. 
The recurrent example of wide discretion is Article 5(4), whereby the EU 
Commission by option for the definition of Community industry can either 
consider the whole EU industry of the like product, or consider only major 
manufacturers out of it. However, there is no apparent reason for this optional 
approach. Article 5(4) however, should provide for only one criterion for defining 
the Union industry, as in other case it causes absurdity. 
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7.2.7 EXCLUSION OF DE MINIMIS DUMPING MARGIN CALLS 
FOR AMENDMENT OF ARTICLE 9(6) 
In Section 3.1, with respect to the Commission Regulation (EC) 1069/97, it was 
found that while constructing average dumping margin for the cooperating traders 
which were not included in the sample, the EU Commission excluded the de 
minimis dumping margin. Thus average dumping margin was calculated on the 
basis of positive dumping margin only. Although the Commission acted 
completely within the ambit of authority provided by Article 9(6) of the basic 
regulation, but this thesis objects to the said provision as well. It is contended that 
the average dumping margin for the cooperating trades not included in the sample 
should be calculated on the basis of the whole sample. 
This recommendation is based upon the reason that, the sample of seven Pakistani 
traders was significantly representing the cotton-type bed linen industry of 
Pakistan. If the Commission strikes out the three Pakistani traders having de 
minimis dumping margin and bases its calculation on the dumping margin of four 
traders, it is possible that the new sample of Pakistani traders do not significantly 
represent the Pakistani industry.  
Moreover, there is apparently no significant ground to exclude the de minimis 
dumping margin. It could cause undue disadvantage to competitive traders (not 
dumping on the Union market at all), or traders having less dumping margin as 
compared to the average dumping margin as calculated by the EU Commission. 
Therefore, it is recommended that Article 9(6) of the basic regulation should be 
amended accordingly, and average dumping margin should be calculated on the 
basis of average of the whole sample. 
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7.2.8 CALCULATION OF NEGATIVE DUMPING MARGIN BY 
THE COUNCIL AS OPPOSED TO THE POSITIVE 
DUMPING MARGIN CALCULATED BY THE COMMISSION 
IN RESPECT OF SAME PRODUCT 
Termination of measures by the Council following the emergence of negative 
dumping margin for all six exporters of Pakistan established how fatal the 
consequences of AD measures may be if investigation is conducted improperly. It 
is also contended that the EU Council took almost five years to rectify the 
erroneous calculations as done by the Commission in Council regulation (EC) 
1069/97, however, the measures were almost due to expire on completion of the 
specified term of five years. It may be argued that if the WTO panel had not 
declared the practice of zeroing as inconsistent with the spirit of the WTO 
Agreement, the textile industry of Pakistan might continue to suffer unfair 
measures.  
It is also found that Pakistan’s textile industry was put under undue disadvantage, 
as they had to pay unfair AD duty with the rate of 6.5% on their exports to the 
Union for a prolonged period. However, the WTO Agreement should be reformed 
to completely block the practice of zeroing as, more than EU some other 
jurisdictions are practicing it.  
7.2.9 SECTION 3.4 
7.2.9.1 USE OF “ZEROING” AGAINST THE SPIRIT OF BASIC 
REGULATION 
In Section 3.4, it is found that, unfair practice of zeroing was used as it was used 
in section 3.2. It is also found that the Ikea Wholesale, an importer of cotton-type 
bed linen from Pakistan and India, challenged the Council’s regulation (EC) 
2398/97. But surprisingly, none of the exporters from Pakistan or associations 
representing Pakistani textile manufacturers challenged the said regulation in the 
EU Courts, despite the fact that the use of zeroing, being a controversial practice 
is very vulnerable to litigation. It is not clear why Pakistani exporters did not 
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challenge the said regulation, but one of the reasons may be the expensive 
litigation involved. To conclude, it could be said that this investigation was 
conducted unfairly by the Commission, as usage of zeroing practice by the 
Commission finds no basis from the basic regulation. 
7.2.9.2 IN ARTICLE 2(6) THE PLURAL PHRASE ‘OTHER 
EXPORTERS OR MANUFACTURERS’ SHOULD BE 
REPLACED WITH A SINGULAR PHRASE 
Secondly, it is recommended that Article 2(6) of the basic regulation should be 
amended. The use of plural phrase, ‘other exporters or manufacturers’ should be 
replaced with the singular phrase. It may cause serious difficulty for the EU 
Commission where only single exporter’s data regarding its SG&M cost and 
profit margin could be considered as within the ordinary course of trade and it is 
noted that the Commission has to encounter such circumstances frequently. 
However, in cases where investigative bodies have to rely on the data provided by 
a single entity, extensive responsibility lies on them to verify single sourced data 
with available possible sources. 
7.2.10 SECTION 3.5  
7.2.10.1  PROVISION OF MISLEADING INFORMATION BY 
PAKISTANI EXPORTERS LEADS TO THE ERRONEOUS 
CALCULATION OF NORMAL VALUE AND DUMPING 
MARGIN FOR THEM 
In Section 3.5, it was concluded that the information regarding profit margin as 
provided by Pakistani traders was misleading and erroneous. The deep analysis of 
facts by the EU Commission revealed that Pakistani traders were earning almost 
1.6% average profit margins on the sale of like product in the domestic market. 
However, on the other hand the average profit margin on the sale of product 
concerned was reported by Pakistani exporters to be around 30% of the sales 
price.  
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It was found that EU Commission’s findings regarding grouping of unbleached 
cotton-type bed linen and dyed bed linen was duly according to the meaning of 
Article 1(4) of the Council Regulation (EC) 384/96. It provides that in the absence 
of identical product, a product having significantly similar characteristics to the 
product concerned can also is considered as a like product.  
7.2.10.2 A SPECIFIC REPRESENTATIVE THRESHOLD IS 
NECESSARY FOR FAIR SAMPLING OF FOREIGN 
EXPORTERS 
It was found that the sample of Pakistani traders as created by the EU 
Commission was having only 32% production share in the textile industry of 
Pakistan, which is insufficient, according to the author. Although Article 17(1) of 
the basic regulation only requires that a sample should represent a major 
proportion of the industry of the country under investigation, it does not, however, 
prescribe a specific threshold in this regard. It is unjust to calculate dumping 
margin for 68% of Pakistan’s textile industry on the basis of misleading 
information provided by 32% of Pakistani traders. Therefore this dissertation 
recommends that Article 17(1) of the basic regulations should specifically provide 
a threshold of representation for creation of a sample, it may be 50%. 
Further, it is found that, as the traders included the sample furnished misleading 
information regarding their profit margin and SG&A costs, as an alternative under 
Article 17(4) of the basic regulation the EU Commission may create a fresh 
sample. Although, it is a discretionary power of the Commission, and thus cannot 
be claimed as a matter of right, however, this step can be taken in order to ensure 
fair investigation. Similarly, within the meaning of Article 16(2) considering the 
incomplete and defective verification visits at the premises of only two Pakistani 
traders, the EU Commission as a matter of discretion might have decided to 
complete the rest of the verification visits in a third country. 
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7.2.10.3   CALCULATION OF AVERAGE DUMPING MARGIN FOR 
SAMPLED EXPORTERS IS AGAINST THE SPIRIT OF 
ARTICLE 17 
It was established that the EU Commission made a manifest error of assessment 
by calculating average dumping margin with the rate of 13.1% for all Pakistani 
traders regardless of whether they were cooperating or non-cooperating. 
Similarly, the Commission unnecessarily made recourse to the average sales 
general and administrative costs. However, Article 17(3) of the basic regulation 
clearly demands to calculate individual dumping margin for all participating 
exporters. The average dumping margin can only be calculated for the non-
cooperating traders, thus the Commission acted against the spirit of Article 17(3) 
of the basic regulation.  
It is also concluded that the Pakistani traders’ plea to calculate individual dumping 
margin was unduly rejected on the basis of the argument that absence of concrete 
information about profit margin and cost of production led to the calculation of 
average dumping margin. 
Lastly, it could be contended that in March 2002 the EU Council, by means of 
Council Regulation (EC) 160/2002, terminated the previously imposed AD duty 
through Commission Regulation (EC) 1069/97, as the EU Commission applied 
‘Zeroing’. Therefore, the Council had to review its calculation of dumping 
margin, as use of ‘Zeroing’ was declared void by the WTO panel. However, 
through review investigation (Council Regulation (EC) 160/2002, the Council 
terminated the existing measures as, excluding the zeroing practice, it found 
negative dumping margin for all Pakistani exporters.  
Therefore it is understandable that after a few months in September 2002, the EU 
Commission on the complaint of European Federation of the Cotton and Allied 
Textile Industries (Eurocoton) once again initiated investigation of alleged 
dumping of same product (cotton-type bed linen), and concluded it with 
calculation of positive dumping margin with a rate of 11.3% of the export price. 
The researcher, however, found both actions of the EU institution (at the first 
267 
  
instance termination of duty and initiation of fresh investigation) inconsistent with 
each other. 
7.2.11 LESSER RATE OF DUTY CALCULATED BY THE 
COUNCIL IN REVIEW INVESTIGATION 
In Section 3.6, it was found that as in the original investigation the sample of 
Pakistani exporters was insufficiently representative, accounting for only 35% of 
the total production of Pakistan’s textile produce, however in the review 
investigation, the representative size of the sample further curtailed, accounting 
for only 31% of Pakistan’s unbleached bed linen industry. It is also found that, 
unlike use of ‘zeroing’ in a previous investigation regarding alleged dumped 
imports of same product in the Community (council regulation (EC) 1069/97), in 
the current investigation the EU Commission has declined the request of 
Community producers to consider only profitable transactions for the purpose of 
calculation of normal value.  
Secondly, the outcome of the review investigation confirmed that investigation of 
the Commission in the original investigation was vague, based on incomplete and 
unreliable information. The average dumping margin calculated in the review 
investigation was found to be 5.8% of export price, which is almost half the 
average dumping margin calculated in the original investigation at the rate of 
13.1%.  
Therefore, it is established that provision of misleading information regarding 
profit margin and normal value by sampled exporters and incomplete verification 
visits cause undue advantage to at least those non-sampled exporters accounting 
for more than 65% of production, as they had to pay an extra 7.2% AD duty on 
their exports for a period of almost two years.  
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7.2.12 FAILURE TO GIVE ADEQUATE STATEMENT OF 
REASONS 
In Section 4.1, it was concluded that the Commission has omitted to state the 
exact representative threshold of 21 Union producers supporting the initiation of 
proceedings. Thus, it is not sufficient to state the number of Union producers 
supporting the complaint, instead the Commission is expected to reveal the 
representative value of supporters of the complaint, as if the prescribed threshold 
of representation is not met, the interested parties may challenge the initiation of 
investigation. 
Regarding comparability of product concerned and like product, it is difficult for 
an outsider to decide if the product concerned and like product sold in the national 
market were comparable, as the Commission established their comparability on 
the basis of having parallel characteristics. Due to the non-availability of any 
unfailing scale to judge the resembling characteristics, this is however the area 
where the Commission enjoys inclusive discretion to decide according to the 
circumstances of each case, and occasionally it may incline to change the result of 
the investigation. 
Moreover, it was found that the domestic sale of one trader was found to be in 
ordinary course of business and representative of export sale; the Commission 
however, did not calculate the normal value on the basis of actual price paid on 
domestic market, as the sale of only one type of product concerned was 
representative. Therefore, in accordance with Article 2(4), the Commission used 
the profit margin incurred (by one trader) on one type of the product concerned to 
construct the normal value (for the same trader and three other traders whose 
domestic sale was found to be insufficient) of whole product concerned.  
Lastly, it is also determined that in this inquiry both the EU Commission and the 
Council interpreted or evaluated Community interest differently, as the proposal 
of the EU Commission to impose definitive duty with the average rate of 32% of 
export price could not be approved in the Council due to dearth of majority vote. 
To conclude, it could be said that there is no precise definition of Community 
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interest, as it was found to be interpreted differently by the institutions and 
Judicature. However, the definition and pre-requisites of Community interest test 
need to be more tightened in order to block its arbitrary interpretation. 
7.2.13 THE GENERAL COURT AND EU COURT OF JUSTICE 
INTERPRETS ‘REVIEWABILITY OF FAILURE TO ADOPT 
DEFINITIVE MEASURES’ INCONSISTENTLY 
In Sections 4.2 and 4.3, it was found that the General Court and the EU Court of 
Justice adopted an inconsistent approach towards the issue of reviewability of 
failure to adopt definitive AD measures due to the lack of a simple majority in the 
EU Council.  
The researcher concludes that the judgement of the General Court was more 
rational and logical, as it established that failure to adopt definitive measures is a 
legislative act of the Council, and it could not be reviewed judicially, as the 
investigation, of the EU Commission could be reviewed. The Council is the forum 
where member states attempt to secure their national interest by using their 
available voting rights. If the simple majority of member states do not support a 
particular proposal of the Commission, it could not be adopted. It could be 
asserted that the lack of majority in the Council speaks itself for its actions, as the 
majority vote in favour to refrain from adoption of AD measures establishes that 
adoption of such measures is not in the Community interest. The lack of 
consistent approach to reviewability of Council’s acts needs to be addressed. The 
EU institutions however, need to frame new guidelines about it.  
7.2.14 IN TWO DIFFERENT INVESTIGATIONS THE 
COMMISSION CALCULATED INCONSISTENT DUMPING 
MARGIN IN RESPECT OF SAME EXPORTERS 
EXPORTING SAME PRODUCT 
In Section 4.4, it was noted that in both inquiries the same Pakistani cooperative 
traders were encompassed in the sample. However, the Commission calculated 
considerably fluctuating dumping margins for them under both investigations. For 
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the Nishat group of industries, the dumping margin was meaningfully increased 
from 17% to 32.5% in the later investigation. In the same way for Kohinoor 
industries, the dumping margin was reduced from 30% to 11.7%. This radical 
upsurge and decline of dumping margin for the same traders in a narrow time 
period also raises questions about the uniformity of the Commission’s calculation 
method.  
It is noted that just two months after the expiration of the 15 month deadline to 
embrace definitive measures, the Commission introduced a fresh investigation. 
However, just as the former proposal of imposition of definitive duty was failed, 
the present proposal also lapsed due to the absence of a simple majority in the 
Council supporting the imposition of definitive duty. In the present case, the 15 
month deadline ended on 11 October 1998. This thesis suggests that, in case of 
failure of an attempt to impose ADD, if the circumstances do not change 
considerably, there must be minimum time frame when second investigation 
could be initiated. It would help to restrict the oppression of competitive foreign 
imports.  
7.2.15 INCONSISTENT INTERPRETATION OF ‘OTHER KNOWN 
FACTORS’ MADE BY THE GENERAL COURT AND THE 
EU COURT OF JUSTICE 
In Chapter 5, it was found that the General Court and the EU Court of Justice 
interpreted Article 3(7) of the basic regulation differently. The General Court held 
that grant of GSP status to Pakistan and removal of previous AD duty were the 
other known factors within the meaning of Article 3(7). Thus, the EU 
Commission must separate the injury caused due to the other known factors (in 
this case grant of GSP status) from injury being caused due to dumped imports 
from Pakistan. The Court further established that the list of other known factors 
provided in Article 3(7) is suggestive and explanatory thus should be used for 
guidance purpose only. 
However, the EU Court of Justice established that legislative amendments or grant 
of GSP status cannot be considered other known factor having any direct link with 
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the conduct of the Union industry. The EU institutions are, however, required to 
analyse only those other known factors having a direct effect on the conduct of the 
Union market. In this case, however, the effect of legislative amendment and 
grant of GSP status should be considered on the dumped imports themselves. 
However, the researcher found that within the meaning of Article 3(7) of the basic 
regulation, the legislative amendments is a separate known factor which was 
directly affecting the Union market; hence EU institutions were expected to 
conduct non-attribution analysis in this regard. 
As both grant of GSP status to Pakistan and withdrawal of previously imposed 
AD duty on Pakistan originated from EU institutions, therefore it could not be 
argued that it could not affect the conduct of the Union market. Instead, the 
consequences of preferential tariff access to Pakistan were already known by the 
EU Commission, that it will significantly help to increase trade flow from 
Pakistan. However, concluding it could be argued that the generality and vague 
scope of Article 3(7) leads to the multiple interpretations drawn by the 
institutions. Thus it is recommended that it should provide a comprehensive list of 
other known factors which need to be considered during causal link analysis. 
7.3 LIMITATIONS OF THIS RESEARCH 
In order to analyse the considerations of the member states for their specific 
voting trends for or against the imposition of the duty on Pakistan, requests for 
access to data were sent to 28 member states (as Croatia joined in 2013). 
However, access was given by only two member states; six member states 
declined the request, citing confidentiality of information, while others did not 
reply. The outcome would have been more trustworthy if at least half of the 
member states had replied, but there was no alternative source to get the same 
information. It does not, however, affect the health of this project, as 
overwhelmingly it relies upon analysis of the Commission’s investigations as 
provided by its regulations and dictum of judges as mentioned in judgements of 
the Courts. 
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Secondly, before transfer stage the researcher travelled to Pakistan to evaluate the 
situation at ground by interviewing government officials of Pakistan and 
representatives of the textile industry of Pakistan. The researcher decided not to 
use them in the thesis, as the data generated from these interviews lacks in terms 
of quality and relevance.  
Thirdly, it involves a lot of expense to interview all the stakeholders including 
European importers, exporters, associations representing European importers and 
exporters, Pakistani manufacturers, EU Commission representatives, and AD law 
experts based in Brussels. It does not, however, affect the viability of this project, 
as the Council’s and Commission’s notices, regulations, decisions, corrigenda and 
judgements of the General Court and EU Court of Justice significantly helped to 
evaluate the consistency of EU institutions to implement and interpret their AD 
law in relation to Pakistan, as well as the voting patterns obtained from the 
institutions. 
7.4  FUTURE PROSPECTS OF THE RESEARCH 
The EU’s application of its safeguard measures with respect to Pakistan is an area 
which has been rarely explored before; hence it offers multi-dimensional key 
areas which could be further studied. The researcher, however, intends to study 
the effectiveness of EU institutions about their application of anti-subsidy 
measures against Pakistan in future. Similarly, the application of AD and/or anti-
subsidy laws by Pakistan against European exporters may also be a good area to 
be explored. Comparative analysis of the EU’s and Pakistan’s AD laws may be 
conducted, to evaluate their conformity with the WTO agreement.  
Moreover, the application of their safeguard measures by other south Asian 
economies (Bangladesh and India) against imports from EU or vice versa also 
calls for significant attention. Another possible projection for future research may 
be to investigate the co-relation between the geographical existence of Union 
industry and the voting trends of the concerned states for adoption or termination 
of Commission’s proposal to adopt definitive measures. Similarly, the influence 
of gigantic member states (having numerous voting rights) and of small member 
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states (having few voting rights in the Council) on decisions of the Council to 
adopt or terminate the Commission’s proposal can also be viable area to examine.  
7.5  CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
This dissertation was aimed to observe the consistency of EU institutions in 
implementation of their AD law with respect to Pakistan. An in-depth analysis of 
all investigations conducted by the EU Commission regarding alleged dumped 
imports from Pakistan was done by the researcher. This dissertation, however, 
figured out many occasions where AD procedures were lacking consistency and 
clarity.  
One of the key examples is the practice of ‘zeroing’ as carried out by the EU in 
respect of investigations about alleged dumped imports of cotton-type bed linen 
from Pakistan and India, which was later declared by the General Court to be out 
of the scope of the basic regulation, or initiation of investigation by the 
Commission (Commission regulation (EC) 1470/2001)1 despite the fact that the 
complaint was not being supported by 50% of the Union producers of the product 
concerned. Similarly, calculation of weighted average dumping margin while 
excluding de minimis dumping margin, comparability of the like product and 
product concerned, causal link, calculation of normal value and the community 
interest test are other areas where the Commission was found to be acting 
inconsistently.  
With respect to Community interest, it is found that the interest of the Union’s 
producers mostly prevails over the interest of importers or consumers. One of the 
possible reasons may be that the Union exporters are associated, thus in a better 
position to safeguard their interest, while the importers’ and consumers’ interest is 
found to be vulnerable as they are separate.  
                                                            
1 Council Regulation (EC) No 1470/2001 of 16 July 2001 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty 
and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of integrated electronic 
compact fluorescent lamps (CFL-i) originating in the People's Republic of China [2001] OJ L 
195/8 
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The European Courts are found to show restraint in AD disputes, as on many 
occasions the Courts reiterated that, due to the complex economic and commercial 
observations involved, the institutions have wide discretion to decide according to 
varying circumstances of the case; the Court’s jurisdiction is however; restricted 
to analysing whether institutions are acting upon the express provisions of the 
basic regulation. The EU Courts have commonly used the phrase ‘complex 
economic and commercial calculations’; however, they have rarely defined it. It 
seems that sometimes they plainly decline the reviewability of institutions’ actions 
without assessing the actual nature of the calculations involved.  
Although this phrase has widespread application in the EU’s case law; appraisals 
of ‘complex economic assessments’ is not required in the majority of cases. 
Mostly the issues are not related to the erroneous calculations of the investigative 
authority; instead, it is about the fair interpretation and application of relevant 
provisions of the basic regulation, where they are unclear. Although the EU 
Courts have acknowledged wide discretion of the administrative institutions, it is 
not clear where the courts draw a line between reviewable and non-reviewable 
matter. Even if such a criterion is established their application is found to be 
arbitrary. 
The conduct of the courts, as established by their decisions, reveals that where the 
EU Courts are fluent in their review of procedural issues, they are reluctant in 
substantial issues. However, analysis of investigations as discussed in this thesis 
reveals that, in AD cases, these are only substantial issues which are mostly the 
bone of contention among interested parties.  
However, procedural matters are comparatively rarely found to be challenged. In 
the case of ADDs imposed on Pakistan, controversies revolved around purely 
substantive issues: e.g. calculation of constructed normal value, causal link, Union 
industry and zeroing etc. However, apart from the use of ‘zeroing’, the EU Courts 
have reviewed the actions of the investigative authorities when they are 
challenged by aggrieved parties, although at various occasions within those 
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reviews the courts limited the scope of review. In the case of ‘zeroing’, however, 
the EU Courts moved only after the WTO Appellate Panels’ decision.      
It is also found that on many occasions the General Court and EU Court of Justice 
interpreted the provisions of the basic regulation differently. For example the 
interpretation of other known factors as made in Gul Ahmed v Council, and 
similarly the interpretation of Union industry (50% supporting initiation of 
investigation) as made in Case T- 469/07. 
The brief overview of cases as discussed in Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 reveals that 
comparatively, the findings of the General Court are found to be steadier. On the 
other hand, sometimes the judgements of the EU Court of Justice are found to be 
debatable, as in Case C-638/11 (about other known factors) and Case C-76/01 
(about statement of reasons for failure to adopt the Commission’s proposal due to 
lack of a simple majority in the Council). In the view of this author, it is also 
established that the EU Courts, by their judgements and interpretations, rendered 
powers to the investigative institutions which were not provided by the basic 
regulation. 
Overall analysis of all investigations conducted related to Pakistan reveal a mixed 
trend. Some investigations are found to be totally consistent with the concerned 
provisions of the basic regulation. However, sometimes the findings of the 
Commission are found to be inconsistent with the observations of the Council, or 
in some cases the findings of both Council and Commission are found to be 
inconsistent with the case law (i.e., the judicial verdict).  
The researcher, however, has established that a few ambiguous provisions of the 
basic regulation (for example the interpretation of Article 3(7) as discussed in 
Case T-199/04) tend to offer inconsistent interpretations and meanings drawn by 
the institutions. Furthermore, analysis of a few investigations of the Commission 
and judgements of the EU Court of Justice revealed a few instances whereby the 
EU institutions were found to be acting totally against the letter and spirit of the 
applicable provisions of the basic regulation.  
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Concluding, it could be established that the efficacy of EU AD law is mostly 
jeopardised due to the inconsistent interpretations (of the provisions of the basic 
regulation) drawn by the institutions (Commission, Council and Judicature), while 
in some cases they are found to be acting beyond the express provisions of the law 
(for example zeroing). The effective implementation of the basic regulation could 
however be assured by eliminating its ambiguous provisions, and by incorporating 
active judicial review of the investigations. 
But it can be presumed that the wide discretionary and ambiguous provisions of 
the basic regulation, the WTO Agreement or other national AD frameworks are 
incorporated on purpose. As it has been argued before that use of AD measures is 
more politically oriented as compared to competition oriented. Therefore, these 
ambiguous provisions help the investigative bodies to manoeuvre their application 
as the circumstances of each case require. It is important to note that today AD 
Statutes are being used strategically by the majority of WTO members.  
Another reason for the inconsistent conclusions drawn by the Commission and the 
Council related to the need of imposition of AD measures could be the difference 
of institution’s capacity, scope and policy making. The Commission purely being 
the administrative institution has been favouring more rigorously the imposition 
of ADD; as in comparison to the Council it has been calculating the higher 
dumping margins for the exporters. It is comprised of 28 commissioners, one from 
each member state who is supposed to look at their own interest through the lens 
of Union interest. Therefore, unlike the Council, the Commission used to draw 
conclusions based upon the significant technical details.   
The Council of the European Union unlike the Commission is not an 
administrative institution instead; it is more political forum where the will of the 
European Union speaks through simple majority or qualified majority. The 
decisions of the Council are more vulnerable to the national interests of the 
member states as compared to the Commission. Although it is found that different 
stakeholders especially the Union manufacturers can influence the decision 
making process of both institutions but it is more frequent and systematic in case 
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of the Council. However as far as judicature is concerned, the frequent 
inconsistency in their judgements is unexplained as unlike the Commission and 
the Council both the general court and the EU Court of Justice have shared 
judicial policy, i.e., the interpretation of the questioned provision of the basic 
regulation. 
It is established that AD duties are not always applied on economic grounds; 
instead they sometimes also originate from political and strategic motives. The 
majority of the fair application issues raised in this thesis are not confined to the 
basic regulation, but extend to the WTO Agreement as well, as the basic 
regulation derives its authority from the international framework. However, 
sometimes the national AD frameworks evolve some powers which were not 
granted by the WTO Agreement, e.g. ‘zeroing’. Therefore, the issues related to the 
EU AD law can be classified in three categories: one expressly originating from 
the WTO Agreement; the second evolving due to diverging interpretations of the 
WTO Agreement thanks to its vague provisions, and the third expressly evolved 
by national AD frameworks without a basis in the international rules. 
Therefore, in order to address issues related to the fair and consistent use of the 
EU AD law, the text of both the basic regulation and the WTO Agreement need to 
be tightened. Those provisions which allow the investigative bodies to manoeuvre 
the scope of an AD investigation should be reviewed. It is found that institutions 
enjoy wide discretion in defining ‘product concerned’ and ‘like product’. The 
other controversial areas which have been usually subject to judicial review 
include: calculation of constructed normal value, calculation of average SG&A 
costs and reasonable profit margin.  
The definition of Union industry is also problematic, as the institutions have 
defined it in various ways in different investigations. Similarly, it is argued that 
the EU Commission’s assessment of ‘fair comparison’, and adjustments to normal 
value and export price, are also arbitrary.  
Similarly, the Commission widely uses its discretion in terms of calculation of 
dumping margin, community interest, in the ordinary course of trade test, 
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sampling and non-attribution analysis. These discretionary powers, however, were 
found to be mostly used in favour of the Union and rarely in favour of foreign 
exporters. This dissertation, however, establishes that although unrestricted 
powers are necessary for the institutions in some circumstances, extensive use of 
discretionary powers challenges the uniformity and consistent use of safeguard 
measures. 
Keeping in view the international perspective and practices related to imposition 
of ADDs, it could not be established that the EU is inconsistent in its application 
of safeguard measures related to Pakistan. Also, it could not be claimed that the 
EU put Pakistan at a comparative disadvantage as compared to other similar 
developing economies. Conversely, it could be established that the application of 
AD measures are now imposed with mixed economic, competitive and strategic 
objectives as opposed to pure economic motives. Thus it is not the EU to be 
singled out from the international framework and blamed for its inconsistencies.  
In respect of the retaliation approach, some researchers have found it one of the 
important reasons for the imposition of measures. Pakistan may also have used 
and imposed AD measures on the EU’s imports without an economic rationale, 
for example, in response to 13 AD investigations initiated by the EU against 
Pakistan, Pakistan also initiated 10 AD investigations against the EU. In a larger 
context, the EU’s AD practices are also less questionable when one consumes the 
lesser extent to which the EU makes use of the AD mechanism. In comparison to 
the size of the market, the EU has been an infrequent user of safeguard measures 
as compared to other similarly sized markets, e.g. the USA and the India.   
The second research question of this thesis aimed to analyse the rationale of 
member states for their specific voting decision in the Council. It is established 
that trade partner allegiance is not found to be the motivation for specific voting 
trends of the EU member states. Their voting styles, however, were found to be 
connected with their consent to or dissent with the findings of the Commission. 
Sometimes the member states are found to be unconvinced by the calculation of 
material injury caused to the Union industry, likewise they also found to be 
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challenging the non-attribution analysis (segregating injury caused by other 
known factors from injury caused by alleged dumped imports) as conducted by 
the Commission.  
The most common and noteworthy reason to vote ‘NO’ to the Commission’s 
proposal to adopt definitive measures is found to be varying Community (Union) 
interest calculation by the Commission and the member states. The two member 
states, however, were found to have contrasting reasons for arguing that 
imposition of measures will cause unreasonable expense for buyers. The 
geographical presence of Union industry complaining about suspected dumped 
imports is also an important conclusive factor for the voting of member states. As 
the Union’s textile industry is concentrated in Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal; 
therefore it has been noted that the aforementioned member states have been 
supporting AD measures on imports of cotton-type bed linen originating from 
Pakistan. The other member states however, showed mixed trend.  
It was found that two groups of member states within the European Union had 
consistently differing styles of voting. The member states like the UK, the 
Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and Finland have been mostly opposing the 
application of safeguard measures against Pakistan. However, the other group of 
member states, which is relatively large and mostly led by France, Germany, 
Spain and Italy, is found to be supporting the imposition of measures. An almost 
similar style of voting in these two groups has been found through voting on all 
the Commission’s proposals for adoption of definitive measures, starting from 
1996. 
A diversified tendency was found about the effect of imposition of duties on 
course of imports from Pakistan. Occasionally the imports of concerned products 
are found to be growing over the duty period, though the proportion of surge is 
noted to be minimal. In the bulk of cases it is established that imposition of duty 
held down the level of imports at a persistent point (the import size is found to be 
same as it was five years before). Nevertheless, in some cases it is found that the 
imposition of AD duty considerably depreciated the scale of imports from 
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Pakistan to the EU. Therefore, it could be proclaimed that imposition of AD duty 
on imports of concerned goods originating from Pakistan has generally affected 
the scale of imports from Pakistan, although, there are some exemptions. 
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APPENDIX I: LETTERS WRITTEN TO THE EU COMMISSION 
FOR ACCESS TO THE VOTING TRENDS OF MEMBER STATES 
 
01 April 2015 
The Secretariat-General 
European Commission 
Unit SG/B/2 "Openness, access to documents, relations with civil society" 
B-1049 Brussels 
Belgium 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
Re: Request under Regulation 1049/2001 of 30 May 2001 for access to documents relating to 
EU Council’s voting patterns in respect of following unsuccessful proposals of EU 
Commission (bearing lack of simple majority in the Council) to adopt definitive AD duty 
against Pakistan 
Please could you supply me with any background documents pertaining to the EU members voting 
trends through following mentioned EU Commission’s proposals for adoption of definitive AD 
measures? 
• Council Regulation (EC) No 397/2004 of 2 March 2004 imposing a definitive anti-dumping 
duty on imports of cotton-type bed linen originating in Pakistan  
• (EC) No 695/2006 of 5 May 2006 amending Regulation (EC) No 397/2004 imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of cotton-type bed linen originating in Pakistan  
• Council Regulation (EC) No 2398/97 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of 
cotton-type bed linen originating in Egypt, India and Pakistan 
• Council Regulation (EC) No 160/2002 of 28 January 2002 amending Council Regulation (EC) 
No 2398/97 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of cotton-type bed linen 
originating in Egypt, India and Pakistan, and terminating the proceeding with regard to 
imports originating in Pakistan  
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• Council Regulation (EC) No 1205/2007 of 15 October 2007 imposing anti-dumping duties on 
imports of integrated electronic compact fluorescent lamps (CFL-i) originating in the People’s 
Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Council Regulation 
(EC) No 384/96 and extending to imports of the same product consigned from the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Republic of the Philippines  
• Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/2004 of 13 August 2004 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of 
polyethylene terephthalate originating in Australia, the People's Republic of China and 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of polyethylene terephthalate 
originating in Pakistan and releasing the amounts secured by way of the provisional duties 
imposed 
• Council Regulation (EC) No 866/2005 of 6 June 2005 extending the definitive anti-dumping 
measures imposed by Regulation (EC) No 1470/2001 on imports of integrated electronic 
compact fluorescent lamps (CFL-i) originating in the People’s Republic of China to imports 
of the same product consigned from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the Islamic Republic 
of Pakistan and the Republic of the Philippines  
Documents in English are preferable; please send them to me at my email address 
bilalyzm@yahoo.com  
Please do not hesitate to contact me if you need any further specificity with regard to the search. 
Thanking you in advance for your kind assistance. 
Yours faithfully, 
Muhammad Bilal 
PhD Student 
University of Bedfordshire 
Luton, UK 
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15 October 2015 
The Secretariat-General 
European Commission 
Unit SG/B/2 "Openness, access to documents, relations with civil society" 
B-1049 Brussels 
Belgium 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
Re: Request under Regulation 1049/2001 of 30 May 2001 for access to documents relating to 
EU Council’s voting patterns in respect of following unsuccessful proposals of EU 
Commission (bearing lack of simple majority in the Council) to adopt definitive AD duty 
against Pakistan 
Please could you supply me with any background documents pertaining to the EU members voting 
trends through dismissal of the below mentioned EU Commission’s proposals for adoption of 
definitive AD measures? 
• Lapse of Commission’s proposal to adopt definitive AD duty after imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on imports of certain unbleached cotton fabrics originating in the People's 
Republic of China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and Turkey through Commission 
regulation (EC) No 773/98 of 7 April 1998 
• Lapse of Commission’s proposal to adopt definitive AD duty after imposing a provisional 
anti-dumping duty on imports of unbleached (grey) cotton fabrics originating in the People's 
Republic of China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and Turkey through Commission 
Regulation (EC) 2208/96 of 18 November 1996. 
Documents in English are preferable; please send them to me at my email address 
bilalyzm@yahoo.com  
Please do not hesitate to contact me if you need any further specificity with regard to the search. 
Thanking you in advance for your kind assistance. 
Yours faithfully, 
Muhammad Bilal 
PhD Student 
University of Bedfordshire, Luton UK 
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18 October 2015 
The Secretariat-General 
European Commission 
Unit SG/B/2 "Openness, access to documents, relations with civil society" 
B-1049 Brussels 
Belgium 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
Re: Request under Regulation 1049/2001 of 30 May 2001 for access to documents relating to 
EU Council’s voting patterns in respect of adoption of following Council Regulation 
I am very sorry to bother you again. With reference to my previous email dated 15th Oct could you 
also please supply me with any background documents pertaining to the EU members voting 
trends through adoption of definitive AD measures through following Regulation? 
• Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/2004 of 13 August 2004 imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of 
polyethylene terephthalate originating in Australia, the People's Republic of China and 
terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of polyethylene terephthalate 
originating in Pakistan and releasing the amounts secured by way of the provisional duties 
imposed. 
Documents in English are preferable; please send them to me at my email address 
bilalyzm@yahoo.com 
Please do not hesitate to contact me if you need any further specificity with regard to the search. 
Thanking you in advance for your kind assistance. 
Yours faithfully, 
 
Muhammad Bilal 
PhD Student 
University of Bedfordshire 
Luton, UK 
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APPENDIX III:  REQUEST (AND SAMPLE OF ITS REPLY) FOR 
ACCESS TO REASONS FOR PARTICULAR VOTING PATTERNS 
OF SWEDEN 
 
19 September 2015 
Permanent Representation of Sweden 
Square de Meeûs 30/De Meeûssquare 30 
1000 Bruxelles/Brussel 
Belgique 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
Re: Request for access to documents relating to the reasons for Sweden’s specific voting 
patterns (Yes/No) for adoption/termination of Anti-Dumping measures on Pakistan through 
the following Council Regulations 
I am a Doctoral research student working on “An enquiry into EU Anti-Dumping law with 
particular reference to Pakistan: How effectively do the EU Institutions implement and interpret 
their AD Regime?” 
Could you please supply me with any background information pertaining to the particular voting 
patterns of Sweden through the voting processes leading to the adoption of the following Council 
Regulations? I am specifically interested to know the reasons and factors responsible for specific 
voting decisions of Sweden, either Yes or No, as stated in parentheses following the title of each 
measure.  
• Closure of the written procedure for the adoption of a Council Regulation imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on 
imports of polyethylene terephthalate originating in Australia, the People's Republic of China 
and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of polyethylene 
terephthalate originating in Pakistan and releasing the amounts secured by way of the 
provisional duties imposed. (Sweden voted Yes) 
• Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) 2398/97 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
imports of cotton-type bed linen originating in Egypt, India and Pakistan (No) 
• Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) 160/2002 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 
2398/97 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of cotton-type bed linen 
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originating in Egypt, India and Pakistan, and terminating the proceeding with regard to 
imports originating in Pakistan (Yes) 
• Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) 397/2004 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
imports of cotton-type bed linen originating in Pakistan  (No) 
• Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) 695/2006 amending Regulation (EC) No 397/2004 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of cotton-type bed linen originating in 
Pakistan  (Yes) 
• Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) 866/2005 (Document 9017/05) extending the 
definitive anti-dumping measures imposed by Council Regulation (EC) No 1470/2001 on 
imports of integrated electronic compact fluorescent lamps (CFL-i) originating in the People's 
Republic of China to imports of the same product consigned from the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Republic of the Philippines (Yes)  
• Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) 1205/2007 imposing anti-dumping duties on imports 
of integrated electronic compact fluorescent lamps (CFL-i) originating in the People's 
Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Council Regulation 
(EC) No 384/96 and extending to imports of the same product consigned from the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Republic of the Philippines 
(Rejected) 
Your kind response, and any pertinent documents, may be sent as an attachment/scanned to my 
email address Muhammad.Bilal@beds.ac.uk or if you prefer to send them through the post, please 
send them to 126 Strathmore Avenue, LU1 3QN, Luton, UK. 
Any information received will be used purely for my doctoral research.  All information collected 
as part of this research study will be retained for two years following submission of my doctoral 
thesis, and then destroyed.  It will be stored on a USB memory stick/ flash drive, kept under lock 
and key in the Law Office, University of Bedfordshire (UK). 
If you so request, I am happy to mask the identity of your country when utilizing the data which 
you have supplied.  In this case, I would simply refer to “one of the Member States voting yes” or 
“one of the Member States voting no”, and so on. 
Please do not hesitate to contact me if you need any further specificity with regard to the research. 
Thanking you in advance for your kind assistance. 
 
Yours faithfully, 
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Muhammad Bilal 
PhD Research Student  
University of Bedfordshire 
Luton, United Kingdom 
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APPENDIX IV: REQUEST (AND ITS REPLY) FOR ACCESS TO 
REASONS FOR PARTICULAR VOTING PATTERNS OF 
DENMARK 
 
02 September 2015 
 
Permanent Representation of Denmark 
Rue d'Arlon 73/Aarlenstraat 73  
1040 Bruxelles/Brussel  
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
Re: Request for access to documents relating to the reasons for Denmark’s specific voting 
patterns (Yes/No) for adoption/termination of Anti-Dumping measures on Pakistan through 
the following Council Regulations 
  
I am a Doctoral research student working on “An enquiry into EU Anti-Dumping law with 
particular reference to Pakistan: How effectively do the EU Institutions implement and interpret 
their AD Regime?” 
Could you please supply me with any background information pertaining to the particular voting 
patterns of Denmark through the voting processes leading to the adoption of the following Council 
Regulations? I am specifically interested to know the reasons and factors responsible for specific 
voting decisions of Denmark, either Yes or No, as stated in parentheses following the title of each 
measure.  
• Closure of the written procedure for the adoption of a Council Regulation imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on 
imports of polyethylene terephthalate originating in Australia, the People's Republic of China 
and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of polyethylene 
terephthalate originating in Pakistan and releasing the amounts secured by way of the 
provisional duties imposed. (Denmark voted Yes) 
• Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) 2398/97 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
imports of cotton-type bed linen originating in Egypt, India and Pakistan (Yes) 
• Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) 160/2002 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 
2398/97 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of cotton-type bed linen 
originating in Egypt, India and Pakistan, and terminating the proceeding with regard to 
imports originating in Pakistan (Denmark voted Yes) 
• Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) 397/2004 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
imports of cotton-type bed linen originating in Pakistan  (No) 
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• Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) 695/2006 amending Regulation (EC) No 397/2004 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of cotton-type bed linen originating in 
Pakistan  (Yes) 
• Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) 866/2005 (Document 9017/05) extending the 
definitive anti-dumping measures imposed by Council Regulation (EC) No 1470/2001 on 
imports of integrated electronic compact fluorescent lamps (CFL-i) originating in the People's 
Republic of China to imports of the same product consigned from the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Republic of the Philippines (Yes)  
• Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) 1205/2007 imposing anti-dumping duties on imports 
of integrated electronic compact fluorescent lamps (CFL-i) originating in the People's 
Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Council Regulation 
(EC) No 384/96 and extending to imports of the same product consigned from the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Republic of the Philippines 
(Denmark Rejected Proposal) 
 
Your kind response, and any pertinent documents, may be sent as an attachment/scanned to my 
email address Muhammad.Bilal@beds.ac.uk or if you prefer to send them through the post, please 
send them to 126 Strathmore Avenue, LU1 3QN, Luton, UK. 
Any information received will be used purely for my doctoral research.  All information collected 
as part of this research study will be retained for two years following submission of my doctoral 
thesis, and then destroyed.  It will be stored on a USB memory stick/ flash drive, kept under lock 
and key in the Law Office, University of Bedfordshire (UK). 
If you so request, I am happy to mask the identity of your country when utilizing the data which 
you have supplied.  In this case, I would simply refer to “one of the Member States voting yes” or 
“one of the Member States voting no”, and so on. 
Please do not hesitate to contact me if you need any further specificity with regard to the research. 
Thanking you in advance for your kind assistance. 
 
Yours faithfully, 
 
Muhammad Bilal 
PhD Research Student  
University of Bedfordshire 
Luton, United Kingdom 
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APPENDIX V: REQUESTS (ALONG WITH THEIR REPLYS) SENT 
TO SOME OTHER MEMBER STATES WHICH WAS DECLINED 
DUE TO THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF DOCUMENTS  
 
02 September 2015 
 
Permanent Representation of Austria 
Avenue de Cortenbergh 30/Kortenberglaan 30  
1040 Bruxelles/Brussel  
Belgique  
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
Re: Request for access to documents relating to the reasons for Austria’s specific voting 
patterns (Yes/No) for adoption/termination of Anti-Dumping measures on Pakistan through 
the following Council Regulations 
I am a Doctoral research student working on “An enquiry into EU Anti-Dumping law with 
particular reference to Pakistan: How effectively do the EU Institutions implement and interpret 
their AD Regime?” 
Could you please supply me with any background information pertaining to the particular voting 
patterns of Austria through the voting processes leading to the adoption of the following Council 
Regulations? I am specifically interested to know the reasons and factors responsible for specific 
voting decisions of Austria, either Yes or No, as stated in parentheses following the title of each 
measure.  
• Closure of the written procedure for the adoption of a Council Regulation imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on 
imports of polyethylene terephthalate originating in Australia, the People's Republic of China 
and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of polyethylene 
terephthalate originating in Pakistan and releasing the amounts secured by way of the 
provisional duties imposed. (Austria Abstained) 
• Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) 2398/97 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
imports of cotton-type bed linen originating in Egypt, India and Pakistan (Yes) 
• Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) 160/2002 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 
2398/97 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of cotton-type bed linen 
originating in Egypt, India and Pakistan, and terminating the proceeding with regard to 
imports originating in Pakistan (Yes) 
• Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) 397/2004 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
imports of cotton-type bed linen originating in Pakistan  (Yes) 
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• Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) 695/2006 amending Regulation (EC) No 397/2004 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of cotton-type bed linen originating in 
Pakistan  (Yes) 
• Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) 866/2005 (Document 9017/05) extending the 
definitive anti-dumping measures imposed by Council Regulation (EC) No 1470/2001 on 
imports of integrated electronic compact fluorescent lamps (CFL-i) originating in the People's 
Republic of China to imports of the same product consigned from the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Republic of the Philippines (Yes)  
• Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) 1205/2007 imposing anti-dumping duties on imports 
of integrated electronic compact fluorescent lamps (CFL-i) originating in the People's 
Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Council Regulation 
(EC) No 384/96 and extending to imports of the same product consigned from the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Republic of the Philippines 
(Abstained) 
 
Your kind response, and any pertinent documents, may be sent as an attachment/scanned to my 
email address Muhammad.Bilal@beds.ac.uk or if you prefer to send them through the post, please 
send them to 126 Strathmore Avenue, LU1 3QN, Luton, UK. 
Any information received will be used purely for my doctoral research.  All information collected 
as part of this research study will be retained for two years following submission of my doctoral 
thesis, and then destroyed.  It will be stored on a USB memory stick/ flash drive, kept under lock 
and key in the Law Office, University of Bedfordshire (UK). 
If you so request, I am happy to mask the identity of your country when utilizing the data which 
you have supplied.  In this case, I would simply refer to “one of the Member States voting yes” or 
“one of the Member States voting no”, and so on. 
Please do not hesitate to contact me if you need any further specificity with regard to the research. 
Thanking you in advance for your kind assistance. 
 
Yours faithfully, 
 
Muhammad Bilal 
PhD Research Student  
University of Bedfordshire 
Luton, United Kingdom 
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02 September 2015 
 
Permanent Representation of Bulgaria 
Square Marie-Louise 49/Maria-Louizasquare 49  
1000 Bruxelles/Brussel  
Belgique 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
Re: Request for access to documents relating to the reasons for Bulgaria’s specific voting 
patterns (Yes/No) for adoption/termination of Anti-Dumping measures on Pakistan through 
the following Council Regulations 
I am a Doctoral research student working on “An enquiry into EU Anti-Dumping law with 
particular reference to Pakistan: How effectively do the EU Institutions implement and interpret 
their AD Regime?” 
Could you please supply me with any background information pertaining to the particular voting 
patterns of Bulgaria through the voting processes leading to the adoption of the following Council 
Regulations? I am specifically interested to know the reasons and factors responsible for specific 
voting decisions of Bulgaria, either Yes or No, as stated in parentheses following the title of each 
measure.  
• Closure of the written procedure for the adoption of a Council Regulation imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on 
imports of polyethylene terephthalate originating in Australia, the People's Republic of China 
and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of polyethylene 
terephthalate originating in Pakistan and releasing the amounts secured by way of the 
provisional duties imposed. (Bulgaria voted Yes) 
• Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) 1205/2007 imposing anti-dumping duties on imports 
of integrated electronic compact fluorescent lamps (CFL-i) originating in the People's 
Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Council Regulation 
(EC) No 384/96 and extending to imports of the same product consigned from the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Republic of the Philippines 
(Bulgaria Abstained) 
 
Your kind response, and any pertinent documents, may be sent as an attachment/scanned to my 
email address Muhammad.Bilal@beds.ac.uk or if you prefer to send them through the post, please 
send them to 126 Strathmore Avenue, LU1 3QN, Luton, UK. 
Any information received will be used purely for my doctoral research.  All information collected 
as part of this research study will be retained for two years following submission of my doctoral 
thesis, and then destroyed.  It will be stored on a USB memory stick/ flash drive, kept under lock 
and key in the Law Office, University of Bedfordshire (UK). 
If you so request, I am happy to mask the identity of your country when utilizing the data which 
you have supplied.  In this case, I would simply refer to “one of the Member States voting yes” or 
“one of the Member States voting no”, and so on. 
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Please do not hesitate to contact me if you need any further specificity with regard to the research. 
Thanking you in advance for your kind assistance. 
 
Yours faithfully, 
 
Muhammad Bilal 
PhD Research Student  
University of Bedfordshire 
Luton, United Kingdom 
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02 September 2015 
 
Permanent Representation of Luxembourg 
Avenue de Cortenbergh 75/Kortenberglaan 75  
1000 Bruxelles/Brussel  
Belgique 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
Re: Request for access to documents relating to the reasons for Luxembourg’s specific voting 
patterns (Yes/No) for adoption/termination of Anti-Dumping measures on Pakistan through 
the following Council Regulations 
I am a Doctoral research student working on “An enquiry into EU Anti-Dumping law with 
particular reference to Pakistan: How effectively do the EU Institutions implement and interpret 
their AD Regime?” 
Could you please supply me with any background information pertaining to the particular voting 
patterns of Luxembourg through the voting processes leading to the adoption of the following 
Council Regulations? I am specifically interested to know the reasons and factors responsible for 
specific voting decisions of Luxembourg, either Yes or No, as stated in parentheses following the 
title of each measure.  
• Closure of the written procedure for the adoption of a Council Regulation imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on 
imports of polyethylene terephthalate originating in Australia, the People's Republic of China 
and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of polyethylene 
terephthalate originating in Pakistan and releasing the amounts secured by way of the 
provisional duties imposed. (Luxembourg voted Yes) 
• Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) 2398/97 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
imports of cotton-type bed linen originating in Egypt, India and Pakistan (Yes) 
• Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) 160/2002 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 
2398/97 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of cotton-type bed linen 
originating in Egypt, India and Pakistan, and terminating the proceeding with regard to 
imports originating in Pakistan (Yes) 
• Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) 397/2004 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
imports of cotton-type bed linen originating in Pakistan  (Yes) 
• Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) 695/2006 amending Regulation (EC) No 397/2004 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of cotton-type bed linen originating in 
Pakistan  (Yes) 
• Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) 866/2005 (Document 9017/05) extending the 
definitive anti-dumping measures imposed by Council Regulation (EC) No 1470/2001 on 
imports of integrated electronic compact fluorescent lamps (CFL-i) originating in the People's 
Republic of China to imports of the same product consigned from the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Republic of the Philippines (Yes)  
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• Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) 1205/2007 imposing anti-dumping duties on imports 
of integrated electronic compact fluorescent lamps (CFL-i) originating in the People's 
Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Council Regulation 
(EC) No 384/96 and extending to imports of the same product consigned from the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Republic of the Philippines 
(Abstained) 
 
Your kind response, and any pertinent documents, may be sent as an attachment/scanned to my 
email address Muhammad.Bilal@beds.ac.uk or if you prefer to send them through the post, please 
send them to 126 Strathmore Avenue, LU1 3QN, Luton, UK. 
Any information received will be used purely for my doctoral research.  All information collected 
as part of this research study will be retained for two years following submission of my doctoral 
thesis, and then destroyed.  It will be stored on a USB memory stick/ flash drive, kept under lock 
and key in the Law Office, University of Bedfordshire (UK). 
If you so request, I am happy to mask the identity of your country when utilizing the data which 
you have supplied.  In this case, I would simply refer to “one of the Member States voting yes” or 
“one of the Member States voting no”, and so on. 
Please do not hesitate to contact me if you need any further specificity with regard to the research. 
Thanking you in advance for your kind assistance. 
 
Yours faithfully, 
 
Muhammad Bilal 
PhD Research Student  
University of Bedfordshire 
Luton, United Kingdom 
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02 September 2015 
 
Permanent Representation of Malta 
Rue Archimède 25/Archimedesstraat 25 
1000 Bruxelles/Brussel 
Belgique 
  
Dear Sir/Madam, 
Re: Request for access to documents relating to the reasons for Malta’s specific voting 
patterns (Yes/No) for adoption/termination of Anti-Dumping measures on Pakistan through 
the following Council Regulations 
I am a Doctoral research student working on “An enquiry into EU Anti-Dumping law with 
particular reference to Pakistan: How effectively do the EU Institutions implement and interpret 
their AD Regime?” 
Could you please supply me with any background information pertaining to the particular voting 
patterns of Malta through the voting processes leading to the adoption of the following Council 
Regulations? I am specifically interested to know the reasons and factors responsible for specific 
voting decisions of Malta, either Yes or No, as stated in parentheses following the title of each 
measure.  
• Closure of the written procedure for the adoption of a Council Regulation imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on 
imports of polyethylene terephthalate originating in Australia, the People's Republic of China 
and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of polyethylene 
terephthalate originating in Pakistan and releasing the amounts secured by way of the 
provisional duties imposed. (Malta voted Yes) 
• Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) 695/2006 amending Regulation (EC) No 397/2004 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of cotton-type bed linen originating in 
Pakistan  (Yes) 
• Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) 866/2005 (Document 9017/05) extending the 
definitive anti-dumping measures imposed by Council Regulation (EC) No 1470/2001 on 
imports of integrated electronic compact fluorescent lamps (CFL-i) originating in the People's 
Republic of China to imports of the same product consigned from the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Republic of the Philippines (Yes)  
• Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) 1205/2007 imposing anti-dumping duties on imports 
of integrated electronic compact fluorescent lamps (CFL-i) originating in the People's 
Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Council Regulation 
(EC) No 384/96 and extending to imports of the same product consigned from the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Republic of the Philippines 
(Rejected) 
 
Your kind response, and any pertinent documents, may be sent as an attachment/scanned to my 
email address Muhammad.Bilal@beds.ac.uk or if you prefer to send them through the post, please 
send them to 126 Strathmore Avenue, LU1 3QN, Luton, UK. 
Any information received will be used purely for my doctoral research.  All information collected 
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as part of this research study will be retained for two years following submission of my doctoral 
thesis, and then destroyed.  It will be stored on a USB memory stick/ flash drive, kept under lock 
and key in the Law Office, University of Bedfordshire (UK). 
If you so request, I am happy to mask the identity of your country when utilizing the data which 
you have supplied.  In this case, I would simply refer to “one of the Member States voting yes” or 
“one of the Member States voting no”, and so on. 
Please do not hesitate to contact me if you need any further specificity with regard to the research. 
Thanking you in advance for your kind assistance. 
 
Yours faithfully, 
 
Muhammad Bilal 
PhD Research Student  
University of Bedfordshire 
Luton, United Kingdom 
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02 September 2015 
 
Permanent Representation of the Netherlands 
Avenue de Cortenbergh 4-10/Kortenberglaan 4-10 
1040 Bruxelles/Brussel 
Belgique 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
Re: Request for access to documents relating to the reasons for Netherlands’ specific voting 
patterns (Yes/No) for adoption/termination of Anti-Dumping measures on Pakistan through 
the following Council Regulations 
I am a Doctoral research student working on “An enquiry into EU Anti-Dumping law with 
particular reference to Pakistan: How effectively do the EU Institutions implement and interpret 
their AD Regime?” 
Could you please supply me with any background information pertaining to the particular voting 
patterns of Netherlands through the voting processes leading to the adoption of the following 
Council Regulations? I am specifically interested to know the reasons and factors responsible for 
specific voting decisions of Netherlands, either Yes or No, as stated in parentheses following the 
title of each measure.  
• Closure of the written procedure for the adoption of a Council Regulation imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on 
imports of polyethylene terephthalate originating in Australia, the People's Republic of China 
and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of polyethylene 
terephthalate originating in Pakistan and releasing the amounts secured by way of the 
provisional duties imposed. (Netherlands voted Yes) 
• Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) 2398/97 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
imports of cotton-type bed linen originating in Egypt, India and Pakistan (No) 
• Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) 160/2002 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 
2398/97 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of cotton-type bed linen 
originating in Egypt, India and Pakistan, and terminating the proceeding with regard to 
imports originating in Pakistan (Yes) 
• Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) 397/2004 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
imports of cotton-type bed linen originating in Pakistan  (No) 
• Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) 695/2006 amending Regulation (EC) No 397/2004 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of cotton-type bed linen originating in 
Pakistan  (Yes) 
• Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) 866/2005 (Document 9017/05) extending the 
definitive anti-dumping measures imposed by Council Regulation (EC) No 1470/2001 on 
imports of integrated electronic compact fluorescent lamps (CFL-i) originating in the People's 
Republic of China to imports of the same product consigned from the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Republic of the Philippines (Yes)  
• Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) 1205/2007 imposing anti-dumping duties on imports 
of integrated electronic compact fluorescent lamps (CFL-i) originating in the People's 
Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Council Regulation 
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(EC) No 384/96 and extending to imports of the same product consigned from the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Republic of the Philippines 
(Rejected) 
 
Your kind response, and any pertinent documents, may be sent as an attachment/scanned to my 
email address Muhammad.Bilal@beds.ac.uk or if you prefer to send them through the post, please 
send them to 126 Strathmore Avenue, LU1 3QN, Luton, UK. 
Any information received will be used purely for my doctoral research.  All information collected 
as part of this research study will be retained for two years following submission of my doctoral 
thesis, and then destroyed.  It will be stored on a USB memory stick/ flash drive, kept under lock 
and key in the Law Office, University of Bedfordshire (UK). 
If you so request, I am happy to mask the identity of your country when utilizing the data which 
you have supplied.  In this case, I would simply refer to “one of the Member States voting yes” or 
“one of the Member States voting no”, and so on. 
Please do not hesitate to contact me if you need any further specificity with regard to the research. 
Thanking you in advance for your kind assistance. 
 
Yours faithfully, 
 
Muhammad Bilal 
PhD Research Student  
University of Bedfordshire 
Luton, United Kingdom 
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02 September 2015 
 
Permanent Representation of the United Kingdom 
Avenue d’Auderghem 10/Oudergemslaan 10 
1040 Bruxelles/Brussel 
Belgique  
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
Re: Request for access to documents relating to the reasons for United Kingdom’s specific 
voting patterns (Yes/No) for adoption/termination of Anti-Dumping measures on Pakistan 
through the following Council Regulations 
I am a Doctoral research student working on “An enquiry into EU Anti-Dumping law with 
particular reference to Pakistan: How effectively do the EU Institutions implement and interpret 
their AD Regime?” 
Could you please supply me with any background information pertaining to the particular voting 
patterns of United Kingdom through the voting processes leading to the adoption of the following 
Council Regulations? I am specifically interested to know the reasons and factors responsible for 
specific voting decisions of United Kingdom, either Yes or No, as stated in parentheses following 
the title of each measure.  
• Closure of the written procedure for the adoption of a Council Regulation imposing a 
definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on 
imports of polyethylene terephthalate originating in Australia, the People's Republic of China 
and terminating the anti-dumping proceeding concerning imports of polyethylene 
terephthalate originating in Pakistan and releasing the amounts secured by way of the 
provisional duties imposed. (UK voted Yes) 
• Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) 2398/97 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
imports of cotton-type bed linen originating in Egypt, India and Pakistan (Yes) 
• Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) 160/2002 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 
2398/97 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of cotton-type bed linen 
originating in Egypt, India and Pakistan, and terminating the proceeding with regard to 
imports originating in Pakistan (Yes) 
• Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) 397/2004 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on 
imports of cotton-type bed linen originating in Pakistan  (No) 
• Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) 695/2006 amending Regulation (EC) No 397/2004 
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of cotton-type bed linen originating in 
Pakistan  (Yes) 
• Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) 866/2005 (Document 9017/05) extending the 
definitive anti-dumping measures imposed by Council Regulation (EC) No 1470/2001 on 
imports of integrated electronic compact fluorescent lamps (CFL-i) originating in the People's 
Republic of China to imports of the same product consigned from the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Republic of the Philippines (Yes)  
• Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) 1205/2007 imposing anti-dumping duties on imports 
of integrated electronic compact fluorescent lamps (CFL-i) originating in the People’s 
Republic of China following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Council Regulation 
(EC) No 384/96 and extending to imports of the same product consigned from the Socialist 
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Republic of Vietnam, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Republic of the Philippines 
(Rejected) 
 
Your kind response, and any pertinent documents, may be sent as an attachment/scanned to my 
email address Muhammad.Bilal@beds.ac.uk or if you prefer to send them through the post, please 
send them to 126 Strathmore Avenue, LU1 3QN, Luton, UK. 
Any information received will be used purely for my doctoral research.  All information collected 
as part of this research study will be retained for two years following submission of my doctoral 
thesis, and then destroyed.  It will be stored on a USB memory stick/ flash drive, kept under lock 
and key in the Law Office, University of Bedfordshire (UK). 
If you so request, I am happy to mask the identity of your country when utilizing the data which 
you have supplied.  In this case, I would simply refer to “one of the Member States voting yes” or 
“one of the Member States voting no”, and so on. 
Please do not hesitate to contact me if you need any further specificity with regard to the research. 
Thanking you in advance for your kind assistance. 
 
Yours faithfully, 
 
Muhammad Bilal 
PhD Research Student  
University of Bedfordshire 
Luton, United Kingdom 
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APPENDIX VI: SAMPLE OF IMPORT DATA OF PRODUCTS 
(ORIGINATED FROM PAKISTAN) WHICH HAD BEEN SUBJECT 
TO EUROPEAN AD DUTY674 
 
                                                            
674 Eurostat 
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